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Federal	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 (Fbi)	montored	 the	 poltcal	 dssent	 of	




government	 offcals	 to	 suspect	 the	motves	 of	 legtmate	 ant-nterven-











other	 leadng	 fgures	 n	 the	ant-nterventonst	movement.	Throughout,	
roosevelt	valued	these	reports	and	made	no	complants	about	the	mpro-
prety	or	cvl	lbertes	volatons	of	J.	edgar	hoover’s	actons.
	 it	 was	 durng	 ths	 perod,	 moreover,	 when	 hoover’s	 Fbi	 frst	 used	
ts	 resources	 n	 an	 expansve	 way	 to	montor,	 provde	 ntellgence,	 and	
dscredt	an	admnstraton’s	poltcal	opposton.	but	whle	the	Fbi	exten-















state,	 executed	 whle	 amerca	 advocated	 an	 actvst	 foregn	 polcy	 and	




	 Further	hghlghtng	 the	development	 of	 the	Fbi	 as	 a	natonal	 secu-
rty	apparatus,	datng	from	1940	t	establshed	a	formal	relatonshp	wth	
brtsh	 ntellgence.	lke	hoover	and	roosevelt,	 the	brtsh	had	a	vested	
nterest	 n	 the	 poltcal	 actvtes	 of	 the	 ant-nterventonsts.	 Whereas	









on	 relevant	 documents,	 nevertheless	 t	 s	 clear	 that	 the	 two	mantaned	
close	 tes.	 The	 closeness,	 orgns,	 and	 development	 of	 the	 relatonshp,	





can	be	understood	 f	we	 recognze	 that	 he	dd	not	 yet	 have	 the	 level	 of	






autonomy	 that	 he	 would	 durng	 the	 Cold	 War,	 though	 he	 dd	 have	 a	
greater	 level	 of	 autonomy	 than	 at	 any	 prevous	 tme.	Wthout	 complete	
assurance	 that	 ntrusve	programs	would	never	 be	dscovered,	 and	untl	
hs	poston	as	Fbi	drector	was	frmly	rooted	wth	deologcal	alles	n	the	
Whte	house	or	Congress—somethng	hoover	dd	not	develop	untl	 the	
Cold	War—hoover	 refused	 to	 employ	 such	methods,	 rememberng	 the	
effects	wrought	 on	 the	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 from	 dscovery	 of	 other	
llegal	 tactcs	 employed	 durng	 the	 1919–20	 red	 Scare.	 These	 concerns	
were	 reflected	 n	hoover’s	 repeated	 efforts	 to	 counter	any	 crtcsm	 that	
Fbi	agents	were	nvolved	n	llegal	actvty	and	hs	publc	denals	that	the	
Fbi	collected	noncrmnal	nformaton	durng	the	Great	Debate.	The	fact	
of	 the	 matter,	 however,	 s	 that	 Fbi	 agents	 had	 ndeed	 employed	 llegal	
survellance	 tactcs	 and	 actvely	 sought	 noncrmnal	 ntellgence	 on	 the	
ant-nterventonsts	for	bureaucratc	and	poltcal	purposes.
—■■■■■■■—
Further	 characterzng	 ths	 perod,	 the	 Fbi	 drector	 demonstrated	 that	








of	 the	welfare	 state,	 the	new	Deal	 reflected	 the	 precept	 of	 “bg	 govern-
ment”	 staffed	 by	 left-of-center	 poltcans	 seekng	 proactve	 leadershp	
n	Washngton.	Whle	on	the	surface	t	seems	the	poltcal	vews	of	new	
Dealers	and	 J.	edgar	hoover	would	be	at	odds,	 the	Fbi	drector	 thrved	
durng	the	roosevelt	admnstraton.	he	succeeded	n	cultvatng	a	close	
relatonshp	 wth	 roosevelt	 by	 usng	 hs	 pragmatsm	 to	manpulate	 the	
relatonshp	 between	 the	 presdent	 and	 the	 Fbi.	 hoover	 became	 a	 val-
ued	source	of	 nformaton	on	roosevelt’s	poltcal	enemes	and	useful	 n	
occasonal	 attempts	 to	 undermne	 them.	 For	 roosevelt’s	 part,	 hs	 long	
personal	nterest	n	secret	ntellgence,	n	part,	explans	hs	receptveness	
to	hoover’s	poltcal	ntellgence	reports.2
	 2.	On	 roosevelt’s	 fascnaton	 wth	 ntellgence	 see	 Davd	 Stafford,	 Roosevelt and 




and	growth	of	power.	hoover’s	 ablty	 to	 ncrease	Fbi	 authorty	has,	 for	
the	most	part,	been	assocated	wth	some	concomtant	nternatonal	crss.	
more	bascally,	 the	 charged	atmosphere	 created	by	varous	 nternatonal	
crses	resulted	n	fears	of	domestc	unrest,	whether	durng	the	Frst	World	
War,	red	Scare,	Great	Depresson,	Second	World	War,	Cold	War,	or	War	
on	 Terrorsm.	 in	 each	 perod,	 the	 Fbi’s	 power	 and	 authorty	 ncreased,	
for	dfferent	reasons,	to	deal	wth	a	perceved	domestc	threat.	Durng	the	










polcy	 crtcs	durng	 ths	perod	 “solatonsts.”	The	 term	“ant-nterven-
tonst,”	however,	wll	be	employed	throughout	ths	study.	The	word	“so-
latonst”	 s	 too	narrow	a	descrptor	 to	 be	 appled	 to	roosevelt’s	 foregn	
polcy	crtcs	who	dd	not	advocate	solaton	from	foregn	affars	but	un-
lateralsm	 n	amercan	 foregn	 relatons.	moreover,	 ant-nterventonsts	









(it	 also	 does	 not	 address	 those	 amercans	 who	 were	 caught	 up	 n	 Fbi	
	 3.	On	the	nterventonst	percepton	of	ant-nterventonsts	as	subversves	see	mark	









were	 best	 organzed	 and	 posed	 the	 most	 sgnfcant	 poltcal	 threat	 to	
admnstraton	foregn	polcy.	Second,	after	the	naz	nvason	of	the	Sovet	
Unon	 n	 June	 1941,	amercan	 leftsts	 and	Communsts	wholeheartedly	
joned	 the	 nterventonst	 cause;	 thereafter	 amerca	 Frst	 remaned	 the	















over,	 would	 lkely	 have	 regarded	 ant-nterventonsts	 as	 “subversves”	
or	“un-amercan”	 n	part	because	of	 the	popular	assocatons	many	had	
made	between	ant-nterventonsts	 and	 radcal	or	 fascst	 elements.	Ths	
followed	a	popular	outlook	datng	from	the	1930s,	and	extendng	nto	the	
early	Cold	War,	that	 dentfed	Stalnsm	and	nazsm	as	essentally	sm-




efforts	n	ths	area	see	athan	Theohars,	Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelli-











Ths	 book	makes	 use	 of	 prevously	 classfed	 Fbi	 fles.	Only	 n	 the	 last	
few	 years	 have	 the	 Fbi	 fles	 of	 Charles	 lndbergh,	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee,	and	other	promnent	ant-nterventonsts,	for	example,	been	
avalable	for	research.	as	a	result,	prevous	dscourses	about	the	bureau’s	
poltcal	 survellance	durng	 ths	perod	have	been	 tentatve	 and	 ncom-





actvtes.	much	 has	 been	mssed	 through	 these	 oversghts,	 partcularly	
new	 nformaton	 that	 reveals	 the	 true	 extent	 of	 Fbi	 survellance	 actv-






Offcal	 and	 Confdental	 fle	 n	 2005.	 For	 over	 seventy	 years,	 Fbi	 fles	
have	remaned	the	preserve	of	Fbi	offcals	who	have	opened	them	to	only	
a	 select	number	of	 “frendly”	 journalsts.7	Only	when	amendments	were	
made	n	1974	to	the	Freedom	of	informaton	act	(FOia)	dd	researchers	
have	access	to	these	mportant	documents,	but	wth	access	comes	restrc-
ton.	 exemptons	 to	 the	 FOia	 nclude	 classfed	materal,	 prvacy-rghts	
related	 nformaton,	 and	 anythng	 revealng	 Fbi	 sources	 and	 methods.	





amercan	 image	 of	 Totaltaransm,	 1930s–1950s,”	American Historical Review	 75	 (aprl	
1970):	1046–64.





very	 expensve.	moreover,	 Fbi	 understaffng	 and	 budgetary	 restrctons	
have	 created	very	 long	delays	 n	 the	processng	of	 requests	 (n	1996	 the	
bureau	averaged	ffty	requests	per	day).	it	s	not	uncommon	to	wat	years	
for	a	sngle	FOia	request	to	be	fnalzed.	nevertheless,	Fbi	records	are	a	
vtal	 and	 mportant,	 f	 sometmes	 frustratng	 and	 tantalzng,	 source	 of	
nformaton.	8
—■■■■■■■—
Ths	book	makes	hstorographcal	 contrbutons	 n	 three	areas:	 the	hs-




lgence	 actvtes	 durng	 the	 Cold	War	 era.10	 Some	 Fbi	 hstorans	 have	
examned	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	survellance	of	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventon-
st	foregn	polcy	crtcs,	but	only	as	a	small	part	of	larger	studes.	athan	
Theohars	 brefly	 mentoned	 the	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 ant-nterventon-
sts	 n	 hs	 broad	 study	Spying on Americans	 (1978), n	 hs	 bography	 of	






	 9.	robert	K.	murray,	Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920	(mnneapo-
ls:	Unversty	of	mnnesota	Press,	1955);	Wllam	Preston	Jr.,	 Aliens and Dissenters: Federal 
Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933,	2nd	ed.	(Chcago:	Unversty	of	Chcago	Press,	1994);	
Davd	Wllams,	“‘Wthout	Understandng’:	The	Fbi	and	Poltcal	Survellance,	1908–1941”	
(Ph.D.	dss.,	Unversty	of	new	hampshre,	1981),	2.		See	also	Davd	Wllams,	“The	bureau	
of	 investgaton	and	its	Crtcs,	1919–1921:	The	Orgns	of	Federal	Poltcal	Survellance,”	  
Journal of American History	68	(December	1981):	560–79.
	 10.	athan	 Theohars,	 Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the 
Huston Plan	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1978);	Frank	J.	Donner,	The Age of Sur-
veillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System	(new	york:	Knopf,	
1980);	Kenneth	O’relly,	Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Men-
ace	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1983);	John	ellff,	The Reform of FBI Intelligence 
Operations	(Prnceton,	nJ:	Prnceton	Unversty	Press,	1979);	Davd	Garrow,	The FBI and 
Martin Luther King, Jr.: From Memphis to “Solo”	(new	york:	norton,	1981);		Wllam	Keller,	
The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State	(Prnceton,	nJ:	
Prnceton	Unversty	Press,	1989).
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tonsts.	 Ther	 nterests	 have	 concentrated	 on	 the	 poltcs	 of	 ant-nter-
ventonsm,	 and	 whle	 recognzng	 Fbi	 poltcal	 survellance	 perhaps	
have	 neglected	 t	 through	 a	 lack	 of	 documentaton.	Wayne	 S.	 Cole	 has	
studed	ant-nterventonsts	more	 than	anyone	 else	 and	 n	hs	magnum	
opus,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists	(1983),	only	brefly	surveyed	the	Fbi’s	
















	 11.	Theohars,	Spying on Americans,	158–59;	athan	Theohars	and	John	Cox,	The Boss: 
J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	
1988),	 149;	athan	Theohars,	The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History	
(lawrence:	Unversty	Press	of	Kansas,	2004)..
	 12.	rchard	Gd	Powers,	Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover	(new	york:	Free	
Press,	1987);	Powers,	Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI (new	york:	
Free	Press,	2004);	Curt	Gentry,	J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets	(new	york:	norton,	
1991).
	 13.	Wayne	 S.	 Cole,	 Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	 (lncoln:	 Unversty	 of	
nebraska	Press,	1983),	484–87,	530–33.
	 14.	 Justus	D.	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 
1939–1941	(lanham,	mD:	rowman	&	lttlefeld,	2000),	276.
	 15.	robert	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945	(new	
york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1979),	289–90.
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and,	 because	 hs	 documentaton	 was	 lmted,	 he	 focused	 more	 on	 the	
Whte	house	than	the	Fbi.16
	 Charles	Croog	has	analyzed	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	survellance	of	ant-nter-





moblzed	 aganst	 roosevelt’s	 law-abdng	 opponents.”	 yet	 Croog’s	 pece	
suffered	 from	one	major	weakness.	 lke	 Steele,	Croog	 employed	 only	 a	







Control,	 and	 natonal	 Securty”	 (1982).	 O’relly	 examned	 Fbi	 nsttu-
tonal	 changes	made	durng	 the	new	Deal	 n	 the	areas	of	 crme	control	
and	 natonal	 securty.	 Whle	 he	 used	 a	 broader	 base	 of	 evdence	 than	
prevous	hstorans,	when	analyzng	the	Fbi’s	montorng	of	foregn	polcy	





Theohars	 analyzed	 the	 Fbi’s	montorng	 of	 promnent	members	 of	 the	
ant-nterventonst	press	and	the	roosevelt	admnstraton’s	desre	to	settle	








	 17.	Charles	 F.	 Croog,	 “Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst-interventonst	
Debate,	1939–1941,”	Historian	54	(Sprng	1992):	441–58.
	 18.	Kenneth	O’relly,	“a	new	Deal	for	the	Fbi:	The	roosevelt	admnstraton,	Crme	
Control,	and	natonal	Securty,”	Journal of American History	69	(December	1982):	638–58.






ventonsts,	 n	 partcular	Charles	 lndbergh,	were	 greater	 than	prevous	
hstorans	had	argued.	Then,	n	“informng	FDr:	Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance	
and	 the	 isolatonst-interventonst	 Foregn	 Polcy	 Debate,	 1939–1945”	
(2000),	i	furthered	my	argument	by	examnng	the	Fbi’s	montorng	of	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	lndbergh,	and	fve	wretap	targets.	i	concluded	
that	secret	Fbi	poltcal	 reports	 to	 the	Whte	house	helped	roosevelt	 to	
advance	 hs	 concepton	 of	 the	 naton’s	 natonal	 securty	 nterests.20	and	
n	“Frankln	D.	roosevelt,	J.	edgar	hoover,	and	Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance”	
(1999),	i	argued	for	a	lay	audence	that	t	was	hoover	and	not	roosevelt	





perod	 n	 ndrect	ways.	roy	Turnbaugh	argued	 n	 “The	Fbi	 and	harry	
elmer	 barnes”	 (1980)	 that	 the	 bureau	 targeted	 the	 ant-nterventonst	
barnes	 n	 an	 effort	 to	 exact	 vengeance	 for	 crtcal	 comments	 the	 noted	
hstoran	had	made	about	the	Fbi	pror	to	the	Great	Debate.	he	dd	not	
analyze	 the	Fbi’s	montorng	 of	barnes	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 effort	 aganst	





adequately	 provng	my	 contenton	 that	 Fbi	 poltcal	 reports	 permtted	 roosevelt	 to	 not	
worry	about	hs	domestc	opponents	as	he	had	kept	tabs	on	them.		i	may	have	overstated	my	
case,	but	i	was	also	not	clear	n	my	argument.		i	should	have	stated	that	roosevelt	gathered	




	 21.	Douglas	m.	 Charles	 and	 John	 ross,	 “Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 Charles	
lndbergh	 investgaton,	 1939–1944,”	Historian	 59	 (Summer	 1997):	 831–47;	 Douglas	m.	
Charles,	 “informng	 FDr:	 Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst-interventonst	
Foregn	Polcy	Debate,	1939–1945,”	Diplomatic History	24	(Sprng	2000):	211–32;	Charles,	





The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front	 (1995),	 analyzed	




noted	roosevelt’s	 empowerment	 of	 the	 Fbi	 but	 overlooked	 ts	montor-
ng	of	 ant-nterventonsts	 n	hs	broad	and	concse	 survey	artcle	 “The	
Fbi	 and	 Cvl	 lbertes	 from	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 to	 Jmmy	 Carter—an	
hstorcal	Overvew”	(1980).25
	 Ths	book	further	makes	a	contrbuton	to	the	hstorography,	n	terms	













atic	 securty	 conscousness	 nvolvng	 ntellgence	 nvestgatons	 aganst	
both	radcals	and	legtmate	foregn	polcy	crtcs	durng	the	perod	before	
the	amercan	entrance	nto	the	Second	World	War.	even	hstoran	Davd	
reynolds,	 n	 hs	 mportant	 book	From Munich to Pearl Harbor	 (2001),	
whle	not	at	all	examnng	the	Fbi,	does	conclude	that	by	“the	end	of	1941	
many	features	of	what	would	emerge	as	the	 ‘natonal	securty	state’	were	
already	 apparent	 n	 embryo,	 albet	 appled	 to	 a	 very	 dfferent	 enemy.”27	
	 23.	 Francs	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home 
Front	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1995),	157–83.
	 24.	barton	J.	bernsten,	“The	road	to	Watergate	and	beyond:	The	Growth	and	abuse	of	
executve	authorty	snce	1940,”	Law and Contemporary Problems	40	(Sprng	1976):	58–76.
	 25.	 John	 F.	 berens,	 “The	 Fbi	 and	Cvl	 lbertes	 from	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 to	 Jmmy	
Carter—an	hstorcal	Overvew,”	Michigan Academician	13	(1980):	131–44.
	 26.	Danel	yergn,	Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security 
State	(boston:	houghton,	mffln,	1977),	5.
	 27.	Davd	reynolds,	From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of 
the Second World War	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	2001),	5.	in	terms	of	the	embryonc	aspects	of	the	
natonal	securty	state,	reynolds	dentfes	amerca’s	“new	global	perspectve	on	nternatonal	
1 Introduction
Therefore,	 i	 have	 termed	 ths	 perod	 the	 domestc	 securty	 state—the	
pont	 at	 whch	 the	 Fbi	 developed	 ts	 domestc	 ntellgence	 apparatus	
and	nternatonal	ntellgence	lason	to	the	degree	that	t	operated	sem-
autonomously	and	was	on	a	sold	 footng	 toward	evolvng	 nto	 the	 later,	
Cold	War–era	natonal	 securty	 state	once	 the	 country	 adopted	 ts	Cold	
War	atttudes	and	polces.
	 Whereas	durng	the	natonal	securty	state	era	the	Fbi	was	part	of,	and	
concerned	wth,	 ensurng	 the	 naton’s	 securty	 from	 communst	 subver-































	 29.	 See	Donner,	The Age of Surveillance; athan	Theohars,	Seeds of Repression: Harry S. 
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	 Ths	study	hopes	to	complement	the	work	of	Fbi,	ant-nterventonst,	
and	natonal	 securty	hstorans	by	examnng	 the	Fbi’s	poltcal	 survel-





have	 dentfed	 the	natonal	securty	state	as	beng	 nextrcably	 lnked	to	
fears	of	communst	subverson	and	the	spread	of	bolshevsm.	Ths	study,	










The	 terrorst	 attacks	 n	 new	 york	 Cty	 and	 Washngton,	 D.C.,	 on	 11	
September	2001	and	subsequent	government	reacton	have	brought	new	
sgnfcance	to	ths	study.	in	reacton	to	these	events,	n	an	effort	to	safe-








	 Testfyng	 before	 the	 Senate	 Judcary	 Commttee,	 attorney	 General	
John	ashcroft	defended	the	bush	admnstraton’s	antterrorsm	plan,	whch	
ncluded	a	broad	expanson	of	Fbi	wretappng	and	nvestgatve	authorty.	
he	 dened	 that	 amercan	 ctzens’	 cvl	 lbertes	 would	 be	 restrcted	 but	
added:	“To	those	[crtcs]	who	scare	peace-lovng	people	wth	phantoms	of	











concomtant	 ncrease	 n	 government	 secrecy	 (.e.,	 a	 tghtenng	 of	 FOia	








of	 ant-war	 [iraq	War]	 demonstrators.”	 and	 by	 December	 the	 Fbi	 had	
elmnated	 dstnctons	 between	 crmnal	 and	 ntellgence	 nvestgaton	
classfcatons.32
	 by	2005,	moreover,	after	the	presdental	electon,	the	effort	to	ncrease	
the	Fbi’s	unchecked	 freedom	 n	 conductng	 nvestgatons	 grew.	Durng	
may,	Senate	republcans	and	the	bush	admnstraton	advocated	expand-
ng	Fbi	powers	to	permt	agents	“to	subpoena	records	from	busnesses	and	
other	 nsttutons	wthout	a	 judge’s	 sgn-off	 f	 they	declared	 the	materal	
was	needed	as	part	of	a	foregn	ntellgence	nvestgaton.”	later	that	year,	
	 30.	 “ashcroft	appears	before	Senate	to	Defend	Tactcs,”	New York Times,	6	December	
2001;	nel	a.	lews,	“ashcroft	Defends	ant-terror	Plan	and	Says	Crtcsm	may	ad	Foes,”	
New York Times, 7	December	2001.
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Justn	blum,	 “Document	Says	Ol	Chefs	met	wth	Cheney	Task	Force,”	Washington Post, 
16	november	2005;	James	rsen,	“bush	lets	US	Spy	on	Callers	wthout	Courts,”	New York 
Times,	 16	 December	 2005;	 Dana	 Prest,	 “Covert	 Cia	 Program	Wthstands	 new	 Furor,”	
Washington Post,	30	December	2005.
	 32.	 “ashcroft	Urges	Cauton	wth	FOia	requests,”	Washington Post,	17	October	2001;	
ellen	nakashma,	“bush	vew	of	Secrecy	is	Strrng	Frustraton,”	Washington Post, 3	march	
2002;	 athan	 Theohars	 to	Douglas	m.	 Charles,	 6	november	 2001;	 erc	 lchtblau,	 “Fbi’s	
reach	nto	records	is	Set	to	Grow,”	New York Times,	12	november	2003;	erc	lchtblau,	“Fbi	
Scrutnzes	antwar	ralles,”	New York Times, 23	november	2003;	Dan	eggen,	“Fbi	apples	
new	rules	to	Survellance,”	Washington Post, 13	December	2003.
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the	 Washington Post	 reported	 that	 the	 Fbi	 had	 nvestgated	 “hundreds	
of	 potental	 volatons	 related	 to	 ts	 use	 of	 secret	 operatons,”	 volatons	
that	were	“largely	hdden	from	publc	vew.”	more	specfcally,	Fbi	agents	
conducted	 survellance	of	U.S.	 resdents	 for	over	a	year	 “wthout	proper	
paperwork	or	oversght.”	as	part	of	ths	effort,	Fbi	agents	sezed	e-mals	
and	 bank	 records	 wthout	 proper	 warrants	 and	 conducted	 at	 least	 one	
“unconsented	physcal	search.”	in	response,	Fbi	offcals	called	the	vola-
tons	“admnstratve	errors.”33
	 in	 november	 of	 2005,	 t	 was	 further	 reported	 that	 Fbi	 agents	 were	
frequently	usng	natonal	securty	letters	“to	scrutnze	U.S.	resdents	and	
vstors	 who	 are	 not	 alleged	 to	 be	 terrorsts	 or	 spes.”	 natonal	 securty	






	 by	December	of	 2005,	 t	was	 also	 reported	 that	 someone	 n	 the	Fbi	
altered	the	dates	on	documents	to	cover	up	the	employment	of	an	llegal	
wretap,	 and	 one	 agent	was	 blackballed	 from	 undercover	 nvestgatons	
after	 he	 crtczed	 Fbi	 volatons	 nternally.	 later	 that	 month,	 t	 was	
further	 reported	 that	Fbi	 agents	workng	 n	 counterterrorsm	cases	had	
montored	 a	 “vegan	 Communty	 Project,”	 a	 Catholc	 Workers	 group,	
Greenpeace,	and	the	anmal	advocacy	group	People	for	the	ethcal	Treat-
ment	of	anmals.35
	 evdence	 advanced	 n	 ths	 book	demonstrates	 that	 the	 roots	 of	 such	
Fbi	actvty	are	to	be	found	durng	the	ant-nterventonst	foregn	polcy	
debate	 when	 legtmate	 admnstraton	 crtcs	 were	 regarded	 as	 wttng	
or	unwttng	dupes	of	fascsts	and	nvestgated	under	a	domestc	securty	
classfcaton.	 it	 was	 durng	 ths	 crtcal	 perod	 (a	 tme	 of	 nternatonal	
crss)	 that	 Fbi	 offcals	 acqured	 ncreased	 nvestgatve	 authorty	 and	
resorted	to	senstve	nvestgatve	technques,	lke	wretappng,	and	volated	
	 33.	erc	lchtblau,	“Plan	Would	broaden	Fbi’s	Terror	role,” New York Times, 19	may	
2005;	Dan	eggen,	“Fbi	Papers	indcate	intellgence	volatons,	Secret	Survellance	lacked	
Oversght,”	Washington Post, 24	October	2005.
	 34.	 “Patrot	 act	 Prmer,”	Washington Post,	 3	 november	 2005;	 barton	 Gelman,	 “The	
Fbi’s	Secret	Scrutny,	in	hunt	for	Terrorsts,	bureau	examnes	records	of	Ordnary	amer-
cans,”	Washington Post,	6	november	2005.









The	 orgns	 of	 the	 Federal	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 date	 back	 to	 the	
Progressve	era	and	the	admnstraton	of	the	frst	Progressve	presdent,	
Theodore	 roosevelt.	 after	 roosevelt’s	 ascendance	 to	 the	 presdency	
n	 1901,	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 responsbltes	 ncreased	 dramat-
cally.	belevng	n	the	Progressve	deal	of	an	assertve	executve,	roosevelt	
sought	 to	use	 the	 federal	government	 to	regulate	 the	burgeonng	corpo-
rate	economy	n	order	to	save	t.	he	therefore	renvgorated	the	Sherman	
anttrust	act	 of	 1890	 and	drected	 the	 Justce	Department	 to	 prosecute	
those	corporatons	he	regarded	as	“bad	trusts.”	Followng	sut,	department	
attorneys	pursued	frst	the	northern	Securtes	Company—a	gant	ralroad	












et	al.,	The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide	(Phoenx,	aZ:	Oryx	Press,	1999),	3;	John	







tgatve	 agency.	 members	 of	 Congress	 were	 worred	 prmarly	 because	
the	Justce	Department	had	used	Secret	Servce	agents	to	nvestgate	(and	
eventually	convct)	a	congressman	and	senator	from	Oregon	for	conspr-




the	Justce	Department,	and	 n	an	effort	 to	ratonalze	agent	 loanng	the	
assstant	chef	of	the	Secret	Servce,	Wllam	moran,	argued	that	Treasury	
Department	funds	were	not	spent	whle	Justce	Department	funds	were.2
Outraged	 over	 ths	 lberal	 nterpretaton	 of	 the	 Secret	 Servce’s	 charter,	
and	concerned	wth	the	possble	evoluton	of	an	amercan	secret	polce,	
Congress	 amended	 ts	 budgetary	 appropratons	 to	 ban	 the	 loanng	 of	
Secret	 Servce	 agents.	 in	 so	 dong,	 Congress	 had	 effectvely	 rendered	








an	 outraged	Congress	 demanded	 answers,	 but	 through	 assurances	 that	
the	 bi	 agents	 were	 professonals	 and	 would	 not	 engage	 n	 noncrmnal	
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act	 (the	mann	 act)	 that	 outlawed	 the	 transportaton	 of	 women	 across	















	 Wth	 the	advent	of	 the	Frst	World	War,	 the	bureau’s	 responsbltes	
moved	nto	the	area	of	domestc	securty,	ncreasng	even	more	ts	natonal	
polcng	role.	most	pressng	at	 ths	 tme	were	 fears	of	 foregn	 nfluences	
upon	amercan	 socety.	 These	 natvst	 concerns	 stemmed	 not	 from	 the	
war	but	 from	 the	depressed	amercan	 economy	 n	1914,	 and	 they	were	
only	heghtened	after	varous	German	attempts	at	 sabotage	were	uncov-
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alen	Deportaton	act	 to	deport	nonctzens	who	 advocated	 the	 volent	
overthrow	of	the	U.S.	government.7
	 These	 varous	 laws	 ncreased	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 responsbl-
tes	 n	 the	 realm	of	 nternal	 securty.	 in	1918,	 therefore,	 the	department	
formed	 the	 alen	 enemy	 regstraton	 Secton,	 known	 popularly	 as	 the	
alen	enemy	bureau.	Ths	 agency	 focused	on	 the	 actvtes	 of	Germans	
and	other	foregn	natonals,	radcals,	anarchsts,	afrcan	amercans,	and	
all	manner	of	perceved	“subversves.”	it	was	n	ths	secton,	sgnfcantly,	
that	 a	 young	 J.	edgar	hoover	began	hs	 career	 and	where	he	 learned	 to	
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when,	 n	1917,	 the	bolshevks	 sezed	power	 n	russa.	Durng	 the	 years	





among	 workers—a	 fear	 that	 management	 delberately	 manpulated	 to	
crush	 the	 labor	 strkes.	 The	 country	 then	 experenced	 a	 seres	 of	mal-
bomb	plots	and	other	bombngs	(sgnfcantly	at	the	resdence	of	attorney	





bureau—later	 renamed	 the	 General	 intellgence	 Dvson—that	 was	
headed	by	J.	edgar	hoover.	The	problem	for	Palmer	and	the	bi	was	that	
to	prosecute	 radcals	under	 federal	 law,	 offcals	had	 to	 ether	prove	 the	
radcals’	membershp	n	radcal	organzatons	or	persuade	them	to	admt	




to	 keep	 radcals	 from	 consultng	 lawyers,	 could	 coerce	 confessons	 and	
therefore	make	them	lable	for	deportaton.	it	was	these	means	that	under-
pnned	 the	 so-called	Palmer	rads,	 n	whch	some	10,000	 suspects	were	
arrested	natonwde	but	only	556	were	deported.10
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 Chapter 1
	 The	 bi’s	 partcpaton	 n	 the	 Palmer	 rads	 was	 just	 one	 example	 of	
questonable	actvty	 that	plagued	 the	bureau	of	 the	early	1920s.	Durng	
the	 presdency	 of	Warren	 G.	 hardng,	 an	 admnstraton	 notorous	 for	
ts	 abuses,	 the	 Teapot	Dome	 scandal	marked	 the	 heght	 of	 such	 nefar-
ous	 actvty.	 The	 scandal	 centered	 on	 ol	 deposts	 located	 n	Wyomng	
and	Calforna	that	were	set	asde	as	naval	reserves	but	placed	under	the	
control	of	 the	 interor	Department	 and	 ts	 secretary,	albert	b.	Fall.	The	
secretary	had	lost	hs	personal	fortune	n	a	bad	mexcan	mnng	venture,	
leadng	 hm	 to	 sgn	 contracts	 to	 permt	 two	 ol	 companes	 to	 tap	 the	
government’s	reserves	n	exchange	for	$400,000	n	“loans.”11
	 by	1923,	montana	Senators	Thomas	Walsh	and	burton	K.	Wheeler—
later	 a	 promnent	 ant-nterventonst—exposed	 Fall’s	 corrupton	 and	










	 hardng	 ded	 before	 any	 of	 ths	 became	 publc,	 however,	 and	 hs	
successor—Calvn	 Cooldge—successfully	 dstanced	 hmself	 from	 the	
scandals	and	apponted	a	reformst	attorney	general	 to	clean	house.	The	
new	attorney	general,	harlan	Fske	Stone,	beleved	men	of	hgh	moral	and	
professonal	 standards	 would	 brng	 order	 to	 the	 corrupted	 department.	
Followng	a	cabnet	meetng	n	may	1924,	Stone	dscussed	hs	plan	wth	
Commerce	Secretary	herbert	hoover,	who	recommended	J.	edgar	hoover	
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Stone,	 belevng	 that	 professonalsm	 and	 hgh	 moral	 standards	 would	
ensure	 no	 abuses,	 trusted	 the	 new	 drector	 and,	 at	 every	 turn,	 hoover	
sought	to	demonstrate	hs	loyalty.14
	 irrespectve	of	the	gudelnes	and	hoover’s	promses	to	abde	by	them,	
he	 and	 the	 bureau	 contnued	 to	montor	 “radcal”	 actvtes,	 as	 hoover	
defned	 them.	 Whle	 ths	 montorng	 dd	 not	 reach	 prevous	 levels,	 t	
nevertheless	 occurred.	 To	 gather	 ths	 ntellgence	wthout	 beng	 dscov-
ered,	hoover	devsed	specal	procedures	 to	ensure	confdentalty.	These	
ncluded	 the	 clppng	of	press	 stores,	 complng	unsolcted	materal	 on	
radcal	actvtes,	usng	euphemsms	to	conceal	llct	sources	(“confden-
tal	 source”),	 and	workng	 closely	wth	 local	 polce	 forces	 that	 regularly	
montored	radcals	and	then	“volunteered”	ther	data	to	bureau	agents.15
	 hoover	 then	 devsed	 a	 specal	 procedure	 that	 would	 relay	 senstve	
ntellgence	about	the	personal	and	poltcal	lves	of	promnent	amercans	
not	nto	the	bureau’s	central	records	system	but	drectly	to	hs	desk.	Such	
reports	 were	 labeled	 “personal	 and	 confdental”	 and	 permtted	 bureau	




began	 to	 servce,	 but	 only	 on	 an	 ad	 hoc	 bass,	 Whte	 house	 requests	
for	 poltcal	 ntellgence.17	and	 by	Presdent	hoover’s	 last	 year	 n	 offce,	
Drector	hoover	helped	hm	n	dealng	wth	the	bonus	marchers.	Feelng	
desperate	 durng	 the	 Great	 Depresson,	 thousands	 of	 unemployed	 Frst	
World	War	veterans	marched	on	Washngton,	D.C.,	demandng	payment	




	 16.	Ths	flng	procedure	s	dscussed	n	athan	Theohars,	ed.,	From the Secret Files of 
J. Edgar Hoover	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	1991),	2–4;	Davd	Wllams,	“‘They	never	Stopped	
Watchng	 Us’:	 Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance,	 1924–1936,”	UCLA Historical Journal	 2	 (1981):	
7–14;	Frank	 J.	Donner,	Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban 
America	(berkeley:	Unversty	of	Calforna	Press,	1990).




the	 bonus	 should	 be	 pad	 mmedately.	 They	 resolved,	 therefore,	 not	 to	
leave	the	captal	untl	ther	demands	were	met.18




Presdent	hoover	 ordered	 the	 army	 to	 dsperse	 the	 veterans.	 Ths	 only	
worked	 aganst	 the	 presdent	 durng	 an	 electon	 year,	 however.	 he	 was	
roundly	 crtczed	 for	 the	harsh	 treatment	 the	veterans	 receved,	 leadng	
the	presdent	to	order	the	bureau	to	prove	communst	lnks.	bureau	agents	
attended	protest	ralles,	montored	bonus	marcher	actvty,	and,	wth	the	
help	 of	 local	 red	 squads,	 nvestgated	 veterans	 groups	 to	 determne	 the	
extent	of	communst	nfltraton.	agents	dscovered	none.19
	 Out	 of	 Progressve-era	 deals	 of	 ratonal	 and	 effcent	 government,	
the	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 was	 born	 durng	 the	 Theodore	 roosevelt	
admnstraton.	 as	 ts	 responsbltes	 grew	 over	 tme,	 the	 ablty	 of	 the	
attorney	general	to	oversee	ts	actvtes	dmnshed.	Ths	led	to	an	abuse	













drector	 developed	 an	 ntmate	workng	 relatonshp	wth	 the	 presdent.	
hoover	then	saw	over	the	next	twelve	years	an	ncremental	expanson	of	
	 18.	 See	Donald	J.	lso,	The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus 
Riot	(Columba:	Unversty	of	mssour	Press,	1974).
	 19.	Wllams,	“‘They	never	Stopped	Watchng	Us,’”	15;	O’relly,	“herbert	hoover	and	













straton)	and	snce	hs	 job	was	not	protected	by	 the	cvl	 servce,	 t	was	
lkely	that	a	Democratc	admnstraton	would	replace	hm.	it	was	wdely	
beleved,	moreover,	that	ths	would	ndeed	happen,	but	hoover—a	master	
bureaucrat—dd	 not	 lack	 the	 ablty	 to	 preserve	 hs	 job.	 he	 had	 advo-





	 irrespectve	 of	 these	 efforts,	hoover’s	 poston	was	 threatened	when	






ment	 through	 sgnfcant	 personnel	 changes,	 and	 then	 hoover	 learned	
that	numerous	ndvduals	had	lobbed	Senator	burton	Wheeler	to	oppose	
hoover’s	 reappontment.	 hoover’s	 prospects	 for	 contnung	 as	 bureau	
drector	seemed	dm	at	best.21





	 20.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	111–12.	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	182.
	 21.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	112–13;	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	180.	Though	he	
overlooks	the	Fbi,	on	Walsh’s	appontment	see	J.	leonard	bates,	Senator Thomas J. Walsh 









tenure	 as	 bureau	 drector.	homer	Cummngs,	 an	 avd	new	Dealer,	was	
far	less	concerned	wth	hoover’s	past	than	Walsh	had	been.	nevertheless,	







t	 nvolved	 celebrty	 kdnappngs,	 bank	 robberes,	 or	 the	 adventures	 of	
varous	gangsters,	many	people	beleved	that	the	crme	ssue	had	ts	roots	
n	the	nablty	of	local	polce	forces	to	deal	wth	sophstcated	(.e.,	nter-





	 To	 expand	 the	 federal	 polce	 force,	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 ssued	 an	
executve	order	n	June	1933	that	combned	the	Prohbton	bureau	(now	
defunct	 wth	 the	 repeal	 of	 the	 eghteenth	 amendment),	 the	 bureau	 of	
identfcaton	 (already	 under	 hoover’s	 supervson),	 and	 the	 bureau	 of	





	 22.	burton	 K.	Wheeler	 and	 Paul	 F.	 healy,	Yankee from the West	 (Garden	 Cty,	 ny:	
Double	Day,	1962),	243;	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	113.
	 23.	 Fred	J.	Cook,	The FBI Nobody Knows (new	york:	macmllan,	1964),	150–51;	Theo-
hars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	114–16.	On	Cummngs	as	attorney	general	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	
Free Speech in the Good War	(new	york:	St.	martn’s	Press,	1999),	20,	31–32.
	 24.	Wllam	e.	leuchtenburg,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940	(new	
york:	harper	&	row,	1963),	334;	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	121.
	 25.	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	182–83.
Background
	 before	Cummngs	delvered	hs	crme	program—a	total	of	twelve	blls	
that	 would	 dramatcally	 alter	 the	 federal	 government’s	 role	 n	 natonal	
polcng—he	ntated	a	publc-relatons	campagn	to	generate	mass	sup-
port	 and	 promote	 the	 newly	 expanded	 Fbi.	 For	 the	 frst	 two	 years	 of	
the	effort,	publc	attenton	was	 focused	on	Cummngs’s	 antcrme	work	
whle	hoover	went	 largely	 unnotced.	among	Cummngs’s	 nnovatons	






lester	 “baby	 Face”	 nelson,	 alvn	 “Old	 Creepy”	 Karps,	 Clyde	 barrow,	
and	 bonne	 Parker—to	 promote	 hs	 program	 to	 wn	 acceptance	 for	 an	
expanded	federal	role	n	law	enforcement.	but	one	case	n	partcular,	that	
of	John	Dllnger,	dd	more	than	any	other	to	assst	Cummngs.27
	 Durng	 the	 sprng	 and	 fall	 of	 1933,	 career-crmnal	 John	 Dllnger	
robbed	ten	banks	and	commtted	varous	msdemeanors.	he	was	arrested	
twce	and	both	tmes	escaped,	but	t	was	the	second	escape	that	brought	
the	Fbi	 n	on	 the	 case.	Upon	breakng	out	of	 jal,	Dllnger	 audacously	
stole	 hs	 jaler’s	 car	 and	 drove	 t	 from	 indana	 nto	 illnos	 and	 thereby	






wse	 i	would	not	have	gotten	away	 from	 the	coppers	 n	 that	Wsconsn,	
mnnesota	case.”28
	 26.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	122;	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	186.
	 27.	 For	a	hstory	of	these	efforts	see	bryan	burrough,	Public Enemies: America’s Great-
est Crime Wave and the Birth of the FBI, 1933–34	(new	york:	Pengun	Press,	2004).	See	also	
Cook,	The FBI Nobody Knows,	158–59,	176,	183,	189–93;	Curt	Gentry,	J. Edgar Hoover: The 
Man and the Secrets	(new	york:	norton,	1991),	167–200;	Don	Whtehead,	The FBI Story: A 
Report to the People	(new	york:	random	house,	1956),	83–103;	and	ralph	de	Toledano,	J. 










to	 lne	 up	 conservatves	 and	new	Dealers	wth	 hs	 proposals	 and,	 after	
the	presdent	publcly	announced	hs	support,	the	crme-bll	package	was	
sent	to	the	house.	On	19	may	1934,	Congress	passed	the	frst	sx	blls	of	
Cummngs’s	program	and,	by	 June,	 t	passed	 three	more.	Thereafter	 the	
Fbi	was	granted	full	arrest	powers,	was	permtted	to	carry	frearms,	had	
ts	 jursdcton	 expanded	 to	 nclude	 apprehendng	 escaped	 felons	 who	
crossed	state	lnes,	and	t	could	automatcally	enter	kdnappng	cases	after	
a	 perod	 of	 seven	 days.	 addtonally,	 nterstate	 racketeerng	 (by	 phone	
or	mal)	became	a	felony	and	the	Fbi	was	authorzed	to	nvestgate	bank	
robberes	 f	 the	 bank	was	 a	member	 of	 the	 Federal	reserve.	These	new	
laws,	 and	 others,	 n	 addton	 to	 the	 publcty	 generated	 by	 Cummngs’s	




to	 assume	 new	 responsbltes	 when	 foregn	 threats	 ncreasngly	 drew	
the	attenton	of	Presdent	roosevelt.	Wth	fascst	and	mltary	aggresson	






alongsde	amerca’s	 ncreasng	 preoccupaton	wth	 foregn	 polcy	 ssues	
durng	the	1930s.
—■■■■■■■—
Frankln	 D.	 roosevelt	 by	 nature	 and	 experence	 was	 an	 nternatonal-
st	man.	he	was	 born	 nto	 a	wealthy,	 arstocratc	 famly	wth	whom	he	
enjoyed	 summers	 n	 europe.	 he	 began	 hs	 formal	 educaton	 at	 elte	
nsttutons	such	as	the	Groton	School,	and	then	harvard	and	Columba,	
where	he	debated	the	lvely	nternatonal	ssues	of	the	late	nneteenth	and	

















later,	 as	 a	presdental	 canddate,	 he	 even	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	dsavow	hs	
prevous	 support	 for	amercan	entry	 nto	 the	league	of	natons	and	he	
made	no	mportant	foregn	polcy	pronouncements	durng	hs	campagn.	
roosevelt	knew	that	gven	the	severty	of	the	domestc	economy,	he	would	
never	 be	 elected	 presdent	 as	 an	 nternatonalst;	 moreover,	 roosevelt	
beleved	that	before	amerca	could	agan	lead	n	world	affars	t	frst	had	
to	effect	relef	at	home.	in	part,	because	he	made	no	ssue	of	foregn	affars,	
roosevelt	won	 the	 support	of	 a	majorty	of	 later	 ant-nterventonsts	 n	
1932,	such	as	Senators	burton	K.	Wheeler	and	Gerald	nye.31
	 Upon	assumng	 the	presdency,	roosevelt	 focused	almost	exclusvely	
on	domestc	affars	whle	renderng	foregn	relatons	of	secondary	mpor-
tance.	 Ths	 s	 not	 surprsng	 nasmuch	 as	 the	 devastatng	 mpact	 of	 the	
Great	Depresson	 n	amerca	necesstated	 the	 presdent’s	 prortes.	The	
gross	natonal	product	had	dropped	from	$87	bllon	n	1929	to	$41	bl-
lon	by	1933,	whle	 the	 jobless	 rate	had	 exceeded	15	mllon.	Therefore,	
roosevelt	 the	 nternatonalst	 acted	 as	 a	 natonalst	 between	 1932	 and	
1934.32
	 roosevelt’s	 prortes	were,	 ndeed,	 reflected	 n	 how	 he	 handled	 for-
egn	 polcy.	hs	 foregn	 polcy	 team	 espoused	 both	 nternatonalst	 and	
	 30.	alan	brnkley,	Liberalism and Its Discontents	 (Cambrdge,	ma:	harvard	Unver-
sty	Press,	1998),	1–16;	robert	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 
1932–1945	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1979),	3–18;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and 
the Isolationists, 1932–1945	(lncoln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	3–5.
	 31.	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,	18–20;	Cole,	Roosevelt 
and the Isolationists, 17–27.





















the	md-	 to	 late	1930s	 led	 some	admnstraton	offcals	 to	became	con-
cerned	over	the	rse	of	fascst	elements	wthn	the	Unted	States.	indeed,	
extreme	rght-wngers	n	amerca,	lke	the	vocal	German	amercan	bund,	
denounced	roosevelt	 and	 the	new	Deal	 as	 communstc.	Whle	 on	 the	
surface	t	mght	have	appeared	there	were	tes	between	naz	Germany	and	
the	small	but	hghly	vsble	 fascst	groups	 n	 the	Unted	States,	 n	realty	
those	 lnks	 were	 mnmal.	 nevertheless,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 percepton	
that	a	domestc	fascst	threat	exsted.	in	1934	and	1935,	for	example,	sev-
eral	books	were	publshed	examnng	the	popularty	of	amercan	fascsm,	
such	as	Carmen	hader’s	Do We Want Fascism?	(1934),	norman	Thomas’s	
The Choice Before Us	 (1934),	 raymond	 Gram	 Swng’s	 The Forerunners 
of American Fascism	 (1935),	 and	 Snclar	 lews’s	 popular	 novel	 It Can’t 
Happen Here	(1935).34
	 33.	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,	23–34;	irwn	F.	Gellman,	
Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles	(baltmore:	Johns	hopkns	
Unversty	Press,	1995),	20–38;	moley	quoted	n	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	52.	On	the	
conferences	see	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,	51–70;	Cole,	Roos-
evelt and the Isolationists,	39–47,	59,	60–76;	Gellman,	Secret Affairs,	38–42.	On	German	foregn	
polcy	durng	ths	perod	see	Gerhard	Wenberg,	The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Dip-
lomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36	(Chcago:	Unversty	of	Chcago	Press,	1970).
	 34.	Carmen	hader,	Do We Want Fascism?	(new	york:	John	Day,	1934);	norman	Thomas,	
31Background
	 Concern	 led	roosevelt	 to	 call	 a	 conference	 on	 8	may	 1934	wth	 the	
attorney	 general,	 treasury	 secretary,	 labor	 secretary,	 and	 Fbi	 and	 Secret	
Servce	chefs	 to	dscuss	 the	 stuaton.	Durng	 the	conference,	 the	pres-
dent	ordered	the	Fbi	to	montor	amercan	nazs	and	ther	sympathzers	
and	to	determne	the	extent	to	whch	Germany	had	nfluenced	domestc	




at	 ts	orgn	 a	 concern	wth	 the	 effects	of	 foregn	 nfluence	on	domestc	
affars,	and	n	tme	ths	authorty	would	only	ncrease.35




economc	 nterests	 wthout	 becomng	 entangled	 n	 anythng	 that	mght	
lead	to	war,	wth	the	Frst	World	War	beng	the	best	example.	Ths	reas-
serton	 of	 congressonal	 prerogatve	 n	 foregn	 polcy	 stemmed	 from	 a	
wdespread	postwar	dsllusonment	 over	 the	purpose	 and	 effects	 of	 the	
Frst	World	War.	hghlghtng	and	contrbutng	to	these	concerns	was	the	
publcaton	of	varous	books	on	the	subject,	such	as	harry	elmer	barnes’s	






n	war,	 t	 nevertheless	 popularzed	 the	 ssue	 and	 fed	amercan	 postwar	
dsllusonment.36
The Choice Before Us	(new	york:	macmllan,	1934);	raymond	Gram	Swng,	Forerunners of 
American Fascism	 (new	york:	 Julan	messner,	1935);	Snclar	lews,	It Can’t Happen Here	
(Garden	Cty,	ny:	Doubleday,	Doran,	1935).	For	the	mpact	of	these	popular	works	on	pub-
lc	perceptons	of	domestc	fascsm,	see	Francs	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth 
Column and the American Home Front	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1995),	29–32.
	 35.	Wllams,	 “‘They	 never	 Stopped	Watchng	 Us,’”	 21–22;	 Theohars	 and	 Cox,	The 
Boss,	148–49.
	 36.	 See	Davd	m.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and 
War, 1929–1945	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1999),	387–88;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Senator 
Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations	(mnneapols:	Unversty	of	mnnesota	Press,	
1962),	 60–81.	On	 the	 nfluence	Dorothy	Detzer	 had	 on	 the	nye	 Commttee	 see	 rhodr	
Jeffreys-Jones,	Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 
1917–1994	(new	brunswck,	nJ:	rutgers	Unversty	Press,	1995),	65–83.
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followng	year,	 ncreased	 to	$583,000.	nevertheless,	 ant-nterventonsts	
were	pleased	wth	the	neutralty	act	and	pleased	that	the	conflct	n	afrca	
promoted	further	debate	on	how	to	mprove	the	measure.38
	 Wth	 the	 neutralty	 act	 to	 expre	 n	 early	 1936,	 Congress	 debated	





act	and	added	a	ban	on	 the	extenson	of	 loans	 to	countres	at	war.	The	
	 37.	 Justus	D.	Doenecke	and	John	e.	Wlz,	From Isolation to War, 1931–1941,	2nd	ed.	
(arlngton	heghts,	il:	harlan	Davdson,	1991),	56–57.
	 38.	 Jonas,	Isolationism in America,	172–75;	lloyd	C.	Gardner,	Economic Aspects of New 
Deal Diplomacy	(madson:	Unversty	of	Wsconsn	Press,	1964),	93,	94.
33Background
new	 provsons,	 n	 realty,	 were	 redundant	 snce	 the	 1934	 Johnson	 act	
prohbted	the	extenson	of	loans	to	countres	that	had	defaulted	on	ther	




	 increased	 nternatonal	 tensons	 n	 1936	 rased	 even	 further	 ssues	
concernng	 neutralty	 and	 domestc	 securty.	 in	 1936	 Span	 fell	 nto	 a	
three-year	cvl	war.	rght-wng	natonalst	forces	led	by	General	Francsco	
Franco	 (aded	 by	naz	Germany	 and	 Fascst	 italy)	 battled	 the	 so-called	







as	 mportant	 toward	 stoppng	 the	 spread	 of	 fascsm	 and,	 by	 1937,	 had	






























at	 the	Whte	 house.	 The	 presdent	 stated	 hs	 concerns	 to	 hull,	 notng	





roosevelt’s	 drectve	 steppng	 up	 Fbi	 ntellgence	 actvty,	 therefore,	
remaned	an	oral	one.41
	 When	hoover	mplemented	roosevelt’s	order,	however,	he	nterpreted	
roosevelt’s	 words	 to	 ntate	 not	 a	 lmted	 nvestgaton	 but	 an	 exten-
















	 42.	 leo	rbuffo,	The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depres-
sion to the Cold War	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1983),	184–87.	On	the	sgnf-
cance	of	the	1936	meetng	and	order	see	athan	Theohars,	The FBI and American Democ-





rhneland,	 and	 the	 Spansh	 Cvl	 War—amercan	 ant-nterventonsts	
sought	 to	make	 permanent	 the	 prevously	 temporary	 neutralty	 legsla-






and-carry	 provson	 whereby	 bellgerents	 could	 buy	 nonmltary	 goods	
from	the	Unted	States	f	they	pad	for	them	wth	hard	currency	and	trans-
ported	the	goods	themselves.	The	law	only	delayed	the	nevtable,	however,	
as	 t	 ndrectly	 encouraged	 the	axs	 powers	 nasmuch	 as	 they	 knew	 the	
Unted	States	would	not	ntervene	drectly	n	european	events.43
	 Other	events	durng	1937	and	1938	further	demonstrated	the	nfluence	









sttutonal	 amendment	 that	 would	 have	 placed	 the	 country’s	 war-mak-
ng	 power	 drectly	wth	 the	 people	 va	 referendum.	Whle	 the	 ntatve	
ultmately	faled,	t	nevertheless	demonstrated	the	popularty	of	the	ant-
nterventonsts	at	ths	pont.	meanwhle,	Fascst	aggresson	contnued	wth	





	 43.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	 400–1;	Doenecke	 and	Wlz,	From Isolation to War,	
63–64;	Jonas,	Isolationism in America,	198–99.
	 44.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	 405–6;	Doenecke	 and	Wlz,	From Isolation to War,	
69–70.
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aggresson	 advanced	 n	 Chna.	 Ths	 led	 roosevelt	 to	 begn	 to	 buld	 up	








found	hmself	 n	 trouble,	rumrch	was	 enamored	wth	Frst	World	War	
German	 esponage	 actvty.	after	wrtng	 to	 the	Völkischer Beobachter—








Jesse	 Jordan	 n	Dundee,	 Scotland,	who	worked	as	 a	 screen	 for	German	
ntellgence.	in	1937,	the	brtsh	Securty	Servce	(mi-5)	obtaned	a	war-
rant	to	ntercept	her	mal,	whch	led	them	to	establsh	her	dentty.	after	
tracng	 the	 source	 of	 her	 correspondence	 to	 the	 Unted	 States,	 mi-5	
offcals	 alerted	 the	Fbi	 and,	 n	due	 course,	 Fbi	 agents	 determned	 that	
rumrch	was	one	of	Jordan’s	correspondents.	he	was	placed	under	survel-
lance	but	only	arrested	n	February	1938	after	he	attempted	to	obtan	blank	
passports	 from	 the	State	Department.	Upon	hs	 arrest	rumrch	decded	
to	cooperate	wth	hs	captors,	 resultng	 n	 the	exposure	of	hs	esponage	
rng.	Despte	 the	fact	 that	 the	spy	rng	was,	 for	all	 ntents	and	purposes,	
rather	nept,	the	case	receved	front-page	headlnes	n	the	amercan	press	
and	helped	 to	 foster	 the	belef	 that	Ffth	Columnsts	had	permeated	 the	
country.	 The	 cooperaton	 wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence,	moreover,	 helped	 to	
lay	a	frm	bass	on	whch	the	Fbi	would	later	develop	an	ntmate	workng	
relatonshp.47
	 45.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	418–20.
	 46.	 Secret	World	War	ii	esponage	Summary,	no	date,	Fbi	65–37193–332,	pp.	25–34.





Wth	 both	 the	 nternatonal	 and	 domestc	 stuaton	 developng	 as	
they	 dd	 n	 1938,	 the	 Fbi	 acqured	 yet	 more	 nvestgatve	 autonomy.	
interested	 n	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 “so-called	 esponage	 stuaton,”	 Presdent	
roosevelt	 drected	 attorney	 General	 Cummngs	 n	 October	 to	 survey	
the	 government’s	 nvestgatve	 actvty.	When	 reportng	 the	 Fbi’s	 work	





stand	 the	 counteresponage	 character	of	Fbi	 nvestgatons	 (after	1936).	
The	Fbi	drector	preferred	to	nvestgate	under	the	bureau’s	1916	appro-
pratons	statute.48
	 Presdent	 roosevelt,	 apparently,	 was	 not	 dsturbed	 by	 the	 poltcal	
nature	of	some	Fbi	nvestgatons.	Ths	s	not	altogether	surprsng	gven	
hs	 leadershp	 style	whereby	 the	 charsmatc	 chef	 executve	 beleved	 he	










dnate	 domestc	 survellance	 through	 an	 nterdepartmental	 commttee,	






roosevelt’s	 secret	 order	 of	 26	 June	 1939	 placng	 all	 domestc	 nvestga-




intellgence.	 more	 mportantly,	 all	 domestc	 nformaton	 collected	 by	
these	agences	was	to	be	coordnated	wth	the	Fbi.	Ths	coordnaton	later	
extended	 publcly	 to	 local	 polce	 unts	 n	 September.	 hoover	 now	 had	




the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	1991),	184.	On	attorney	General	
murphy’s	concept	of	cvl	lbertes	protectons,	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	Free Speech in the Good 
War	(new	york:	St.	martn’s	Press,	1999),	21,	24,	26,	38,	48.
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tactc	 of	 the	 blitzkrieg.	Whle	 fghtng	 bravely,	 the	 Polsh	 defense	 forces	
were	utterly	unprepared	for	the	overwhelmng	nvason	and	had	no	chance	
of	 successfully	 defendng	 ther	 homeland.	 For	 Germany,	 however,	 the	
mltary	campagn—at	least—was	a	successful	part	of	adolf	htler’s	ncre-
mental	plan	to	unte	all	German-speakng	peoples	 nto	a	sngle	German	





or	 face	 the	 consequences.	 When	 Germany	 rebuffed	 the	 demand,	 both	
brtan	and	France,	adherng	to	ther	mutual	pledge	to	assst	Poland	n	the	
event	of	German	aggresson,	declared	war	on	3	September.
	 in	 the	 Unted	 States,	 Presdent	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 sought	 to	 move	
cautously	f	delberately.	before	the	German	nvason	of	Poland,	between	
1934	 and	1939,	roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy	was	 restrctonst	 and	 focused	




the	 Unted	 States	 was	 n	 realty	 clearly	 ant-axs,	 sgnfcantly	 no	 lon-
ger	 restrctonst,	 and	 predsposed	 to	 favor	 an	alled	 vctory.	 roosevelt,	
utlzng	 hs	 fnely	 honed	 leadershp	 sklls	 and	 wth	 a	 new	 percepton	
of	Germany	 as	 an	 aggressor,	was	 able	 from	 ths	 pont	 forward	 to	 shape	






tonst	 bloc.	 Some	of	 them	had	 sympathy	 for	 the	Poles,	 such	 as	Oswald	
Garrson	vllard	and	the	Chicago Tribune,	both	of	whom	regarded	htler	

























roosevelt	 then	 called	Congress	 nto	 specal	 sesson	on	 13	 September	 to	
consder	 revson	 of	 the	 neutralty	 act—to	 abandon	 the	 embargo	 and	
permt	the	use	of	cash-and-carry	for	mltary	goods.3
	 1.	Wayne	 S.	 Cole,	 Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	 (lncoln:	 Unversty	 of	
nebraska	Press,	1983),	320.
	 2.	 Justus	D.	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 
1939–1941	(lanham:	rowman	&	lttlefeld,	2000),	9–10,	14;	hamlton	Fsh,	Memoir of an 
American Patriot	 (Washngton,	DC:	regnery,	1991),	91;	Charles	lndbergh,	The Wartime 
Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh	(new	york:	harcourt	brace	Jovanovch,	1970),	250.






confded	 to	 hs	 journal	 after	 roosevelt’s	 rado	 talk	 that	 he	 wshed	 he	











and	warned	that	“by	 fghtng	 for	democracy	abroad	we	may	end	by	 los-
ng	t	at	home.”	The	war	had	the	potental,	he	argued,	to	destroy	Western	









he	 also	 publshed	 varous	 artcles	 n	 Reader’s Digest,	 Atlantic Monthly,	
and	Collier’s between	1939	and	the	sprng	of	1941	that,	whle	provng	to	
be	 controversal,	 sparked	 great	 publc	 nterest.	 lndbergh’s	 newly	 found	
poltcal	actvsm—whch	so	passonately	opposed	the	roosevelt	admns-
traton—almost	mmedately	caught	the	attenton	of	Fbi	offcals.6
	 The	 bureau’s	 ntal	 nvestgaton	 of	 lndbergh,	 datng	 broadly	 from	
September	1939	to	aprl	1941	when	he	joned	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	
	 4.	 lndbergh,	Wartime Journals,	251–52.
	 5.	 ibd.;	Wartime Journals,	253–56;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle 







materal.	 Fbi	 agents	 scoured	 the	 publc	 press	 for	 artcles	 about	 and	 by	
lndbergh	and	 revewed	books	 that	mentoned	hm.	by	clppng	 several	
hundred	press	stores,	Fbi	agents	were	able,	early	on,	to	construct	a	dosser	
that	enabled	them	to	dentfy	lndbergh’s	assocates	as	possble	nvestga-
tve	 targets.	 Searchng	 all	 avalable	 publc	 avenues,	 Fbi	 agents	 perused	
the	 country’s	manstream	 and	 extremst	 presses	 for	 any	 and	 all	 data	 on	







n	 the	controversy—sad	 that	by	usng	cash-and-carry	 to	 trade	 n	mun-
tons,	the	Unted	States	could	become	economcally	dependent	upon	the	
war.	he	also	advocated	replacng	roosevelt’s	cash-and-carry	proposal	wth	
one	 that	 mposed	 an	 absolute	 embargo	on	bellgerents,	 argung	 that	 the	
defct	n	trade	would	be	made	up	n	latn	amerca.	nye	warned,	more-
over,	that	f	cash-and-carry	were	adopted,	roosevelt	would	only	then	ask	






the	pay	of	 the	German	government”	 and	a	 spy.	Ths	 type	of	 sensatonal	
accusaton	 was	 leveled	 aganst	 varous	 promnent	 ant-nterventonsts,	
and	 t	 was	 one	 that	 stemmed	 purely	 from	 ther	 publc	 opposton	 to	
roosevelt’s	 foregn	 polcy.	 in	nye’s	 case,	 however,	 hs	 unnamed	 accuser	
beleved	 the	 content	 of	 nye’s	 poltcal	 speeches	 confrmed	 that	 he	 was	
pro-naz	and,	 n	 the	opnon	of	a	San	Francsco	chropractor,	a	German	
agent.	irrespectve	of	the	absurdty	of	such	a	complant,	an	Fbi	agent	was	
dspatched	 to	 ntervew	 the	 nformant	 (not	 always	 a	 routne	 procedure)	
and	only	then	dd	Fbi	offcals	deem	the	charge	baseless.	Whle	Fbi	agents	
	 7.	blnd	memorandum	re	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	no	date,	Fbi	65–1149–152.	On	the	use	
of	publc	source	materal	to	dentfy	targets,	see	Frank	J.	Donner,	The Age of Surveillance: The 
Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System	(new	york:	Knopf,	1980),	129.








crushed	wth	 the	Sovet	 nvason	of	 that	 country	 n	md-September,	 the	
war	 n	 europe	 suddenly—and	 temporarly—became	 quet.	 htler	 had	
hoped	the	alles,	facng	the	realty	of	a	defeated	Poland,	would	recognze	
that	he	had	no	desgns	on	 ether	French	or	brtsh	 terrtory	 and	would,	
therefore,	cease	hostltes.	hs	wsh	was	fancful,	f	at	all	serous.	For	ther	
part,	 the	alles	 saw	 no	 reason	 to	 seek	 reconclaton.	 They	 beleved	 the	
French	 border	 fortfcatons	 were	 adequate,	 and	 they	 thought	 the	 thck	
ardennes	Forest	would	prevent	the	German	army	from	enterng	France.	
To	 the	alles,	 the	 only	 possblty	 for	 a	German	westward	 nvason	was	
through	the	low	Countres	where	t	would	be	countered	by	the	combned	




ant-nterventonst	 actvty,	 prmarly	 by	 collectng	 varous	 newspaper	
clppngs.	 They	 were	 also	 nterested	 n	 correspondence	 amercans	 sent	
to	the	Whte	house,	but	partcularly	that	concernng	Charles	lndbergh.	
Worred	 ctzens	 wrote	 ther	 government	 to	 express	 concern	 about	
lndbergh	 or	 to	 provde	 nformaton	 they	 beleved	 would	 nterest	 gov-
ernment	 offcals.	no	matter	who	 n	 the	 government	 receved	 these	 let-
ters,	much	of	the	correspondence	nvarably	found	ts	way	to	the	Fbi.	as	
lndbergh’s	poltcal	efforts	ncreased,	so,	too,	dd	the	bureau’s	correspon-
dence	 fle.	 reflectng	 lndbergh’s	 ncreasng	 promnence	 n	 the	 foregn	
polcy	 debate—where	 hs	 poltcal	 actvty	 and	 past	 tours	 of	 Germany	
between	1936	and	1938	(where	he	was	awarded	a	medal)	were	called	nto	
queston—many	amercans	 expressed	 concern	 over	 the	 avator’s	 loyalty	
and	patrotsm.	One	ctzen	wrote:	“i	don’t	understand	why	your	depart-









pellng	 forward	 the	 Fbi’s	 already	 unauthorzed—f	 passve—montorng	
of	 the	ant-nterventonsts.	On	9	aprl	1940,	however,	 the	 	“phony	war”	  
came	 to	 an	 end.	Germany	 nvaded	Denmark,	 leadng	 to	 the	 subsequent	
conquests	 of	 norway,	 belgum,	 holland,	 and	 France.	 in	 reacton,	 lead-
ng	 ant-nterventonsts—lke	 lndbergh—spoke	 out	 aganst	 amercan	
nvolvement.	 Then,	 n	 may	 1940,	 at	 roosevelt’s	 request,	 Presdental	
Secretary	Stephen	early	forwarded	to	hoover	“a	number	of	telegrams”	that	
were	“n	opposton	to	natonal	defense.”	The	Whte	house	had	receved	
the	 telegrams	 followng	 roosevelt’s	 recent	 speech	 on	 natonal	 defense	
and	 the	 threat	 to	amerca	by	 foregn	 ar	 forces.	early	 nformed	hoover	
that	 “the	Presdent	 thought	you	mght	 lke	 to	 look	 them	over	noting the 
names and addresses of	 the	 senders.” The	 followng	month,	 for	a	 second	
tme,	early	forwarded	to	hoover	thrty-sx	telegrams	receved	“expressng	
approval	 of	Col.	 lndbergh’s	 [rado]	 address”	 that	month	on	 “Our	Drft	
Towards	War.”11
	 instead	of	merely	“notng	the	names	and	addresses”	of	the	correspon-
dents,	hoover	 exceeded	 the	 presdent’s	 nterest	 and	 ordered	 a	 search	 of	
the	Fbi’s	 fles	 for	 any	 nformaton	on	 the	wrters.	Ths	 nformaton	was	
then	 compled	 and	 forwarded	 to	 the	Whte	house	 for	 ts	 “convenence	
and	 reference.”	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 had	 not	 requested	 ths	 nformaton.	




presdent	 told	hm	over	 lunch:	 “if	 i	 should	de	 tomorrow,	 i	want	you	 to	
know	ths.	i	am	absolutely	convnced	that	lndbergh	s	a	naz.”	roosevelt	
also	wrote	Stmson:	 “When	 i	 read	lndbergh’s	 speech	 [of	 20	may]	 i	 felt	
that	t	could	not	have	been	better	put	f	t	had	been	wrtten	by	Goebbels	










	 12.	Personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	 J.	edgar	hoover	 to	 Stephen	early,	 26	 June	1940,	
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	 hoover’s	 decson	 to	 bref	 the	Whte	house	 on	 ts	 ant-nterventon-
st	 crtcs	 marked	 a	 sgnfcant	 development	 n	 the	 hoover-roosevelt	
relatonshp,	 trggerng	 an	 ongong	 and	 ntensfed	 survellance	 of	 the	







	 as	 lndbergh’s	 partcpaton	 n	 the	 so-called	Great	Debate	 escalated	
over	1940,	so,	too,	dd	Fbi	montorng	efforts.	as	the	avator’s	comments	
became	 ncreasngly	 more	 controversal,	 hs	 popularty	 and	 nfluence	
among	the	publc	ncreased.	in	hs	1939	artcle	“avaton,	Geography,	and	
race,”	 the	 fler’s	contentous	and	racst	 statements	 led	many	 to	conclude	




a	 Genghs	 Khan	 or	 the	 nfltraton	 of	 nferor	 blood.”	 (years	 later,	 well	
after	the	concluson	of	the	war,	lndbergh	elaborated	on	these	comments,	





not	 surprsngly,	 such	 deas	 led	many,	 ncludng	offcals	 n	 the	 govern-
ment,	to	regard	the	fler	as	a	naz	sympathzer.	no	matter	how	odous	hs	
vews,	 lndbergh’s	 opnons	dd	not,	 however,	 consttute	 grounds	 for	 an	
Fbi	nvestgaton.13
	 lndbergh’s	goal	durng	1940	was	to	promote	the	dea	that	the	Unted	












approaches	 to	 the	Western	hemsphere,	 lndbergh	 clamed	 the	 country	
would	be	mpregnable	to	enemy	attack.	“Wth	a	frm	and	clear-cut	polcy,”	
he	 told	amercans	 n	 a	 natonal	 rado	 broadcast	 n	may	 1940,	 “we	 can	
buld	an	ar	defense	for	amerca	that	wll	stand	above	these	shftng	sands	




	 Datng	 from	1940,	 Fbi	 agents	 began	 to	pursue	 leads	 suggestng	 that	
lndbergh	mght	 have	 been	 nvolved	wth	 fascst	 organzatons.	 To	 Fbi	
offcals	 these	 alleged	 connectons	 assumed	 partcular	 sgnfcance	 after	
Congress	 passed	 the	 Smth	 act	 of	 1940	 that	 authorzed	 prosecuton	 of	






called	 the	 James	 True	assocates—an	 ant-Communst	 and	 ant-Semtc	
group—whose	 leaders	 reportedly	 “referred	 to	 lndbergh	 as	 ther	 leader	
and	a	good	man	for	the	presdency.”	by	august	1940,	another	Fbi	source	
reported	 that	 the	 German	 propagandst	 Dr.	 Frederch	 ernst	 auhagen,	
who	had	been	convcted	for	falng	to	regster	wth	the	Justce	Department	
as	an	agent	of	a	 foregn-controlled	organzaton,	clamed	that	lndbergh	
was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Steerng	 Commttee	 of	 the	 amercan	 Fellowshp	
Forum.	 accordng	 to	 auhagen,	 the	 amercan	 Fellowshp	 Forum	 was	 a	
“German	propaganda	unt”	that	“advocated	a	Fascst	form	of	government	
and	one	whch	would	cooperate	wth	the	naz	regme.”15
	 lndbergh	 was	 allegedly	 lnked	 to	 other	 groups	 lke	 the	 natonal	
Copperheads,	led	by	ells	Jones	(who	was	convcted	for	sedton	n	1942)	
and	robert	hoble,	who	“supported	the	polces	and	prncples	of	Charles	









followers.	 Despte	 lndbergh’s	 beng	 popularly	 assocated	 wth	 “numer-
ous”	subversve	organzatons,	Fbi	offcals	nevertheless	admtted	that	“no	








concded	wth	hs	 elevaton,	upon	 the	death	of	 Senator	Wllam	borah,	
















	 Unlke	 the	 prevous	 esponage	 charge	 aganst	nye,	hoover	 took	 ths	
one	 more	 serously.	 The	 reason	 for	 ths	 probably	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	
that	Wtherow	was	 a	 lawyer	 and	 clamed	 to	have	prevously	 engaged	 n	















	 irrespectve	 of	 ther	 uncorroborated	 or	 fantastc	 nature,	 hoover	





congressman	wthout	 admnstraton	 approval.	 if	 any	 unauthorzed	 Fbi	
nvestgaton	became	publc,	the	onus	for	t	would	be	on	hoover	alone.
	 Ths	 dchotomy	 between	 unsolcted	 allegatons	 and	 admnstra-
ton	 requests	 for	 nvestgatons	 s	 exemplfed	 n	 a	Whte	house	 request	
of	 June	 1940	 to	 nvestgate	 a	matter	 concernng	nye	 and	 hs	 assocates.	












	 because	 the	 Whte	 house	 had	 requested	 ths	 nvestgaton,	 hoover	
ordered	that	 t	be	gven	“contnuous	and	preferred	attenton.”	Fbi	agents	
ntervewed	 Senator	brookhart,	nye’s	 former	 secretary	D.	h.	mcarthur,	
and	major	Thomas	C.	mcDonald—brookhart’s	 frend	who	had	 clamed	
	 18.	 letter,	 James	m.	Wtherow	 to	hoover,	 31	 January	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–8799–2X;	 letter,	
Wtherow	to	hoover,	24	February	1940,	Fbi	65–8799–2X;	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	
to	hoover,	18	march	1940,	Fbi	65–8799–2X.
	 19.	memorandum,	 early	 to	hoover,	 18	 June	 1940,	 Offcal	 Fle	 10-b,	 146-a,	 FDrl;	
memorandum,	mrs.	 John	Frece	 to	 early,	 18	 June	 1940,	Offcal	 Fle	 10-b,	 146-a,	 FDrl;	
memorandum,	C.	m.	busbee,	miD,	 to	actng	Chef	of	 Staff,	G-2,	 25	 June	1940,	Fbi	87–
2755–287.
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Grunewald	 was	 a	 spy.	 because	 brookhart’s	 statement	 was	 hearsay,	 Fbi	
agents	 focused	 upon	mcarthur	 and	mcDonald.	 The	 former	 confrmed	





between	 Grunewald	 and	 Colonel	 edwn	 emerson,	 whom	 mcDonald	
clamed	was	a	Frst	World	War	German	agent.	Fbi	agents	then	sought	to	





agents’	 probe	 of	 Grunewald	 because,	 n	 June,	 Grunewald—unaware	 of	
the	nvestgaton—asked	Fbi	agents	to	examne	hs	telephone	to	ascertan	
f	 t	 had	been	 tapped.	 “belevng	 ths	was	 a	 good	opportunty	 to	 closely	









ths	 “negatve”	 nformaton	 about	 Grunewald,	 nye,	 and	 Woodrng	 not	
only	to	early—who	had	requested	the	nvestgaton—but	to	the	attorney	
general	and	hs	assstant,	as	well	as	Treasury	Secretary	henry	morgenthau.	
Clearly,	 t	 only	 renforced	 ther	negatve	 opnons	 of	roosevelt’s	 oppos-
ton.22
	 20.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	early,	27	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	
146-a;	 affdavt	 of	 D.	h.	mcarthur,	 27	 June	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–6165-?.	Whle	 the	 document	
number	s	unreadable,	t	can	be	found	n	Wayne	S.	Cole’s	papers	at	the	hhl.	memorandum,	









nvestgaton	 and	 Grunewald’s	 unsolcted	 sharng	 of	 nformaton	 wth	
the	Fbi,	hoover	realzed	the	value	of	Grunewald	as	a	source	of	poltcal	
ntellgence.	a	connected	Washngton	poltcal	operatve,	Grunewald	had	
connectons	 to	 promnent	 personaltes	 lke	 Senator	nye,	 former	Whte	
house	ade	Thomas	Corcoran,	and	the	conservatve	and	poltcally	actve	





and	 subversve	 groups.	 Sgnfcantly,	 however,	 Fbi	assstant	Drector	D.	
mlton	ladd	determned	that	miD	“was	merely	resurrectng	old	nforma-
ton”	 already	put	 to	 rest.	yet,	 anxous	 to	 captalze	 on	Grunewald’s	 con-




	 Wretappng	 was	 not	 a	 legal	 survellance	 method.	 Snce	 passage	 n	
1934	 of	 the	 Federal	Communcatons	act,	 and	 untl	 the	 1968	Omnbus	
Crme	Control	and	Safe	Streets	act	permtted	wretappng	wth	a	warrant,	
the	 ntercepton	of	wre	or	rado	communcatons	by	anyone	was	 llegal.	
Ths	 law	was	 even	upheld	by	 two	companon	Supreme	Court	decsons,	
Nardone v. U.S.	 (1937	and	1939),	 and	attorney	General	robert	 Jackson,	
who	 n	 march	 1940,	 publcly	 announced	 that	 the	 Justce	 Department	
would	not	sancton	wretappng.	he	ponted	out	that	the	Fbi	was	not	an	
OGPU—forerunner	of	the	Sovet	nKvD	and	KGb.	in	may	1940,	however,	
wth	 the	 war	 crss	 mountng,	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 secretly	 authorzed	
the	 use	 of	wretaps	 to	 avert	 “sabotage,	 assassnatons,	 and	 ‘ffth	 column’	
actvtes”	but	only	n	cases	concernng	“natonal	defense”	and	“of	persons	
suspected	of	 subversve	 actvtes	 aganst	 the	Government	 of	 the	Unted	
to	mcGure,	9	July	1940,	Fbi	65–6165–12	(wth	attached	8	July	memo);	letter,	morgenthau	














	 attorney	General	 Jackson,	 however,	wanted	hoover	 to	mantan	 the	
record	of	these	wretaps.	hoover	dd	ths	by	mantanng	a	“memorandum	
book”	 of	 attorney	 general–authorzed	 wretaps	 n	 hs	 offce.	 by	 placng	











secret	 fle	 of	 assstant	 Drector	 lous	 nchols.	 even	 more	 curous,	 the	
Fbi	 mantaned	 as	 standard	 polcy	 that	 wretap-authorzaton	 cards	 be	
destroyed	every	sx	months,	yet	these	cards	somehow	escaped	destructon.	





they	 recorded	 crtcal	 and	 poltcally	 charged	 comments	 that	 varous	
promnent	 ndvduals	 had	 made	 to	 Grunewald	 over	 the	 telephone.	 in	
September	1941,	for	example,	Grunewald	had	a	conversaton	wth	former	
	 24.	 Federal	Communcatons	act,	47	U.S.C.	605	(1934);	majorty	Opnon,	U.S.	Supreme	
Court	Justce	Owen	J.	roberts,	Nardone v. United States,	302	U.S.	397	(20	December	1937);	












navy	 Secretary	 Knox	 as	 an	 “ncompetent	 four-flusher,”	 and	 dsmssed	
naval	 ntellgence	 offcers	 as	 an	 “awfully	 snooty	 bunch.”	 Corcoran	 also	
commented	 to	 Grunewald	 that	 he	 beleved	 roosevelt	 only	 surrounded	
hmself	 wth	 “stuffed	 shrt”	 ndvduals.	 Fbi	 agents	 also	 ntercepted	 a	
conversaton	 Grunewald	 had	 wth	 Woodrng	 concernng	 hs	 desre	 to	
work	wth	the	prcng	commsson.	These	examples	demonstrate	that	the	












publcly.	 hoover’s	 “personal	 and	 confdental”	 letter	 system—dscussed	
n	chapter	1—was	certanly	used,	but	by	1940	he	devsed	further	creatve	
flng	methods.	On	 11	aprl	 1940,	hoover	 nsttuted	 the	 “Do	not	 Fle”	







Fbi	 offcals	 were	 nterested	 n	 the	 poltcal	 actvtes	 of	 varous	 ant-	
nterventonsts,	 but	 partcularly	 nterested	 n	 them	 f	 ther	 poltcs	
nvolved	 crtcsm	of	 the	Fbi.	 in	 ths	 regard,	 Fbi	 offcals	 found	 Senator	
	 27.	Personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	(deleted)	to	Tamm,	3	September	1941,	Fbi	
65–6165–42.





of	 the	Fbi	suspcous.	 in	 terms	of	 the	 foregn	polcy	debate,	Fbi	offcals	
focused	 on	Wheeler’s	 publc	 statements	made	 n	may	 of	 1940	 when	 he	
crtczed	 the	 Fbi	 n	 the	Philadelphia Inquirer.	 in	 reacton	 to	roosevelt’s	
proposal	 to	 transfer	 the	 immgraton	 bureau	 to	 the	 Justce	 Department	
after	the	“phony	war,”	Senator	Wheeler	sad	the	dea	was	terrble	because	
another	 Justce	 Department	 agency—the	 Fbi—was	 staffed	 by	 “a	 lot	 of	
cheap	two-by-four	detectves.”	Then,	 n	June,	the	Fbi’s	Seattle	feld	offce	













tser	henry	hoke—publsher	of	the Reporter of Direct Mail Advertising—
had	 accused	 varous	 senators	 and	 congressmen	 of	 llegally	 dstrbutng	
franked	 envelopes.	 (Congressmen	 have	 the	 rght	 to	 mal	 speeches	 and	
other	 nformaton	 to	 consttuents	 postage-free.)	These	 envelopes,	whch	
contaned	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature,	 allegedly	 were	 sent	 to	 German	
amercans	 who	 subsequently	 maled	 them	 en	 masse	 to	 amercans	 n	
an	 attempt	 to	 nfluence	 popular	 opnon.	hoke	 sngled	 out	 Farm-labor	
Senator	ernest	lundeen	of	mnnesota,	Democratc	Senator	rush	holt	of	
West	vrgna,	 Senator	nye,	 republcan	representatve	 J.	 Thorkelson	 of	
montana,	 and	representatve	 Fsh	 for	 usng	 ther	 frank	 n	 ths	manner.	
hoover	forwarded	ths	nformaton	to	the	Justce	Department’s	neutralty	
law	Unt,	and	whle	at	ths	tme	t	generated	no	concern,	by	1941	t	would	
evolve	 nto	 a	 controversy	 that	 for	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 congressmen	
suggested—by	assocaton—that	they	had	foregn	lnks.30
	 29.	 “Wheeler	 Denounces	 Fbi	 as	 ‘2-by-4’	 Detectves,”	 Philadelphia Inquirer, 31	 may	
1940,	n	Wheeler	Fbi	fle,	number	unreadable;	memorandum,	r.	P.	Kramer	to	Clegg,	1	June	
1940,	Fbi	62–55261–3;	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon,	103,	104.
	 30.	Personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	 SaC	 new	 york	 to	 hoover,	 7	 September	 1940,	
54 Chapter 
















unsubstantated	 nformaton	 n	 December	 1940,	 whch	 he	 shared	 wth	
the	Whte	house,	Treasury	Department,	and	State	Department,	 that	 the	
wfe	 of	 a	 former	 German	 embassy	 counselor	 agreed	 to	 prepare	 a	 sum-
mary	of	 nformaton	on	adolf	htler	and	dsarmament	 for	Wheeler	and	
Democratc	Senator	mllard	Tydngs.	The	nformaton	also	ndcated	that	
the	woman	clamed	 to	be	“workng	wth	mrs.	Wheeler	on	 ths	 ‘amerca	
Frst’	 organzaton.”	 (The	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 became	 a	 natonal	
organzaton	 n	December	 1940.)	 Ths	 nformaton,	 though	 uncorrobo-
rated,	suggested	to	senor	admnstraton	offcals	that	Wheeler	and	other	
ant-nterventonst	 crtcs	 had	 tes	 wth	 naz	 Germany.	 Such	 nforma-












	 32.	blnd	memorandum,	 31	December	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–28688–115X1	 attached	 to:	 per-



















head	 of	 our	Government	 one	who	 possesses	 such	 sterlng,	 sncere,	 and	
altogether	human	qualtes.33
Wth	such	approval	comng	from	the	Whte	house	n	1940,	t	was	perhaps	
wth	 lttle	 surprse	 that	 durng	 the	 followng	 year	 the	 Fbi’s	 survellance	
efforts	ncreased.
—■■■■■■■—
a	sgnfcant	development	 n	1940	that	underscores	 the	evoluton	of	 the	


















nterest	 was	 prmarly	 bureaucratc—as	 a	 conservatve	 operatng	 n	 the	
roosevelt	admnstraton—whereas	the	bSC’s	nterest	was	n	brngng	the	
Unted	States	nto	the	european	war	on	the	alled	sde.








the	usual	cover	 for	brtsh	 ntellgence—and	wth	 the	brtsh	Purchasng	
Commsson.	by	1939,	furthermore,	hoover	reported	to	the	Whte	house	
that	 the	 Fbi	 had	 enjoyed	 “for	 the	 past	 several	 years”	 an	 offcal	 lason	
wth	 the	royal	Canadan	mounted	Polce	 “n	 the	 felds	 of	 plant	 protec-
ton,	esponage	and	sabotage,”	whch	yelded	valuable	nformaton	for	the	
bureau.	 it	was	 not	 untl	 1940,	 however,	 that	 the	 Fbi	would	 establsh	 an	










the	Orgns	of	amercan	Central	 ntellgence,”	 Intelligence and National Security	 20	 (June	
2005):	226.	hoover	relayed	some	ntellgence,	about	the	securty	of	Greenland,	gleaned	from	
Paget	to	roosevelt:	see	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	23	aprl	1940,	
Offcal	Fle	 10-b,	FDrl.	 (Ths	 nformaton,	whch	roosevelt	 read	personally,	 apparently	
mpressed	the	Canadan	prme	mnster,	mackenze	Kng,	n	terms	of	the	presdent’s	ntel-
lgence	 sources	when	roosevelt	 shared	 t	wth	hm.	 See:	 personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	
hoover	to	Watson,	14	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.)	On	the	Fbi-rCmP	connecton	
see	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	2	December	1939;	letter,	S.	T.	Wood,	










was	 mperatve	 that	he	 frst	make	contact	wth	 J.	edgar	hoover	and	 the	
Fbi.	Ths	he	was	able	to	do	through	a	mutual	frend,	the	celebrated	boxer	
Gene	Tunney,	who	had	defeated	Jack	Dempsey	for	the	heavyweght	box-





opposed	 strongly	 any	 ntmate	 relatonshp	 wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence.	
because	of	ths	obstacle,	Stephenson	obtaned	roosevelt’s	assent	through	
a	mutual	frend	he	had	wth	the	presdent,	the	wealthy	new	york	arstocrat	
vncent	astor.	Presdent	roosevelt	 then	endorsed	a	 lason	between	 the	
Fbi	and	brtsh	ntellgence,	hopng	that	the	two	would	work	very	closely	
together.36
	 reportedly,	 Stephenson	 then	 negotated	 the	 detals	 of	 lason	 wth	
hoover,	sharng	wth	hm	brtsh	nformaton	regardng	the	forthcomng	
italan	declaraton	of	war	on	the	alles	n	1940	whch	hoover	forwarded	
to	 the	Whte	house.	 Stephenson	 then	 traveled	 to	london	 to	 coordnate	
wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 authortes,	 and	 returned	 to	new	york	Cty	 on	
21	 June	1940	 to	organze	what	would	be	named,	 by	hoover,	 the	brtsh	
Securty	 Coordnaton.	 located	 on	 Ffth	 avenue	 wthn	 rockefeller	
Center,	 Stephenson	 peced	 together	 the	 bSC	 by	 hrng	 ffteen	 securty	
offcers	 and	 forty-fve	 support	 personnel	 whle	mantanng	 close	 com-
muncatons	wth	hoover.	Stephenson’s	msson,	however,	was	 threefold:	
to	protect	brtsh	property	 n	amerca	 (especally	after	 the	 formaton	of	
	 35.	Charles,	 “‘before	 the	 Colonel	 arrved,’”	 226–27;	 anthony	 Cave	 brown,	 “C”: The 
Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill	 (new	york:	macmllan,	
1987),	262.
	 36.	Thomas	Troy,	Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA	
(new	haven,	CT:	yale	Unversty	Press,	1996),	39;	h.	montgomery	hyde,	Secret Intelligence 
Agent	 (new	york:	St.	martn’s,	1982),	82;	Charles,	“‘before	 the	Colonel	arrved,’”	227.	On	
amercan	anglophoba	see	John	e.	moser,	Twisting the Lion’s Tail: American Anglophobia 





The	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 ant-nterventonsts	 between	 September	 1939	
and	December	1940	conssted	prmarly	of	passve	ntellgence	gatherng,	








over	amercan	 nvolvement	 n	 the	european	war	 ncreased	dramatcally	
by	1941,	a	tme	when	ant-nterventonsts	moved	beyond	advocatng	neu-





record	 Group	 59,	 800.01b11	 regstraton/1140,	 natonal	 archves	 and	 records	 admn-
straton	 (nara);	 letter	 and	 lst	of	bSC	employees,	Crane	 to	Gordon,	12	February	1941,	
rG	59,	800.01b11	regstraton/1209,	nara;	 letter,	r.	l.	bannerman	to	Clark,	6	February	
1941,	rG	59,	841.01b11/191,	nara;	letter,	berle	to	Sumner	Welles,	31	march	1941,	rG	59,	
841.20211/23,	nara;	British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence 
in the Americas, 1940–45	(london:	St.	ermn’s	Press,	1998),	xxv–xxv.
Intensification
The Lend-Lease Debate, America First, and Its Allies
December 1940 to Summer 1941
The	 debate	 between	 nterventonsts	 and	 so-called	 solatonsts	 changed	
n	late	1940	and	extendng	nto	1941.	Durng	the	1940	electon	cycle,	the	
debate	centered	on	the	need	to	ensure	neutralty	and	amercan	defense,	















volatng	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law	 as	 defned	 n	 the	neutralty	 and	 Johnson	
acts,	 on	 17	December	 1940	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 announced	 a	 new	 and	
nnovatve	 polcy.	 To	 ensure	 contnued	 brtsh	 access	 to	 war	 matérel,	
roosevelt	 proposed	 to	 “elmnate	 the	 dollar	 sgn”	 from	 further	 orders.	
The	presdent	called	hs	 dea	“lend-lease”	and,	to	smplfy	the	matter	for	
	 1.	 See	Garry	J.	Clfford	and	Samuel	r.	Spencer	Jr.,	The First Peacetime Draft	(lawrence:	
Unversty	of	Kansas	Press,	1986);	Wllam	l.	langer	and	everett	S.	Gleason,	The Challenge 















	 ant-nterventonsts	moblzed	 n	 opposton	 to	 the	 presdent’s	 pro-
posal.	lend-lease,	n	partcular,	became	a	focal	pont	for	those	who	sought	






moreover,	 provded	 momentum	 for	 ant-nterventonsts	 to	 organze	
natonally	and	gave	rse	to	the	emergence	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
as	 the	 most	 sgnfcant,	 and	 best-funded,	 ant-nterventonst	 pressure	
group.
	 Whle	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	became	natonally	promnent	only	
by	 late	1940,	 ts	orgns	date	 from	earler	 that	year	when	yale	Unversty	
law	student	r.	Douglas	Stuart	Jr.	formed	the	group	as	a	student	organza-
ton.	Troubled	by	 the	events	of	 early	1940,	he	 sought	 the	backng	of	hs	
colleagues	who	ncluded	Gerald	r.	Ford	(the	future	presdent)	and	Potter	
Stewart	(the	future	Supreme	Court	justce),	among	others.	by	the	autumn	
he	 had	 persuaded	 a	 number	 of	 mdwestern	 busnessmen	 and	 leadng	
republcan	conservatves	 to	help	organze	hs	group	on	a	natonal	 level,	
n	 part,	 to	 oppose	 the	 nterventonst	 Commttee	 to	 Defend	 amerca	
by	 adng	 the	 alles	 whch	 was	 led	 by	 newspaperman	 Wllam	 allen	
Whte.	Wth	these	goals	n	mnd,	the	so-called	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
announced	 ts	 formaton	 n	September	1940	and	headquartered	 tself	 n	
Chcago.3
	 2.	Wayne	 S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1939–1945	 (lncoln:	Unversty	 of	
nebraska	Press,	1983),	411–13.
	 3.	Wayne	S.	Cole,	America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940–1941 (madson:	
Unversty	of	Wsconsn	Press,	1953),	10–13;	Justus	D.	Doenecke,	ed.,	In Danger Undaunted: 
The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940–1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America 
First Committee	(Stanford,	Ca:	hoover	insttuton	Press,	1990),	7,	87–88.
1Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941
	 The	commttee’s	prmary	objectve	was	 to	undermne	publc	 support	
for	 Presdent	 roosevelt’s	 ncreasngly	 nterventonst	 foregn	 polcy.	 To	
promote	 ths	 objectve,	 Stuart	 enlsted	 robert	 e.	 Wood—charman	 of	











after	 gong	 natonal,	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 expanded	 rapdly	
by	 openng	 chapters	 n	 ctes	 and	 towns	 natonwde.	 it	 also	 sponsored	
ant-nterventonst	 speakers	 both	 at	 ralles	 and	 on	 the	 rado,	 publshed	
ant-nterventonst	 lterature,	 and	 suppled	 nformaton	 to	 members	




	 Whle	 the	 commttee	 declared	 tself	 to	 be	 nonpartsan,	 ts	member-
shp	 was	 composed	 mostly	 of	 those	 who	 were	 poltcally	 conservatve.	
irrespectve	of	ths	makeup,	varous	radcal	groups	endorsed	smlar	polt-





commttee’s	most	 sgnfcant	 hndrances,	 and	 a	 bass	 on	 whch	 the	 Fbi	
would	focus.6
	 4.	Cole,	America First,	13–15;	amerca	Frst	ams	as	quoted	n	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt 
and the Isolationists, 1932–45	(lncoln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	381.	emphass	
n	orgnal.
	 5.	 Justus	 D.	 Doenecke,	 The Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941	 (malabar,	 Fl:	
Kreger	Press,	1997),	9.
















the	 aFC’s	 alleged	 fascst	 leanngs—all	 of	 t	 unsubstantated—Fbi	 off-
cals	ether	beleved	 these	allegatons	or	 found	 t	poltcally	expedent	 to	
forward	ntellgence	to	the	admnstraton	that	suggested	ts	crtcs	were,	
ndeed,	 “subversve.”	 in	 short,	 Fbi	Drector	hoover	 played	 to	 Presdent	
roosevelt’s	poltcal	nterests.	but	at	the	start	of	ther	probe,	at	least,	nto	
amerca	Frst,	Fbi	agents	found	very	lttle	evdence	to	suggest	the	group	
had	 subversve	 connectons.	 Throughout	 the	 entre	 course	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	
nvestgaton,	moreover,	agents	gathered	 nformaton	accurately	showng	
that	the	aFC	sought	to	exclude	extreme	elements	from	ts	ranks,	but	ths	
nformaton	 was	 subordnated	 to	 negatve	 nformaton,	 much	 of	 whch	
was	shared	wth	the	admnstraton.	as	the	foregn	polcy	debate	ntens-
fed,	and	as	nterventonst	groups	and	advocates	ncreased	ther	nvectve	
toward	 ant-nterventonsts,	 the	 Fbi’s	 accumulaton	 of	 unsubstantated	
materal	 suggestng	 aFC	 fascst	 lnks	multpled.	 Ths	 changng	 vew	 s	










amercan	 image	 of	 Totaltaransm,	 1930s–1950s,”	American Historical Review	 75	 (aprl	
1970):	1046–64.
	 8.	report,	SaC	Washngton,	DC,	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–384.
3Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941
	 Fbi	agents	frst	took	notce	of	the	aFC’s	poltcal	actvtes	and	susp-
cous	 connectons	 on	 9	november	 1940.	On	 that	 date	 the	brmngham,	
alabama,	 specal	 agent	 n	 charge	 (SaC)	 reported	 to	 hoover	 that	 an	
nformer	had	alerted	hm	to	a	rado	program,	sponsored	by	amerca	Frst,	
ared	 to	dscuss	 the	war	stuaton.	The	 nformant	beleved	 the	program’s	
content	 “ndcated	 to	hm	 that	 t	was	 a	naz	 nspred	program	 [that]	he	








dated	 the	 forthcomng	 vocferous	 lend-lease	 debate,	 accurately	 reflected	
the	aFC’s	poltcal	poston.	On	16	December,	for	example,	Fbi	assstant	
Drector	 lous	 nchols—the	 head	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	 Crme	 records	 Dvson	
and	n	ths	capacty	hoover’s	formal	lason	to	the	meda	and	Congress—
authored	a	 revew	of	news	 reports	 that	 ndcated	 that	 the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	was	“n	favor	of	mantanng	a	strct	cash	and	carry	polcy,	a	
strct	polcy	of	neutralty,	buldng	adequate	defenses	and	that	they	would 
not tolerate any Communists or Fascists	n	the	group.”10
	 Unsurprsngly,	Fbi	agents	at	ths	pont	had	not	developed	sgnfcant	
quanttes	 of	 nformaton	 on	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 The	 reason	
for	the	paucty	of	the	nformaton	les	n	the	fact	that	the	group	had	only	
just	 been	 formed	 and	 t	 devoted	 ts	 resources	 to	 organzng	 tself	 whle	
opposng	 the	 nterventonst	 Commttee	 to	 Defend	 amerca	 by	 adng	




presdent’s	 ntatve.	The	 frst	 summary	memorandum	on	amerca	Frst	
was	created	on	29	 January	1941	 for	assstant	 to	 the	Drector	edward	a.	











ton	 would	 oppose	 the	 presdental	 ntatve	 “wth	 all	 the	 vgor	 t	 can	





that	 hs	 remark	 was	 the	 “rottenest,”	 most	 “dastardly,”	 and	 “unpatrotc”	
thng	he	had	ever	heard.)	after	the	bll	was	ntroduced	n	Congress,	Wood,	





sored	 hundreds	 of	 meetngs,	 dstrbuted	 newsletters	 and	 pettons,	 and	
pad	for	poston	papers	n	major	newspapers,	whch	were	then	reprnted	
n	 the	Congressional Record,	 urgng	 opposton.	 by	 the	 end	 of	 February	
1941,	at	the	heght	of	the	lend-lease	debate,	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
had	organzed	some	648	“embryonc	chapters”	across	the	naton.13




through	march	and	was	one	of	 the	most	heated	 n	amercan	hstory.	 in	
the	 nterm,	Fbi	Drector	hoover,	despte	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Whte	house	
was	 recevng	 poltcal	 updates	 from	 ts	 congressonal	 floor	 managers,	
provded	 the	 admnstraton	wth	 advance	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 on	 both	
the	Senate	debate	and	 the	 nfluence	amerca	Frst	had	durng	 t.	On	21	
February,	hoover	nformed	Presdental	Secretary	edwn	Watson	that	he	
had	 learned	 through	 a	 “strctly	 confdental	 source”	 that	 “the	 debate	 n	
January	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–6.	The	 bureau	 followed	 ths	memorandum	up	wth	 a	more	
detaled,	yet	stll	lmted,	descrpton	of	amerca	Frst	and	ts	leaders.	See	memorandum	re	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	7	February	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–10.
	 12.	robert	Wood	quoted	n	Doenecke,	In Danger Undaunted,	22.
	 13.	Doenecke,	In Danger Undaunted,	23;	amerca	Frst	Commttee	Washngton	news	
letter	 #1,	 31	 January	 1941,	 reprnted	 n	 Doenecke,	 In Danger Undaunted,	 226–27.	 On	
Wheeler’s	status	as	an	ant-nterventonst	see	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 
1932–45	(lncoln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	458.
5Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941
the	 Senate	 on	 the	lend-lease	bll	wll	 last	 for	 about	 two	weeks	 longer.”	
eleven	senators,	hoover	also	reported,	planned	to	flbuster	the	measure	
n	an	attempt	 to	undermne	 ts	passage.	hs	effort	 to	keep	 the	presdent	
nformed	on	poltcal	matters	nvolvng	promnent	polcy	crtcs	reflected	
hoover’s	 larger	 nterest	 n	promotng	 the	 nterests	of	 the	admnstraton	
for	the	betterment	of	hs	own,	and	the	Fbi’s,	poston.14
—■■■■■■■—




house	 Commttee	 on	 Foregn	affars	 and	 the	 Senate	 Foregn	 relatons	
Commttee	 who	 were	 consderng	 the	 presdent’s	 bll.	 (The	 lend-lease	
bll	 had	 been	 submtted	 to	 both	 houses	 of	 Congress	 smultaneously.)	
lndbergh’s	 appearances	 at	 these	 hearngs	 were	 a	 popular	 draw.	 lend-












Clement	 vallandgham—a	 northerner	 wth	 pro-southern	 sympathes	




ant-nterventonst,	 had	 joned	 the	most	 nfluental	 and	 powerful	 ant-
	 14.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	edwn	m.	Watson,	21	February	
1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	Frankln	D.	roosevelt	lbrary	(FDrl),	hyde	Park,	ny.
	 15.	as	quoted	n	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh,	92–93.	The	best	account	of	the	lend-lease	











newspaper	Publicity	 that	 lkened	 “Colonel	Charles	a.	 lndbergh,	 by	 hs	
courageous	 stand	aganst	1776	 [the	 lend-lease	bll]	may	prove	 to	be	 ths	
naton’s	man	on	a	whte	horse.	Just	the	ndvdual	to	rde	roughshod	nto	
the	naton’s	captol	n	1944	[an	electon	year].”	Seemngly	confrmng	ther	





was	 not	 reported	 to	 Fbi	 headquarters	 untl	 June—the	head	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	
Kansas	Cty,	mssour,	feld	offce	obtaned	permsson	from	the	edtor	of	
the	Kansas City Star	to	search	that	newspaper’s	fles	for	nformaton	relat-
ng	 to	amerca	Frst.	Ths	 revew	uncovered	 the	 followng	 controversal	
poltcal	 comments	 made	 by	 leadng	 ant-nterventonsts.	 Commttee	
Charman	robert	Wood	reportedly	sad:	“Democracy	s	not	gong	to	work	
unless	men	 stand	up	 for	 ther	 convctons.”	ant-nterventonst	 John	T.	




could	 lve	 sde	 by	 sde”	 and	 sad	 nothng	 else	 “except	 n	 crtcsm	 of	
Presdent	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy.”18
	 The	 bureau’s	 best	 opportunty	 to	 gather	 ntellgence	 on	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee	came,	however,	durng	the	frst	half	of	1941	from	none	




100–4712–75.	On	Flynn	see	ronald	radosh,	Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative 
Critics of American Globalism	(new	york:	Smon	and	Schuster,	1975),	197–273.







ntellgence	on	 the	 commttee	 n	 confdence,	 as	 n	 the	opportunty	wth	
the	Kansas City Star,	hoover	hestated	to	have	Fbi	agents	publcly	examne	
the	 fles	 of	 a	 poltcal	 group	 that	 opposed	 the	roosevelt	 admnstraton.	
accordng	to	hstoran	Justus	Doenecke,	however,	the	Fbi	eventually	dd	
examne	the	Chcago	chapter’s	fles	(n	June)	but	refused	to	peruse	other	
chapters’	 records.	 Word	 then	 spread	 of	 the	 Chcago	 chapter’s	 request	






straton	 dfferent	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 regardng	 John	Wheeler,	 the	 son	
of	 the	 promnent	 ant-nterventonst	 senator	 and	 charman	 of	 the	 los	
angeles	 branch	 of	 amerca	 Frst.	 The	 Fbi	 drector	 reported	 that	 John	
Wheeler’s	wfe—also	 a	 leadng	member	of	amerca	Frst—sad	 n	 refer-
ence	to	lend-lease:	“the	only	way	we	can	be	safe	s	to	see	the	pns	knocked	
	 19.	 letter,	Chester	bowles	 to	r.	Douglas	 Stuart	 Jr.,	 28	november	1941	 n	Doenecke,	
In Danger Undaunted,	 107–8;	 Justus	D.	Doenecke,	 Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge 
to American Intervention, 1939–1941	 (new	york:	rowman	&	lttlefeld,	2000),	276;	Cole,	




















of	her	 assocaton	wth	varous	 ndvduals	 .	 .	 .	 [all	 of]	whom	are	under	
nvestgaton	 by	 ths	 bureau.”	 beyond	 the	 statements	 and	 alleged	 sym-




further	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 to	 the	 Whte	 house	 concernng	 the	 los	
angeles	 branch	 of	 amerca	 Frst.	 agan,	 he	 noted	 the	 actvtes	 of	 the	
Wheelers,	but	also	those	of	the	revsonst	hstoran	harry	elmer	barnes	
who	 had	 actvely	 campagned	 n	 the	 regon	 aganst	 lend-lease.	 Taken	
together,	the	content	of	the	two	reports	confrm	that	hoover’s	nterest	was	
to	 forward	 not	 nformaton	 concernng	 crmnal	 actvtes	 but	 poltcal	
ntellgence	 to	ether	 sustan	or	create	 the	 mpresson	 that	amerca	Frst	
members	had	lnks	to	questonable—n	effect	subversve—ndvduals.	at	
the	same	tme	that	Fbi	agents	were	collectng	ths	type	of	derogatory	data,	
other	 agents	 were	 collectng	 exculpatory	 nformaton	 that	 ndcated	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	had	no	subversve	lnks	or	that	t	actvely	sought	
to	dstance	tself	from	such	elements—such	as	lous	nchols’s	December	
1940	memorandum	 to	Tolson	 reportng	 as	much.	nevertheless,	hoover	
chose	 not	 to	 forward	 nchols’s	 memorandum	 or	 any	 other	 exculpatory	
data	to	the	Whte	house,	whereas	he	dd	the	other.21
	 Satsfed	wth	hoover’s	 provdng	 of	 unsolcted	 poltcal	 ntellgence	
reports,	by	the	start	of	the	lend-lease	debate	Presdent	roosevelt	eventu-
ally	 requested	 an	 Fbi	 nvestgaton	 of	 the	amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 in	
February	 1941,	 the	 presdent	 learned	 of	 an	 amerca	 Frst	 crcular	 cap-
toned:	“are	you	wllng	 to	gve	up	democracy?”	Ths	document	charac-
terzed	lend-lease	as	“a	war	dctatorshp	bll”	that	would	ultmately	bestow	
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	 early	passed	roosevelt’s	request	on	to	hoover,	who	ordered	an	mme-
date	 reply.	The	drector	ordered	a	 summary	memorandum	on	amerca	








orgnal	 nterest;	 and	 nstead	hoover	 launched	 a	 full-scale	 nvestgaton	
nto	 the	 fundng	of	not	 the	 commttee’s	 ant-lend-lease	 campagn	but	of	





that	 a	 more	 exhaustve	 nvestgaton	 be	 made	 relatve	 to	 the	 means	 by	
whch	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	s	beng	fnanced,	I hope you will not 
hesitate	 to	 call	 upon	me	 to	 conduct	 such	 an	 nvestgaton.”	early	passed	
on	 hoover’s	 response	 to	 the	 presdent,	 employng	 hoover’s	 nterpreta-
ton	of	roosevelt’s	 request—“source	 of	 funds	 and	organzatonal	 data	 of	





tonst	 movement	 and	 n	 partcular	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee,	 was	
settled	when	n	march	the	Senate	approved	the	measure	and	the	presdent	
sgned	 t	 nto	 law.	 The	 end	 of	 the	 sngle	most-debated	 ssue	 durng	 the	
Great	 Debate	 dd	 not,	 however,	 lead	 Fbi	 offcals	 to	 halt	 ther	 survel-
lance	 of	 admnstraton	 crtcs.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 on	 19	march,	 hoover	
volunteered	to	 the	presdent	and	the	attorney	general	what	he	descrbed	
as	 “the	 contemplated	plans	of	 the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.”	accordng	
early,	21	February	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–18.
	 23.	handwrtten	note	on	routng	slp,	hoover	to	K.	r.	mcintre,	26	February	1941,	Fbi	
100–4712–18;	 blnd	 summary	 memorandum	 re	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee,	 no	 date,	 Fbi	
100–4712–18;	memorandum,	early	to	roosevelt,	4	march	1941,	Offcal	Fle	4330,	FDrl.
	 24.	memorandum,	early	 to	roosevelt,	 4	march	 1941,	Offcal	 Fle	 4330,	 FDr;	 letter,	
hoover	to	early,	1	march	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–18.	emphass	added.
0 Chapter 3
to	hoover	 the	 commttee	planned	 “to	have	Senators,	Congressmen,	 and	
varous	 peace	 and	 patrotc	 organzatons	 travel	 throughout	 the	 Unted	
States	to	reach	all	areas	for	the	purpose	of	opposng	any	plans	the	Presdent	







	 The	 Fbi	 drector’s	 nformaton	was	 accurate	 and,	more	 sgnfcantly,	
confrms	hs	 nterest	 n	 the	 commttee’s	 poltcal	 actvtes	 n	 relaton	 to	
the	presdent’s	foregn	polcy.	Shortly	after	passage	of	the	lend-lease	act,	










of	 hoover’s	 report	 on	 amerca	 Frst’s	 “contemplated	 plans”—requested	
that	Fbi	 agents	montor	 an	amerca	Frst	 rally	 n	los	angeles	 at	whch	
Senator	Wheeler	 was	 to	 speak.	 bddle	 was	 nterested	 n	 the	 sze	 of	 the	
crowd	and	how	 t	 reacted	 to	Wheeler’s	 speech.	hoover	reported	back	 to	











	 27.	memorandum,	 ladd	 to	hoover,	 27	 September	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–170;	 report,	
SaC	los	angeles	 to	hoover,	3	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–158;	memorandum,	hoover	
to	bddle,	8	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–158;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	
1Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941
	 by	 late	august,	hoover	 receved	 another	 request	 for	 nformaton	on	
amerca	Frst,	but	not	from	the	Whte	house.	Ths	tme,	Senator	Claude	
Pepper,	a	Democrat	from	Florda	and	a	vocferous	crtc	of	the	ant-nter-
ventonsts,	 requested	 nformaton	 about	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	






ndcaton	 of	 the	 sender	 or	 recpent—on	 the	amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	
to	bddle,	who	 subsequently	provded	 t	 to	Pepper.	The	document,	 des-





to	 obtan	 nformaton	 about	 amerca	 Frst.	 Knox’s	 concern	 stemmed	
from	hs	 belef	 that	 the	 commttee	was	 tryng	 “to	 frustrate	 the	natonal	
Defense	effort	 through	manpulaton	of	 trade	unons	 n	 brngng	 about	
labor	 dsputes.”29	 Convnced	 that	 subversve	 elements	 had	 contrbuted	





followed	by	 frm	acton	the	 last	condton	wll	be	worse	 than	the	 frst.”30	
On	3	September,	Tamm	responded	by	forwardng	to	the	navy	secretary	“a	









of	Congress,	Washngton,	DC.	See	also	Francs	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth 
Column and the American Home Front (new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1995),	80–81;	
















closer	 brtsh	 and	amercan	 relatonshp	 before	 the	 enactment	 of	 lend-
lease;	hoover	reported	to	the	presdent	that	hopkns	had	succeeded	well	
n	hs	msson.32




was	undoubtedly	 to	show	the	Fbi’s	value	 n	 the	 ntellgence	 feld	as	part	
of	a	long	effort	to	cultvate	for	hmself	a	future	role	n	foregn	ntellgence.	














the	Orgns	of	amercan	Central	intellgence,	1940–41,”	Intelligence and National Security	20	
(June	2005):	229–31.





between	 the	 two	 groups	 (even	 f	 tense)	 tantalzng	 questons	 are	 rased	
about	the	nature	of	the	Great	Debate	that	to	date	cannot	be	resolved.33
—■■■■■■■—
















son	of	 the	neutralty	act	 to	 arm	merchant	 shps,	 the	head	of	 the	 Fbi’s	




i	 am	contnung	 to	 take	an	actve	part	 n	opposng	 the	propaganda	and	
agtaton	for	war.	The	country	s	stll	opposed	to	our	entry,	but	i	am	not	










each	day.	 it	 s	 dffcult	 to	 see	 how	democracy	 can	 functon	 ntellgently	
or	even	survve	wthout	any	accurate	source	of	nformaton	to	whch	the	
people	can	go,	and	from	whch	they	can	base	ther	decsons.
in	 august	 1942	 Fbi	 offcals	 ncorporated	 ths	 plfered	 letter	 as	 part	 of	














	 Whle	workng	 n	Calforna,	rutherford	read	a	newspaper	artcle	 n	
the	Los Angeles Examiner	wrtten	by	General	henry	arnold	of	the	army	
ar	 Corps	 that	 descrbed,	 n	 detal,	 a	 bulletproof	 self-sealng	 avaton	
fuel	 tank	 that	was	 found	wthn	luftwaffe	arplane	wreckage	 n	england	
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to	prevent	anyone	else	(.e.,	enemy	agents)	from	copyng	them.	rutherford	




	 When	 the	 SaC	of	 the	Dallas	 feld	 offce	 forwarded	 ths	 nformaton	
to	 Fbi	 headquarters,	 hoover	 sought	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 counsel.	
because	ths	nformaton	was	receved	from	an	unsolcted	source,	hoover	
asked	 the	assstant	 to	 the	attorney	general,	matthew	F.	mcGure,	 “f	you	
would	advse	ths	bureau	what	acton,	 f	any,	should	be	taken.”	mcGure	







	 From	 a	 legal	 standpont,	 the	 ssue	 seemed	 closed.	 The	 Justce	













probe	 contnued	 snce	 the	 Fbi	 drector	 succeeded	 n	 bypassng	 Justce	
	 37.	 letter,	a.	P.	Ktchn	 to	 J.	edgar	hoover,	27	 June	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–74.	On	 the	
popular	mage	of	lndbergh	as	a	naz	see	chapter	18,	“is	lndbergh	a	naz?”	n	Cole,	Charles 
A. Lindbergh,	142–53.	Cole	concluded	the	avator	was	many	thngs	but	not	a	naz.





































	 beyond	 tryng	 to	 develop	 nformaton	 to	 prosecute	 lndbergh,	 Fbi	
	 39.	 Strctly	confdental	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	edward	Tamm,	10	Septem-
ber	1936;	press	release,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	all	law	enforcement	Offcals,	6	September	1939,	





survellance	see	Joan	m.	Jensen,	Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980	(new	haven,	CT:	
yale	Unversty	Press,	1991).
	 41.	 letter,	n.	J.	l.	Peper	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	14	February	1942,	Fbi	65–11449–129.
Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941
offcals	also	collected	derogatory	ntellgence	about	hm.	Gatherng	such	
nformaton	had	nothng	to	do	wth	a	volaton	of	federal	statutes.	its	only	
possble	 value	was	 that	 t	 could	be	dssemnated	 to	dscredt	lndbergh.	
Fbi	 agents	 usually	 culled	 such	 nformaton	 from	 bureau	 nformers	 and	
then	 relayed	 t	 to	 Fbi	 headquarters	 n	 a	 secure	 manner,	 such	 as	 wth	
hoover’s	“personal	and	confdental”	letter	system	whereby	senstve	data	












“should	 have	 been	 prosecuted	 on	 two	 dfferent	 charges	 of	 bootleggng	
whskey	from	Canada	to	bllngs,	montana,	by	arplane.”	Despte	the	dated	




beleved,	 “wll	 furnsh	 t,	 properly	 supported	 by	 affdavts,	 etc.,	 to	 [pro-
roosevelt	newspaper	and	rado	gossp	columnst]	Walter	Wnchell.”43
	 Through	 another	 nformant,	 Fbi	 offcals	 learned	 about	 the	 alleged	
state	of	lndbergh’s	mental	health.	The	data	was	gleaned	from	an	nformer	
who	was	assocated	wth	lndbergh’s	close	frend	and	colleague	(they	had	
coauthored	 a	 book	 together,	The Culture of Organs	 [1938]),	 Dr.	 alexs	











	 Why	 dd	 Fbi	 agents	 collect	 and	 Fbi	 offcals	 mantan	 ths	 type	 of	





lndbergh	had	developed	 a	 reputaton	 as	 a	 shy,	 clean-cut,	 all-amercan	
boy.	Such	personally	derogatory	data	could	 tarnsh	 ths	 mage.	and	Fbi	


















mcCormck—of	 the	 conservatve	 New York Daily News	 and	 Chicago 

















cated	 that	 a	 large,	 unnamed	 Jewsh	 organzaton	 operatng	 through	 the	
Guggenhem	Foundaton	had	wthdrawn	ts	support	of	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	because	of	 ts	 “ant-roosevelt”	poston,	 ts	efforts	 to	embar-
rass	the	presdent,	and	ts	espousal	of	“ant-Jewsh	propaganda.”	Fbi	agents	






	 in	 ther	ceaseless	efforts	 to	uncover	 the	 fnancal	 sources	of	amerca	
Frst,	Fbi	agents	pursued	all	possble	 leads.	a	new	opportunty	 arose	 n	







offcals	 that	 they	would	 dscover	 the	 fnancal	 sources	 behnd	amerca	
Frst.	There	s	no	menton	n	Fbi	records,	however,	as	to	the	dsposton	of	
ths	partcular	effort	other	than	a	notaton	that	the	Wsconsn	chapter	“has	
refused	 to	comply	wth	 ths	 law	as	of	 the	present	wrtng.”	nevertheless,	
the	 epsode	 further	 llustrates	 the	 lengths	 to	whch	hoover	would	go	 to	
satsfy	what	he	beleved	to	be	the	poltcal	nterests	of	the	roosevelt	Whte	











another	 nvestgatve	 avenue	 Fbi	 agents	 focused	 upon	 wth	 regard	 to	
the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	 ts	 alleged	 lnks	 to	 subversve	groups.	
if	 agents	 could	 verfy	 such	 nformaton	 t	 could	have	 been	 employed	 to	
dscredt	amerca	Frst	or	to	prosecute	ts	members	as	agents	of	a	foregn	
power.	ether	way,	Fbi	offcals	would	have	satsfed	the	poltcal	nterests	
of	 the	presdent.	 ironcally,	 though,	 the	 very	 act	of	hoover’s	 contnually	
passng	on	 to	 the	Whte	house	unsubstantated	 reports	 purportng	 that	
the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 had	 questonable	 assocatons	 helped	 to	
sustan	admnstraton	belefs	that	the	group	was,	ndeed,	subversve.	Wth	





ated	 for	 nvestgators	 a	 sgnfcant	 amount	 of	 poltcal	 ntellgence.	 The	
prmary	means	by	whch	agents	gathered	ther	 nformaton	was	through	




was	not	a	 top	prorty.	and,	 ndeed,	 the	qualty	of	 the	Fbi’s	 nformaton	
on	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	often	suspect.	most	often,	except	for	
the	 very	 frst	 reports	 agents	 fled	 on	 the	 commttee,	 Fbi	 offcals	 seem-
ngly	accepted	the	wdely	held	noton	that	amerca	Frst	and	other	ant-
nterventonsts	 were	 fascst	 dupes.	 interventonst	 groups—notably	 the	
Fght	for	Freedom	Commttee—had	successfully	promoted	ths	vew	and,	
clearly,	the	percepton	worked	n	favor	of	the	Fbi.
	 The	 bureau’s	 nformer	 n	 the	 Washngton,	 D.C.,	 area	 reflected	 the	







sts”	 n	 the	 commttee	 were	 vastly	 outnumbered	 by	 “ant-admnstra-
ton	 busnessmen	 and	 ndustralsts	wth	 an	 overwhelmng	 followng	 of	






n	Chcago,	 for	 example,	 reported	 that	 after	 the	dssoluton	of	 the	 com-
mttee,	 “nvestgaton	 to	date	has	 faled	 to	 reveal	 any	 ndcaton	 that	 the	
structure	of	amerca	Frst,	has	n	any	way,	been	used	by	foregn	nterests	
or	 ndvduals	cooperatng	wth	 foregn	 nterests.”	The	agent	also	argued	
that	 “a	 few	 local	 Chapters	 .	 .	 .	 have	 reportedly	made	 avalable	 lsts	 and	
pledged	cooperaton	to	certan	radcal	groups	but	these	have	been	solated	
nstances	 and	 n	 the	opnon	of	persons	 ntervewed,	 represented	only	 a	
mnute	mnorty	of	the	total	membershp.”49





bund,	 Chrstan	 Front,	 Slver	 Shrts,	 Women	 Unted,	 mothers’	 organ-
zatons,	 Chrstan	 moblzers,	 amercan	 Destny	 Party”	 among	 many	
other	 groups	 and	 extremst	 ndvduals.	not	 only	 dd	 the	amerca	 Frst	
Commttee	not	mantan	offcal	 lnks	wth	any	of	 these	groups,	none	of	
the	 nformaton	 n	 the	 SaC’s	 report—such	 as	 newspaper	 and	magazne	
clppngs	from	extremst	publcatons—proved	the	exstence	of	subversve	
connectons.	hs	reportng	reflects	only	an	nterest	n	data	that	suggested	
subversve	 lnks,	 but	 t	 also	 shows	 a	 falure	 by	 Fbi	 agents	 to	 nvestgate	
properly.50
—■■■■■■■—
in	 ts	 offcal	 hstory,	 brtsh	 Securty	 Coordnaton	 clamed	 that	 t	 had	
nvestgated	and	taken	drect	acton	aganst	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	
To	 reterate,	 because	 no	 sgnfcant	 documentaton	 has	 been	 released	















degenerated	 nto	 “a	 pro-German	 assocaton.”	 Ths	 vew	 corresponds	 to	
how	 Fbi	 offcals	 vewed	 amerca	 Frst	 durng	 the	 1940s.51	 The	 bSC’s	
assessment	 of	 amerca	 Frst	 also	 ncluded	 the	 clam	 that	 the	 group	








	 Other	 aspects	 about	 the	amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 are	 naccurate	 n	
the	offcal	bSC	hstory	but	reflect	contemporary	assumptons	about	 the	





the	 commttee’s	 leader.	Whle	 lndbergh	 certanly	was	 the	 group’s	most	
popular	 and	 controversal	 speaker	 and	 member,	 he	 was	 not	 ts	 leader.	
nevertheless,	such	a	vew	was	wdely	beleved	n	the	1940s.	Other	vews	of	
amerca	Frst	n	the	bSC	hstory	nclude	a	belef	that	the	group	had	been	
nfltrated	 by	 German	 agents	 who	 turned	 the	 commttee	 “more	 openly	
ant-brtsh	 and	 pro-German.”	 as	 evdence,	 the	 hstory	 ctes	 a	 speech	
lndbergh	had	gven	just	pror	to	the	Pearl	harbor	attack	where	he	ponted	
	 51.	British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Ameri-
cas, 1940–45	(london:	St.	ermn’s	Press,	1998),	71–72.	For	the	Fbi’s	vew	see	report,	SaC	
Washngton,	DC,	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–384.
	 52.	British Security Coordination,	 72.	 For	 the	 contemporary	 nterventonst	 vew	 of	
amerca	Frst	see	crcular-letter,	henry	W.	hobson,	3	november	1941,	box	1,	Fght	for	Free-
dom	manuscrpts,	Seeley	mudd	lbrary,	Prnceton	Unversty,	Prnceton,	nJ.	See	also	Cole,	
America First: The Battle against Intervention.













	 it	 s	 nconcevable	 that	hoover—a	bureaucrat	 always	 very	 protectve	
of	hs	Fbi’s	 turf	and	always	concerned	about	unwelcome	and	dangerous	
publc	exposure—would	permt	a	foregn	ntellgence	agency	to	run	freely	





n	 ther	 affars	 by	 a	 foregn	 agency.”	moreover,	 by	 the	 early	 summer	 of	
1942,	accordng	to	the	bSC’s	own	hstory,	“all	foregn	ntellgence	agences	
were	prohbted,	 inter alia,	 from	employng	 ther	own	agents	wthn	 the	
Unted	States.”55












	 53.	British Security Coordination,	72–73;	Doenecke,	The Battle against Intervention, 9.












s	 unknown.	The	Fght	 for	Freedom	Commttee	 sought	 and	mantaned	
a	relatonshp	wth	brtsh	offcals.	(The	bSC	hstory	clams,	unconvnc-
ngly,	 that	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	was,	 n	 realty,	 a	 brtsh	 front.)	When	 the	
Fght	 for	 Freedom	Commttee	was	 formed	 n	 1940,	 one	 of	 ts	 prncpal	
members—Dr.	 henry	 van	 Dusen,	 a	 theology	 professor	 at	 the	 Unon	




that	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	 would	 work	 wth	 the	 assstance	 of	 the	 brtsh	
embassy.57
	 hstoran	mark	lncoln	Chadwn	has	found	that	the	Fght	for	Freedom	
Commttee	 acted	 as	 a	 lason	 between	 the	 brtsh	 embassy,	 brtsh	
informaton	Servce,	and	the	amercan	nterventonst	press.	van	Dusen’s	
close	 cooperaton	 wth	 the	 brtsh	 embassy,	 n	 helpng	 t	 to	 dstrbute	








maton	 Servce	 and	 the	 nterventonst	 press,	 t	 s	 possble	 that	 the	bSC	
played	some	ndrect	role.	The	brtsh	informaton	Servce	was	headquar-
tered,	lke	the	bSC,	n	rockefeller	Center,	strongly	suggestng	that	the	two	
organzatons	had	 tes.	 it	 s	at	 least	concevable	 that	 the	bSC	cooperated	
	 56.	British Security Coordination,	73.
	 57.	mark	 lncoln	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II	 (Chapel	hll:	Unversty	 of	
north	Carolna	Press,	1968),	41–42.
	 58.	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II,	74,	100,	102,	138–39,	143.
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wth	 the	 nformaton	 servce	 to	 forward	 pro-alled	 nformaton	 to	 the	



















tonsts,	 partcularly	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	members.	 Some	 nterventonsts	
were	 to	 arrve	 early	 and	 others	 later	 to	 dsrupt	 the	 seatng	 of	 legtmate	
amerca	Frst	tcket	holders.	Unfortunately	for	the	bSC,	attendance	at	the	
rally	was	 low	 and	 the	 llegtmate	 attendees	were	 seated	 n	 vacant	 seats,	
thereby	 ncreasng	 the	 rally’s	 already	 low	 attendance.	hstoran	mchele	
Flynn	 Stenehjem	 has	 dscovered	 that	 John	 T.	 Flynn	 of	 the	 new	 york	




	 There	 s	no	verfable	evdence	 to	prove	 that	 the	bSC	had	persuaded	
or	drected	Fght	for	Freedom	(or	other	nterventonst	groups)	to	dsrupt	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	ralles.	it	s	possble	that	the	bSC	sought	to	nflu-
ence	 ths	 type	of	 behavor,	 but	 t	 s	 equally	 f	 not	more	 lkely	 that	 these	
groups	employed	dsruptve	tactcs	wthout	any	promptng	from	external	
forces.	 in	hs	book	Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the 
	 59.	British Security Coordination,	74.
	 60.	 ibd.,	74–75;	mchele	Flynn	Stenehjem,	An American First: John T. Flynn and the 
America First Committee	(new	rochelle,	ny:	arlngton	house,	1976),	163–64.
 Chapter 3
United States, 1939–44 (1998),	 Thomas	 mahl	 clams	 that	 the	 Fght	 for	
Freedom	Commttee	was,	 n	fact,	a	 front	for	the	bSC.	mahl	provdes	no	
verfable	evdence	beyond	speculaton	to	support	hs	contentons	and	too	
easly	accepts	 the	offcal	bSC	 lne,	 reflectng	 the	 long	persstence	of	 the	






	 61.	 See	Thomas	e.	mahl,	Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United 
States, 1939–44	(Washngton,	DC:	brassey’s,	1998).
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others	 that	mght	 be	 used	 ether	 to	 prosecute	 or	 dscredt	 them.	 These	
efforts	 extended	 nto	 1942	 and,	 n	 some	 cases,	wth	 the	 country	 at	war,	
ntensfed.
—■■■■■■■—
by	 early	 1941	 Senator	 Wheeler	 agan	 surfaced	 n	 connecton	 wth	 the	
frankng	 ssue,	 but	 ths	 tme	 wth	 far-reachng	 poltcal	 mplcatons.	



















Defenders.	 The	 senator	 told	 hoover	 that	 he	 was	 “extremely	 anxous	 to	










	 accordng	 to	 the	 Fbi’s	 specal	 agent	 n	 charge	 n	 el	 Paso,	 a	 local	
resdent	allegedly	had	receved	from	Wheeler	a	 large	package	contanng	
unaddressed,	 franked	 envelopes.	 The	 SaC	 reported	 that	 each	 envelope	
contaned	a	prnted	speech	and	letter	sgned	by	Wheeler	that	denounced	
the	lend-lease	bll	whle	suggestng	roosevelt	was	seekng	dctatoral	pow-
ers.	When	reportng	 ths	event	 to	 the	Fbi,	 the	Texas	resdent	demanded	
an	 nvestgaton	 because,	 n	 hs	 vew,	 the	 lterature	 from	Wheeler	 was	
“un-amercan.”	Despte	beng	told	the	Fbi	had	no	jursdcton,	the	Texan	






	 by	 the	 late	 sprng	 and	early	 summer,	 as	 ssues	over	 convoys	 and	ad	
to	russa	were	hotly	debated,	the	frankng	ssue	evolved	from	an	solated	
	 1.	 letter,	Wheeler	 to	hoover,	4	February	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–6;	 letter,	The	German	
Frend	Socety	of	houston	to	Senator	burton	K.	Wheeler,	20	January	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–6.
	 2.	memorandum,	matthew	 F.	mcGure,	 the	 assstant	 to	 the	 attorney	 general,	 to	 l.	
m.	 C.	 Smth,	neutralty	 laws	Unt,	 17	 February	 1941,	 Fbi	 62–55261–9X;	 letter,	hoover	
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lshed	a	publc	 condemnaton	of	 the	 senator	and	hs	 alleged	abuses	 n	a	
July	 artcle	 ttled	 “War	 n	 the	mals.”	When	 the	 nterventonst	Fght	 for	
Freedom	Commttee	learned	of	hoke’s	charges,	they	also	attacked	Wheeler	
whle	 askng	 the	 postmaster	 general	 to	 lmt	 Congress’s	 frankng	 prv-
lege.5
	 The	 sensatonal	 nature	 of	 the	 now	 publc	 charge	 aganst	 Wheeler	
prompted	 reporter	 blar	moody,	 of	 the	Detroit News,	 to	 telephone	 Fbi	
headquarters	 to	 ascertan	 whether	 the	 Fbi	 had	 nvestgated	 the	 charge.	
Concerned	wth	the	publc	nature	of	the	charge,	especally	snce	the	bureau	











sve	 actvtes	 aganst	 the	Unted	 States,	 f	 not	 treason.”	Wheeler	 repled	
that	he	had	made	no	attempt	to	nfluence	the	solders	and	explaned	that	
	 4.	The	 Fbi	 obtaned	 copes	 of	 the	Wheeler/hoke	 correspondence	 from	 an	 unsolc-





naton	of	 the	most	Ggantc	Drect	mal	 Fraud	 n	 the	hstory	of	advertsng”;	 all	 n	Fbi	














hm	 amd	 the	 acrmony	 of	 the	 1920s	 Teapot	 Dome	 scandal,	 the	 group	
clamed	 that	Wheeler	 had	 accepted	 the	 brbe	 n	 return	 for	 dsmssng	 a	















ed	 Senator	 nye’s	 belef	 that	 the	 msuse	 of	 the	 frank	 was	 “wdespread”	
and	 “perfectly	 regular.”	 Grunewald	 also	 reported	 nye’s	 percepton	 that	
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ntellgence.	 (if	 released,	 the	 specfc	 nature	 of	 the	 comment	 probably	
could	have	been	traced	back	to	Grunewald	and	then	to	the	Fbi.)	instead,	
Fbi	 offcals	 fled	 t	 n	hoover’s	 secret	 offce	 fle	 usng	 the	Do	not	 Fle	
procedure.9	The	second	undentfed	nformant	clamed	nye	regularly	sent	
a	great	deal	of	franked	mal	to	people	outsde	of	hs	state.	in	lght	of	the	
developng	 frankng-abuse	 story,	 hoover	 forwarded	 this	 nformaton	 to	
the	Justce	Department.10
	 Tme	and	agan,	nterventonsts	accused	certan	congressmen	of	ms-
usng	 ther	 frankng	prvlege.	Such	charges	were	 strongly	dened	by	 the	
accused,	 but	German	propagandsts	were,	 n	 fact,	 behnd	 the	brouhaha.	
On	29	July	1941,	the	German	chargé	d’affares	n	Washngton	reported	to	
the	German	Foregn	mnstry	that:
in	 recent	months	 the	mass	 dspatch	 of	 postcards	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 par-
tcularly	effectve	as	a	propaganda	acton	whch	can	be	carred	out	very	





on	 roosevelt	 and	 the	 warmongerng	members	 of	 hs	 Cabnet,	 remnd-
ers	of	hs	 campagn	promse	 to	keep	amerca	out	of	war,	 a	 reference	 to	
the	amercan	blood	sacrfces	 n	the	World	War,	an	appeal	to	amercan	














stry,	 29	 July	 1941,	 n	Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945,	 seres	D,	 vol.	 13	
(london:	her	majesty’s	Statonary	Offce,	1964),	234.
9 Chapter 4
The	 chargé	 d’affares	 further	 reported	 that	 Senator	 Wheeler	 had	 been	




















manpulate	Fsh’s	 offce	 to	 effect	 a	wde	dstrbuton—more	 so	 than	 any	
lone	 senator	 or	 congressman	 would	 have	 done—of	 ant-nterventonst	
lterature.	 To	 keep	 the	 operaton	 secret,	 vereck	 used	 a	 thrd	 party	 (an	
ant-nterventonst	publcst	named	Prescott	Dennett)	to	mantan	contact	
wth	hll.16
	 vereck	 gathered	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature	 and	 forwarded	 t	 to	
Dennett’s	offce	wheren	he	sent	t	to	George	hll.	hll	then	had	Fsh	nsert	
the	 materal	 nto	 the	 Congressional Record	 whereby	 hll	 would	 order	











	 17.	 ibd.,	187–88;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	472;	“mal	bags	lnked	to	no-
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	 Whle	the	German	propaganda	effort	was	certanly	creatve,	ts	effcacy	
was	 neglgble.	 all	 vereck	 managed	 to	 accomplsh	 was	 a	 wder	 dstr-
buton	 of	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature	 that,	 n	 any	 event,	 dd	 not	 lead	
amercans	to	reassess	ther	vew	of	the	alles.	besdes,	snce	late	1940	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	had	already	been	conductng	a	much	larger	and	
well-organzed	effort	 to	prevent	amercan	 nterventon	 n	 the	european	
war.	The	revelaton	of	a	 lnk	between	German	propagandsts	 (not	 spes)	
and	 leadng	 ant-nterventonsts,	 no	 matter	 f	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	
were	unsuspectng,	was	a	boon	to	nterventonst	partsans	lke	the	Fght	
for	 Freedom	 Commttee.	 Such	 groups	 used	 the	 event	 to	 dscredt	 the	
ant-nterventonsts	by	accusng	 them	of	beng	naz	dupes,	and	 thereby	
confrmed	to	some	ther	status	as	subversves.
	 in	 September	 1941,	 a	 federal	 grand	 jury	 led	 by	 prosecutor	Wllam	
maloney	began	 to	 consder	 evdence	of	German	propaganda	and	 “other	
subversve	 elements”	 n	 the	 Unted	 States.	 Smultaneously,	 Washington 
Post	reporter	Dllard	Stokes	took	up	the	frankng	matter.	he	revealed	the	
lnk	between	Dennett’s	and	Fsh’s	offces	as	well	as	the	fact	that	amerca	
Frst	 was	 tangentally	 nvolved.	 The	 ncreased	 publcty	 led	 the	 polce	
to	 seze	 franked	 mal	 from	 amerca	 Frst’s	 Washngton	 chapter	 on	 25	





for	 perjury	 and	 receved	 a	 jal	 sentence	 of	 between	 two	 and	 sx	 years.	
vereck	was	 convcted	 for	 volatng	 the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act	
nasmuch	as	he	faled	to	reveal	the	full	extent	of	hs	actvtes	to	the	govern-
ment.	When	asked,	Congressman	Fsh	refused	to	testfy	before	the	grand	










tal	lbrary	(hereafter	hhl),	West	branch,	ia;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	471–72;	




that	 hoover	 provde	 prosecutor	 maloney	 nformaton	 about	 hamlton	
Fsh.19
	 Whle	 one	 mght	 assume—gven	 hoover’s	 caterng	 to	 roosevelt’s	
poltcal	 nterests—that	he	would	have	happly	asssted	maloney,	the	Fbi	
drector	dd	not.	The	facts	are	not	entrely	clear,	but	hoover	had	personal	
dfferences	 wth	 maloney	 that	 orgnated	 from	 a	 crtcal	 comment	 the	
prosecutor	had	made	about	hoover	not	 takng	a	more	proactve	 role	 n	
the	case.	(Gven	hs	provdng	of	poltcal	ntellgence	to	roosevelt,	hoover	










about	 the	 bSC’s	 possble	 nvolvement	 s	 ts	 offcal	 hstory.	 Snce	 none	
















	 20.	Do	 not	 Fle	 memorandum,	 helen	 Gandy	 to	 hoover,	 28	 October	 1941,	 hoover	
O&C;	memorandum,	Gandy	to	hoover,	28	October	1941,	hoover	O&C.
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	 accordng	to	the	bSC	offcal	hstory,	an	“amercan	frend”	of	brtsh	










	 The	 bSC	 verson	 of	 the	 frankng	 controversy	 has	 t	 that	 after	hoke	
developed	the	frankng	nformaton,	bSC	agents	more	thoroughly	probed	
the	 ssue.	 The	 agents	 supposedly	 had	 learned	 that	 a	 partcular	 type	 of	
letter-addressng	 machne	 was	 used	 and	 they	 dscovered	 malng	 lsts	
orgnatng	 from	 the	 German	 lbrary	 of	 informaton.	 The	 bSC	 hstory	






that	hoke	had	worked	 “on	hs	 own”	 though	wth,	 perhaps,	 lmted	bSC	


















shps	and	 to	permt	 those	 shps	 to	dock	at	brtsh	ports.	The	presdent’s	












as	 roosevelt’s	 speech	 wrter	 robert	 Sherwood	 (and	 later	 chef	 of	 the	
Offce	of	War	informaton)	wrote	concernng	these	tmes,	“[i]solatonst	

















	 22.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	446–53;	robert	Sherwood,	Roosevelt and Hop-
kins: An Intimate History	(new	york:	harper	and	brothers,	1948),	382–83.






	 hoover	 mmedately	 sought	 to	 support	 roosevelt’s	 proposed	 grand	
jury	 nqury.	he	 frst	 forwarded	 to	attorney	General	bddle	 a	 summary	
memorandum	of	all	nformaton	the	Fbi	had	concernng	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee.24	 Fbi	 agents	 also	 pursued	 a	 new	 lead.	 Ths	 lead	 orgnated	
n	a	 sensatonalst	book	 n	press	 at	harper	 and	brothers	Publshers	 that	
clamed	the	German	government	had	secretly	subsdzed	the	commttee.25	
The	 book—orgnally—was	 to	 have	 focused	 only	 on	amerca	 Frst,	 but	
after	Pearl	harbor	t	examned	the	broader	topc	of	ffth	column	actvty.	










	 23.	memorandum,	roosevelt	 to	 the	 attorney	 general,	 17	november	 1941,	Presdent’s	
Secretary’s	Fle:	Justce	Department,	FDrl;	Cole,	America First,	117,	126.
	 24.	memorandum,	Tamm	to	ladd,	21	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–230;	memoran-
dum,	hoover	 to	 the	attorney	general,	 22	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–210;	memoran-
dum,	ladd	 to	hoover,	 4	December	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–309;	memorandum	 for	 attorney	
general	re	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	4	December	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–309.
	 25.	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	21	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–231.







publcly	released	 n	some	of	 these	 dentcal	documents	released	 to	hstoran	Wayne	Cole.	
letter,	 SaC	new	york	 to	hoover,	 25	aprl	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–344;	 letter,	 Foxworth	 to	
hoover,	2	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–345;	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	21	november	
1941,	Fbi	100–4712–231.	For	Cole’s	 copes	of	 these	documents	 refer	 to	hs	papers	 at	 the	
herbert	hoover	Presdental	lbrary	n	West	branch,	ia.
	 27.	 Sayers	and	Kahn,	Sabotage!	 235–36.	hstoran	Wayne	Cole	noted	 that	burch	was	
9 Chapter 4
	 For	 several	 months	 Fbi	 agents	 attempted	 to	 ntervew	 Sayers	 and	
Kahn’s	 edtor—russell	 Davenport—to	 wn	 permsson	 to	 examne	 ther	
research	fle.	Fbi	agents	tred	tme	and	agan	to	arrange	ths	ntervew	but	
were	plagued	by	contnued	schedulng	conflcts	and	delays	untl	hoover	
personally	 stepped	 n	 and	 arranged	 to	 meet	 wth	 Davenport.	 hoover	
beleved	 that	 Sayers	 and	Khan’s	 research	 fle	would	 be	 valuable	 for	 two	
reasons:	“frst,	for	nformatve	purposes	on	the	broad	pcture	of	subversve	
actvtes,	 and	 second,	 from	 the	 prosecutve	 angle.”	 bureau	 and	 Justce	
Department	offcals,	meanwhle,	evaluated	the	evdence	avalable	to	them	
concernng	 ths	 avenue	 of	 nvestgaton.	 eventually,	 though,	 attorney	
General	bddle	met	wth	harper	and	brothers	lawyer,	morrs	ernst.	ernst,	
who	mantaned	close	tes	to	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	and	the	pres-
dent,	 relayed	 to	hoover	 that	 Sayers	 and	Khan’s	 evdence	 about	amerca	
Frst	havng	 receved	 foregn	money	was	 thn,	 but,	he	 stressed,	 “there	 s	
a	good	deal	of	evdence	of	nterlockng	management	whch	mght	be	the	
bass	 of	 regsterng	 under	 the	 [Foregn	agents]	 regstraton	act.”	 ernst	
emphaszed	 that	 f	 nvestgators	 could	prove	amerca	Frst	had	 receved	
any	 foregn	money,	 the	 organzaton	 could	 be	 prosecuted	 for	 falng	 to	
regster	under	the	provsons	of	the	law.28







tax	 returns	 of	 nformaton	 from	 amerca	 Frst,	 Coughln,	 et	 al.”	 Then	
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contrbuted	money	to	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	that	he	had	secured	
from	“relable”	sources.	When	ernst	later	learned	that	no	one	from	ether	
the	 Justce	 or	 Treasury	 Departments	 was	 serously	 pursung	 the	matter	
(by	1942),	he	urged	roosevelt	to	contnue	the	project.	Despte	ernst’s	sug-
gestons	 for	 “aggressve	 acton,”	 all	 along	 Fbi	 offcals	 were	 reluctant	 to	
undertake	hs	plan	owng	to	ts	publc	nature.29
	 even	 before	 ernst	 voced	 hs	 concerns	 to	 roosevelt,	 assstant	 Fbi	
Drector	Tamm	recommended	on	12	December	1941	that	 the	Fbi	avod	
becomng	nvolved	n	ernst’s	plan	because	t	“obvously	.	 .	 .	[s]	an	effort	










havng	 faled	 to	 obtan	 ntervews	wth	 the	 book’s	 authors	 or	 the	 pres-
dent	of	 the	publshng	company,	 Justce	Department	offcals	decded	 to	
assgn	 the	 case	 to	 the	 Crmnal	Dvson.31	 but	 the	 effort	 was	 too	 lttle,	
too	 late.	Followng	 the	 Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	harbor	on	7	December,	
the	 Justce	 Department	 temporarly	 suspended	 the	 case.32	 The	 bureau’s	
nvestgaton	resumed	wth	the	start	of	the	new	year,	but	Fbi	agents	were	
not	able	to	examne	Sayers	and	Kahn’s	materal	untl	aprl	1942.	by	then	










100–4712–240;	 memorandum,	 Tamm	 to	 hoover,	 2	 December	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–243;	













gressonal	electons.	Ther	plan	was	 to	campagn	 n	an	attempt	 to	 swng	
contested	 electons	 away	 from	 the	 presdent.	 indeed,	 on	 13	 February	
1942	hoover	 nformed	Presdental	 Secretary	edwn	Watson	about	 a	 17	
December	1941	dnner	party	at	whch	Charles	lndbergh	was	present.	in	
addton	 to	 descrbng	 lndbergh’s	 remarks	 at	 the	meetng	 (whch	were	
obtaned	through	an	llegal	wretap	[see	chapter	6]),	hoover	advsed	the	
Whte	house	that	lndbergh	had	“ndcated	.	 .	 .	[that]	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	can	agan	be	a	poltcal	 force;	 that	 there	may	be	a	 tme	soon	
when	the	Commttee	can	advocate	a	negotated	peace.”	hoover	also	pro-




















	 35.	memorandum,	 Clyde	 Tolson	 to	 hoover,	 26	 February	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–302;	
memorandum,	D.	m.	ladd	to	hoover,	5	march	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–302.	




through	 frequent	 “house	 partes	 .	 .	 .	 to	 keep	 alve	 [poltcal]	 contacts.”	
hoover	 ordered	 Fbi	 feld	 offces	 to	 revew	 ther	 fles	 and	 then	 ntate	
nvestgatons	 “for	 background	 nformaton,”	 but	 to	 be	 careful	 to	 make	











	 Specal	 agents	 n	 charge	 at	 each	 Fbi	 offce	 ntated	 nvestgatons	
n	 ther	 geographc	 areas	 lookng	 nto	 the	 status	 of	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee.	 Some	of	 the	 larger	 feld	offces,	 such	 as	Chcago,	 even	 sub-




to	 suggest	 that	 the	amerca	 Frst	Commttee	 had	 gone	 underground	 n	
antcpaton	 of	 reemergng	 later	 to	 become	 nvolved	 agan	 n	amercan	


















in	 late	 December	 1941,	 hoover	 receved	 yet	 another	 unsolcted	 docu-
ment	that	portrayed	Senator	Wheeler	as	a	subversve.	The	document	was	























report,	SaC	el	Paso	 to	Fbi	hQ,	4	 June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–467;	 report,	SaC	rchmond	
to	Fbi	hQ,	2	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–408;	report,	SaC	Phladelpha	 to	Fbi	hQ,	6	June	
1942,	Fbi	100–4712–409;	report,	SaC	buffalo	to	Fbi	hQ,	2	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–410;	













100–4712–466;	 report,	 SaC	 San	Dego	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 3	October	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–467;	
report,	SaC	Soux	Falls	to	Fbi	hQ,	15	October	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–470;	report,	SaC	inda-
napols	to	Fbi	hQ,	14	October	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–471.




volatng	 the	 1917	 esponage	 act	 for	 revealng—the	 prevous	 July—the	
government’s	plan	 to	occupy	 iceland.	Fnally,	 the	document	accused	 the	
senator,	as	were	many	people	at	ths	tme,	of	llegally	usng	hs	congresson-	









dum	 from	hoover	 to	Wendell	 berge—head	 of	 the	 Justce	Department’s	
Crmnal	Dvson—confrms	 that	berge	had	 asked	hoover	whether	 the	
Fbi	made	an	 nvestgaton.	hoover	 repled	 that	 the	bureau	had	not,	but	
the	department’s	 language	 n	 the	document	suggests	 that	admnstraton	
offcals	had	regarded	the	charges	aganst	Wheeler	as,	at	least,	vable	and	
that	they	consdered	pursung	them.39
	 Whle	hoover	 forwarded	 unsolcted	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 reports	 to	
the	Whte	 house	 and	 Justce	 Department,	 n	 at	 least	 one	 nstance	 the	
admnstraton	 requested	 nformaton	 from	 the	 Fbi	 regardng	 Senator	
Wheeler.	 The	 Whte	 house’s	 nterest	 centered	 on	 some	 off-the-record	
remarks	Wheeler	 had	made	 to	Milwaukee Journal	 reporter	 laurence	C.	
eklund	 on	 14	 January	 1942.	Wheeler	 commented	 durng	 hs	 ntervew	






















account.	 mlwaukee	 Fbi	 agents	 conducted	 several	 ntervews	 and	 Fbi	




	 hoover	 forwarded	 ths	 specfc	 nformaton	 to	 early	 on	 3	 February	






	 The	 best	 way	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 Senator	
burton	Wheeler	s	to	compare	t	wth	other	promnent	ant-nterventon-
sts.	 Whereas	 the	 Fbi’s	 probe	 of	 Charles	 lndbergh	 was	 extensve	 and	
thorough—owng	 to	hs	popularty	and	many	controversal	publc	 state-
ments—the	 bureau’s	 nvestgaton	 of	 Wheeler	 was	 crcumspect.	 Whle	
Wheeler	was	one	of	the	most	promnent	ant-nterventonsts,	he	was	also	
a	very	powerful	 and	 nfluental	 senator.	Ths	 explans,	 for	 example,	why	
	 40.	 letter,	 rchard	 S.	 Davs,	Milwaukee Journal,	 to	 roosevelt,	 14	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	











document,	 no	 date,	 Fbi	 62–55261–44	 (entre	 document	 wthheld);	memorandum,	 K.	 r.	
mcintre	to	mr.	mumford,	17	October	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–45	(all	text	deleted);	and	four-
teen	pages	of	documents	wthheld	n	ther	entrety,	Fbi	62–55261–45.
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Dvson	where,	 n	 the	mass	 round-up	of	alleged	radcals,	many	people’s	





Whle	hoover	would	only	 ntate	a	 formal Fbi	 nvestgaton	that	delved	
nto	 an	 ant-nterventonst	 congressman’s	 or	 senator’s	 poltcal	 actvtes	













therefore,	 not	 elgble	 to	 receve	 the	 contract.	 instead,	 the	 contract	 was	
awarded	 to	 a	 corporaton	 supposedly	 under	 ths	man’s	 control.	 hoover	
advsed	 the	 attorney	 general	 of	 the	 charge	 on	 13	 may,	 whereupon	 he	
authorzed	a	prelmnary	crmnal	nvestgaton.	Fbi	agents	doggedly	pur-
sued	the	matter	that	year,	generatng	a	flurry	of	reports	between	the	Fbi	
and	 attorney	 general,	 but	nothng	was	developed	 to	 ndcate	 that	Walsh	
had	been	nvolved	n	any	crme.	nevertheless,	because	he	had	a	crmnal	
allegaton	hoover	was	 able	 to	pursue	 the	matter	 vgorously	 and	 thereby	






	 What	 s	 more	 tellng	 about	 ths	 ncdent,	 however,	 s	 what	 was	 not	
fled	 n	 the	 “offcal	 fles”	 of	 the	 Fbi,	 but	 n	 hoover’s	 secret	 offce	 fle.	
Sgnfcantly,	ernst	had	also	tpped	Fbi	offcals	off	on	nformaton	“con-
cernng	Senator	Walsh’s	alleged	connecton	wth	the	house	of	degradaton	
operated	 [deleted,	 but	 by	 Gustave	 beekman]	 n	 new	 york	 Cty.”45	 Ths	
“house	of	degradaton”	was	 a	 “male	brothel”	 frequented	by	 solders	 and	
salors	seekng	homosexual	encounters.	The	pro-roosevelt	New York Post	
broke	 ths	 story	 on	 6	may	 clamng	 that	Walsh	 had	 vsted	 the	 brothel,	








Department	 offcal	Oscar	Cox	wth	 a	 complete	 Fbi	 report,	whereupon	
he	shared	t	wth	Senator	alben	barkley,	the	Senate	majorty	leader,	who	
revealed	the	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	on	the	floor	of	the	Senate	to	demonstrate	




nformaton,	 hoover	 dd	 not	 fle	 t	 n	 the	 bureau’s	 central	 records	 sys-
tem—as	he	had	wth	the	other	complant	aganst	Walsh—but	n	hs	secret	
offce	fles.48






	 48.	 “Fbi	Clears	Walsh,	barkley	asserts,”	New York Times,	21	may	1942,	6;	“Tobey	asks	
inqury	on	Walsh	Charge,”	New York Times,	 22	may	1942,	 10;	 “The	Case	of	 ‘Senator	X,’”	
Time,	1	June	1942,	50;	“Gustav	beekman	Sentenced	on	morals	Charge	 n	brooklyn,”	New 
York Times,	6	October	1942,	16.
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lndbergh,	 Wheeler,	 and	 Walsh	 were	 leadng	 opponents	 of	 roosevelt’s	
foregn	 polcy,	 but	 the	most	 crtczed	 congressonal	 ant-nterventonst	




	 Fsh,	 a	 republcan	 who	 represented	 roosevelt’s	 home	 dstrct	 n	
Congress,	was	n	many	ways	the	presdent’s	nemess.	lke	roosevelt,	Fsh	





Fsh	 attended	 harvard	 College	 where	 he	 also	 studed	 law	 (roosevelt	
studed	 law	 brefly	 at	 Columba);	 Fsh	 graduated	 at	 the	 top	 of	 hs	 class	
(roosevelt	dd	not).	Durng	the	Frst	World	War	Fsh	served	as	the	com-
pany	commander	of	an	afrcan	amercan	unt,	whereas	roosevelt	served	
as	Presdent	Wlson’s	assstant	 secretary	of	 the	navy.	Fsh	won	 the	Slver	
Star	and	French	Crox	de	Guerre	for	hs	servce,	whle	roosevelt	went	on	




vce	 wth	 an	afrcan	amercan	 unt,	 he	 garnered	 some	 support	 among	
mnortes.	Wth	 ths	 consttuency	 Fsh	 supported	 antlynchng	 legsla-


















Fsh	 Commttee	 that	 had	 nvestgated	 communst	 propaganda	 n	 the	
Unted	 States.	 a	 staunch	 antcommunst,	 Fsh	 opposed	 the	 roosevelt	
admnstraton’s	recognton	of	the	Sovet	Unon.50
	 irrespectve	 of	 Fsh’s	 antcommunsm,	 Fbi	 offcals	 took	 an	 nterest	
n	hm	after	 he	 began	 to	 oppose	roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy,	 but	 partcu-
larly	 snce	 he	 was	 the	 rankng	mnorty	member	 of	 the	 house	 Foregn	
affars	 Commttee.	When	 t	 came	 to	 supportng	 ether	 antcommunsts	
or	 Presdent	 roosevelt,	 hoover—the	 shrewd	 bureaucrat	 that	 he	 was—
chose	 roosevelt.	 Snce	 1932,	 Fsh	 had	 opposed	 roosevelt	 and	 hs	 new	
















by	 the	 German-language	 newspaper	Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter	
and	other	radcal	publcatons.	The	memorandum	stands	as	evdence	that	
Fbi	 offcals	 took	 great	 nterest	 n	 ant-nterventonst	 poltcal	 actvty,	
especally	where	 t	 ntersected	wth	 the	poltcal	 efforts	 and	goals	 of	 the	
roosevelt	admnstraton.52
	 50.	 Fsh,	Memoir of a Patriot,	32–39;	summary	memorandum	re	representatve	haml-
ton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	94–4–3997–33,	pp.	3–6.














	 in	 ther	 nvestgaton,	Fbi	agents	 ntervewed	mrs.	vanderblt	Webb,	
head	of	the	commttee	opposng	Fsh’s	reelecton,	as	well	as	her	confdant,	
henry	 hoke—who	 had	 ntally	 publczed	 the	 congressonal	 frankng-
prvlege	controversy.	mrs.	Webb	clamed	that	Fsh	had	accepted	two	checks	
totalng	$3,000	from	a	German	cavar	retaler	by	the	name	of	Sturm.	When	
Fbi	 agents	 ntervewed	hoke,	he	 clamed	 that	Fsh	had	 accepted	 checks	
n	1940	 totalng	$2,500	 from	 the	romanoff	Cavar	Company	and,	more	
mportant,	that	the	Treasury	Department	had	possesson	of	the	checks	“n	
connecton	wth	an	ncome	tax	volaton.”54





role	 n	 the	vereck-led	congressonal	 frankng	scandal,	hoover	 regarded	
ths	 partcular	 connecton	 as	 suspcous.	he	 ordered	 an	 nvestgaton	 to	
determne	whether	Fsh	had	volated	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act,	
and	he	 advsed	 the	Whte	house	 that	 f	 any	 nformaton	was	developed	
that	would	“nterest	the	presdent”	he	would	pass	t	along.55





“no	 nformaton	 about	 any	 such	 checks	 n	 the	 amounts	 or	 any	 smlar	
	 53.	Confdental	memorandum	for	edgar	hoover,	4	may	1942,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	
letter,	Frankln	a.	Schrver	to	Watson,	23	aprl	1942,	Offcal	Fle	300,	FDrl;	personal	and	
confdental	 letter,	hoover	 to	Secretary	 to	 the	Presdent	edwn	m.	Watson,	13	may	1942,	
Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
	 54.	 ibd.




suggested	 to	Fsh	 that	 people	 often	 confused	other	 federal	 agences	 and	
ther	 nvestgatons	 wth	 the	 Fbi,	 and	 that	 he	 should	 check	 wth	 those	
agences.	Fsh,	nevertheless,	explaned	 that	“the	check	was	a	 forgery	 f	 t	
exsted,	and	t	was	put	out	for	poltcal	purposes.”56
	 Tamm	mght	have	dened	any	Fbi	 nvestgaton,	but	 just	one	month	
before	Fsh’s	phone	call	hoover	had	provded	the	Whte	house	wth	nfor-












acceptng	checks	 from	hansen-Sturm.	accordng	 to	 the	brtsh	account,	
bSC	agents	conducted	a	“straghtforward	ntellgence	job”	to	“dscredt”	a	
number	of	“partcular	personaltes,”	ncludng	Fsh.	The	bSC	hstory	gves	
no	detals—whch	 s	 typcal—and	only	notes	 that	 copes	of	 checks	 from	
hansen-Sturm	to	Fsh	“were	obtaned.”	One	mght	logcally	presume	that	
snce	henry	hoke	was	nvolved	n	ths	affar—as	wth	the	frankng	prv-










	 58.	British Security Coordination,	73–74,	75.
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questonable	sources.	Ths	 tme	 the	Fbi’s	 nterest	 followed	a	Washington 
Post	story	publshed	on	6	august	reportng	that	Fsh	had	receved	$25,000	
from	 General	 rafael	 Trujllo,	 the	 rght-wng	 mltary	 dctator	 of	 the	
Domncan	 republc.	 accordng	 to	 the	 artcle,	 Fsh	 had	 receved	 ths	
money	 n	 July	 1939,	 but	 had	 only	 declared	 $22,000	 on	 hs	 ncome	 tax	












money	 n	ol	 stocks	and	had	returned	the	remander	 to	hm.	he	further	
clamed	that	the	internal	revenue	bureau	had	never	asked	hm	about	the	
transacton,	 as	 had	 been	 reported.	Whatever	 the	 truth,	 the	 story	 dom-
nated	Fsh’s	reelecton	campagn	and	nterested	Fbi	offcals.60
	 What	 nterested	 the	Fbi	most	was	 the	 relatonshp	between	 the	con-




in	 ther	 probe,	 Fbi	 agents	 learned	 that	 Fsh	 had	 vsted	 the	Domncan	

















	 Fbi	 offcals	 took	 great	 nterest	 n	 the	 money	 Trujllo	 had	 gven	 to	
Fsh,	but	ther	specfc	nterest,	and	what	they	learned,	s	unknowable	due	
to	redactons	n	Fbi	documents.	hoover	ordered	the	Fbi’s	new	york	feld	
offce	 to	 report	 on	Trujllo’s	 vst	 and	Fsh’s	meetng	wth	hm	 “n	order	
that	any	further	nformaton	n	ths	case	may	be	mmedately	brought	to	
the	attenton	of	the	Whte	house	offcals.”	Whle	the	detals	of	what	Fbi	
agents	had	 learned	and	 reported	 are	murky,	 t	 s	 clear	 that	hoover	kept	





nformed	roosevelt	 about	 the	Fsh-Trujllo	 affar	 before	 the	Washington 
Post	even	broke	the	story,	revealng	that	the	federal	grand	jury	nvestgat-
ng	 the	 frankng	case	had	dscovered	 the	payment	 nformaton.	because	
Trujllo’s	money	allegedly	orgnated	from	a	German	source,	federal	pros-
ecutor	maloney	forwarded	the	nformaton	to	assstant	Secretary	of	State	
berle.	 Whle	 berle	 concluded	 there	 had	 been	 no	 transgresson,	 Welles	
nevertheless	shared	t	wth	roosevelt,	satsfyng	the	presdent’s	nterest	and	
explanng	why	he	had	not	sought	an	Fbi	probe.63
	 interestngly,	 n	 1951	 Fsh	 learned	 that	 the	 Justce	 Department	 had	
consdered	hm	a	fascst	durng	the	1930s	and	1940s.	Concerned	wth	these	
old	allegatons	at	the	heght	of	mcCarthysm,	Fsh,	who	consdered	hmself	
a	 stalwart	 antcommunst,	 vsted	 Fbi	 headquarters	 to	 request	 access	 to	
hs	 Fbi	 fle.	an	 Fbi	 offcal	 advsed	 the	 former	 thrteen-term	 congress-
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had	 approached	 hm	 for	 not	 reportng	 the	 questonable	 checks	 on	 hs	
ncome	tax	return,	but	he	convnced	them	that	 the	 ncdent	was	bengn.	
nevertheless,	 Fsh	 beleved	 the	 internal	 revenue	 bureau’s	 nterest	 was	
nothng	but	a	roosevelt	admnstraton	effort	to	“get	hm.”64
	 by	 the	 late	 summer	of	1942,	 the	Whte	house	asked	 the	Fbi	 to	 look	
nto	 one	 last	 matter	 concernng	 Fsh.	 On	 22	 august,	 Colonel	 harman	
beukema—an	 nstructor	 at	 West	 Pont—wrote	 Presdental	 Secretary	
Watson	that	Fsh	possessed	a	photograph	of	roosevelt’s	hyde	Park	lbrary	
showng	 a	 brtsh	 flag	 dsplayed	 above	 an	 amercan	 one.	 accordng	 to	






aganst	 usng	 the	 sketch.	as	 compared	 to	 Fsh’s	 other	 actvtes	 ths	 one	











The FBI and the Victory Program Leak
4 December 1941 to Mid-1942
On	 4	 December	 1941,	 the	 Chicago	 Tribune	 and	 ts	 sster	 paper,	 the	
Washington	Times-Herald,	publshed	a	sensatonal	story	that	reverberated	
n	 the	 already	 btter	 and	 deadlocked	 ant-nterventonst/nterventonst	
foregn	polcy	debate.1	Just	three	days	before	the	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	






other	 hand,	 vewed	 the	 revelaton	 as	 tratorous	 behavor	 on	 the	 part	 of	
roosevelt’s	crtcs.




leaked	the	document.	 in	 the	ensung	 nvestgaton,	Fbi	Drector	hoover	
spared	no	effort	and,	ndeed,	the	affar	reflected	hs	pragmatsm	whereby	




	 1.	robert	mcCormck’s	Chicago Tribune	 was	 loosely	 connected,	 by	 famlal	 tes,	 to	
papers	 of	 smlar	 poltcal	 lk.	 Joseph	 Patterson,	 hs	 cousn,	 founded	 the	New York Daily 
News	and	hs	other	cousn,	Cssy	Patterson,	was	publsher	of	the	Washington Times Herald.	













quckly	 n	 the	publc	mnd	and	 the	press.	nevertheless,	 the	 ssue	 strred	
deeply	 held	 emotons	 on	 both	 sdes	 of	 the	 foregn	 polcy	 debate,	 even	
extendng	 nto	 1942.	The	 nvestgaton,	moreover,	 reached	 and	 nvolved	
many	 promnent	 members	 of	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 communty	 to	
nclude	one	U.S.	representatve,	two	U.S.	senators,	a	host	of	mltary	off-
cers,	 Charles	 lndbergh,	 henry	 Ford,	 and	 reporters	 and	 staff	 from	 the	





why	he	became	 the	 focus	of	 government	 nvestgators,	why	 some	of	hs	
belefs	 nterested	Fbi	 agents,	 and,	 fnally,	why	he	 acted	 as	he	dd	 n	 the	
face	 of	 an	Fbi	 nvestgaton.	a	natve	nebraskan	of	German	 extracton,	
Wedemeyer	receved	a	Jesut	educaton	steeped	n	deals	of	duty	and	obl-
gaton.	Followng	hs	hgh	school	graduaton,	n	1916	Wedemeyer	won	an	
appontment	 to	 the	Unted	States	mltary	academy	at	West	Pont	 from	
Senator	George	W.	norrs.	Wth	 the	 crss	 of	 the	Great	War	of	 1914–18	
and	amerca’s	late	entrance	nto	that	conflct,	Wedemeyer	was	graduated	
early	from	the	academy	but	never	partcpated	n	any	combat.	Then,	n	the	
mmedate	 postwar	 years,	 as	 a	 newly	mnted	 junor	 offcer,	Wedemeyer	
studed	nfantry	tactcs	and	was	assgned	duty	as	a	mltary	nstructor	and	
later	assumed	command	of	an	artllery	unt.3
	 as	 an	 army	 offcer,	 Wedemeyer	 served	 n	 a	 varety	 of	 capactes	






	 3.	Charles	e.	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Vic-
tory Plan of 1941	(Washngton,	DC:	Center	for	mltary	hstory,	1990),	6–7.
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led	 nvestgators	 to	 queston	 the	 offcer’s	 loyaltes	 amd	popular	 notons	
of	 naz	 ntrgue	 among	 amerca	 Frsters—whch	 ncluded	Wedemeyer.	
addng	 to	 hs	 later	 troubles,	 durng	 hs	 bref	 assgnment	 n	 Germany,	
Wedemeyer	was	afforded	specal	prvleges	not	commonly	granted	foregn	





from	hs	German	contacts.	hs	 tour	proved	 to	be	 so	valuable	 that	upon	
ts	concluson	he	submtted	a	report	n	1938	to	General	George	marshall,	
then	 chef	 of	 the	 War	 Plans	 Dvson.	 Undoubtedly	 mpressed	 by	 ths	
report,	marshall	 later	 elevated	Wedemeyer	 to	 the	War	Plans	Dvson	 n	
may	1941,	by	whch	tme	marshall	had	rsen	to	chef	of	staff.5
	 Wedemeyer’s	tme	n	Germany	also	contrbuted	to	hs	later	ant-nter-
ventonsm.	Wrtng	 n	 1958,	Wedemeyer	 stated	 that	 durng	 hs	 stay	 n	
Germany	he	had	“dscerned	a	great	deal	of	truth	about	Communst	ams,	
practces,	and	methods	unknown	or	 gnored	 n	amerca	untl	 recently.”6	
he	had	 also	 come	 to	 regard	naz	Germany	 n	 a	postve	 fashon.	 “[m]y	
two	years	experence	wth	the	German	people	n	general	and	the	mltary	
pedagogy	n	partcular,”	he	wrote	Walter	Trohan,	“had	caused	me	to	ren-
der	 favorable	 reports	 concernng	 them.”7	Wedemeyer,	moreover,	 saw	 n	
naz	Germany	a	bulwark	aganst	Communst	russa.	To	hm	“the	German	
search	 for	Lebensraum	 dd	 not	menace	 the	Western	World	 to	 anythng	
	 4.	 ibd.,	7–9.
	 5.	 ibd.,	9–11.
	 6.	albert	C.	Wedemerer,	Wedemeyer Reports! 4.	
	 7.	 letter,	Wedemeyer	to	Walter	Trohan,	27	november	1953,	Wedemeyer	Papers,	box	
139,	hoover	insttuton	archves	(hereafter	hia),	Stanford	Unversty,	Palo	alto,	Ca.
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lke	 the	 same	 degree	 as	 the	worldwde	Communst	 conspracy	 centered	
n	moscow.”	Wedemeyer’s	vews,	as	 such,	 shared	a	common	thread	wth	
those	 of	 another	 ardent	 ant-nterventonst,	 Charles	 lndbergh.	 both	






Followng	 passage	 of	 the	 lend-lease	act	 n	march	 1941,	 the	amercan	
government	 was	 faced	 wth	 the	 task	 of	 arrangng	 procurement	 of	 war-
related	 matérel	 for	 Great	 brtan.	 The	War	 Department	 was	 delegated	
responsblty	 for	determnng	the	projected	needs	of	 lend-lease,	but	was	
gven	 no	 specfc	 drecton	 from	 senor	 admnstraton	 offcals.	 War	







	 accordng	 to	 the	 offcal	 hstory	 of	 the	 vctory	 Program,	 Secretary	
Stmson	wholeheartedly	agreed	wth	the	undersecretary’s	desre	for	more	
specfc	drecton.	The	War	Department	contnued	to	fumble	about	devel-
opng	 a	 plan	 for	whch	mltary	 offcals	 had	no	natonal	 strategc	 goals	
or	estmates.	That	 s,	untl	9	 July	1941,	when	Presdent	roosevelt	 fnally	
stepped	n	and	ordered	hs	secretares	of	war	and	navy	to	explore	“at	once	
the	 overall	 producton	 requrements	 requred	 to	 defeat	 our	 potental	
enemes.”	 The	 offcal	 hstory	 suggests	 that	 Undersecretary	 Patterson’s	
executve	offcer,	General	burns,	who	was	the	War	Department’s	lason	to	
the	Whte	house,	had	nfluenced	lend-lease	supervsor	harry	hopkns	to	
	 8.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	10–12;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh and 
the Battle against American Intervention in World War II	(new	york:	harcourt	brace	Jova-
novch,	1974),	33–37.
	 9.	memorandum,	Undersecretary	of	War	robert	Patterson	to	Secretary	of	War	henry	
Stmson,	18	aprl	1941,	reprnted	n	mark	Sknner	Watson,	United States Army in World War 






	 Soon	 thereafter,	 responsblty	 for	drawng	up	a	 global	wartme	 con-
tngency	plan	devolved	from	the	secretary	of	war	to	General	marshall	to	
General	leonard	Gerow	of	the	War	Plans	Dvson—the	unt	responsble	
for	 creatng	mltary	 plans—and	 fnally	 to	major	albert	C.	Wedemeyer.	
as	 Wedemeyer	 later	 ponted	 out,	 never	 before	 had	 amercan	 mltary	
authortes	devsed	such	an	all-encompassng	plan.	“it	meant	travelng	on	
uncharted	seas	wthout	a	compass	toward	a	fatal	Shangr-la,”	Wedemeyer	
wrote,	 “snce	 no	 natonal	 ams	 or	 strategc	 objectves	 were	 gven	 us.”	
Despte	ths	mpedment,	Wedemeyer	coordnated	wth	other	government	









natonal	 strategc	 plannng,	 Wedemeyer	 was	 convnced	 that	 amercan	
nvolvement	 n	 a	 second	 worldwde	 mltary	 conflct	 would	 lead	 only	
to	 natonal	 devastaton.	 yet,	 despte	 hs	 underlyng	 ant-nterventonst	










	 10.	 letter,	 roosevelt	 to	 Secretares	 of	War	 and	navy,	 9	 July	 1941,	 reprnted	 n	 bd.,	
338–39.
	 11.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	16–17;	blnd	memorandum,	publcaton	 n	Chi-
cago Tribune and	Washington Times-Herald	 of	army	and	navy	estmate	of	Unted	States	
Over-all	Producton	requrements,	5	December	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–23.
	 12.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	14.
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Wedemeyer	could	not	arrve	at	any	useful	fgures.	On	hs	own,	therefore,	
he	drafted	an	assessment	of	natonal	objectves	and	submtted	ths	state-






out	 the	 summer	of	1941,	 and	 n	a	 relatvely	 short	perod	of	 tme—from	




the	 completed	 plan	 was	 dstrbuted	 to	 the	 hghest-rankng	members	 of	






account	 of	 the	 vctory	 Program,	 Wedemeyer’s	 lfe	 became	 markedly	
uncomfortable.	he	vvdly	 recalled	 that	mornng	when	he	 arrved	at	hs	
offce	n	the	muntons	buldng:






	 13.	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future,	 60–62;	 ntervew	wth	General	Wedemeyer,	 24	
aprl	1987,	quoted	n	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future,	63.
	 14.	blnd	memorandum,	publcaton	 n	Chicago Tribune	 and	Washington Times-Her-
ald	 of	 army	 and	 navy	 estmate	 of	 Unted	 States	 Over-all	 Producton	 requrements,	 5	
December	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–23.	For	detaled	hstores	of	the	complaton	of	the	vctory	




The	 developer	 of	 the	 top-secret	 contngency	 plan	 had	 cause	 to	 be	wor-
red,	for	he	was	responsble,	to	a	large	degree,	for	ts	securty.	The	news-
paper	 story,	 wrtten	 by	 the	 Tribune’s	 Chesly	 manly,	 gave	 detals	 of	 the	
plan,	 ncludng	ts	estmates	for	a	10,000,000-plus-man	combned	armed	
force	consstng	of	a	1,100,000-man	navy,	a	150,000-man	marne	corps,	a	
6,745,000-man	 army,	 and	 a	 2,050,000-man	 army	 ar	 force.	addtonally,	
the	 artcle	 reprnted	 n	 ts	 entrety	 Presdent	 roosevelt’s	 9	 July	 memo-





	 ant-nterventonsts	 depcted	 the	 revelaton	 as	 a	 smokng	 gun.	 To	
them,	 the	vctory	 Program	was	 clear	 evdence	 that	 roosevelt	 had	 been	
purposefully	 maneuverng	 the	 country	 nto	 war.	 moreover,	 ant-nter-
ventonsts	planned	to	use	the	revelaton	to	ther	advantage.	ruth	Sarles,	
drector	 of	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee’s	 speakers	 bureau,	 advocated	
dstrbutng	the	plan	across	the	country	“n	tens	of	thousands.”	She	hoped	
“that	every	speaker	who	goes	on	the	platform	for	aF	[amerca	Frst]	wll	
denounce	 t	 n	rngng	 terms,	 that	all	wll	hammer	 ‘no	aeF’	 [amercan	
expedtonary	 Force].”17	 One	 republcan	 ant-nterventonst	 congress-





	 interventonsts,	on	 the	other	hand,	vewed	 the	 leak	 n	 strkngly	df-
ferent	 terms.	Senator	Carter	Glass	of	vrgna,	honorary	charman	of	 the	
rabdly	 nterventonst	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	 Commttee,	 commented	 that	
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thng	to	have	happen,”	Secretary	of	War	Stmson	noted	n	hs	dary,	“and	
was	typcal	of	the	mental	atttude	of	the	solatonsts	at	that	tme.”20	and	


















or	unpatrotc.	 “your	 rght	 to	prnt,”	early	 repled,	 “s	unchallenged	and	
unquestoned.”22







and,	 accordng	 to	 Stmson,	 roosevelt	 agreed	 wth	 hm.	 moreover,	 the	
whole	ssue	of	the	leak,	Stmson	clamed,	caused	the	presdent	to	be	“full	of	
fght.”	apparently	sensng	roosevelt’s	mood,	Stmson	suggested	prosecut-



























dutes	and	responsbltes	of	 the	War	Department.	 .	 .	 .	Falures	 to	make	




What	 would	 you	 thnk	 of	 an	 amercan	 General	 Staff	 whch	 n	 the	
present	 condton	of	 the	world	dd	not	 nvestgate	and	 study	every	con-
cevable	 type	of	 emergency	whch	may	confront	 ths	 country,	 and	every	
possble	method	of	meetng	 that	 emergency?	What	do	 you	 thnk	of	 the	











United States Army in World War II,	359.




what	Stmson	had	sad.	harold	 ickes,	 ardent	opponent	of	 the	ant-nter-
ventonsts,	 found	 t	 to	be	“entrely	 too	defensve.”	vce	Presdent	henry	
Wallace	agreed	wth	Stmson	but	objected	to	the	questons	followng	the	




	 much	of	 the	 cabnet	meetng	was	 spent	 dscussng	whether	 to	 pros-
ecute	 those	 responsble	 for	 the	 vctory	 Program	 leak.	 ickes	 urged	 the	
presdent	 to	 go	 forward	 wth	 prosecutons	 aganst	 the	Chicago Tribune	
and	Washington Times-Herald.	The	queston	over	whether	the	esponage	
act	offered	an	avenue	to	explot	was	settled,	 to	the	cabnet’s	satsfacton,	
when	 attorney	 General	 bddle	 defended	 such	 acton.	 Then,	 followng	
the	meetng,	Stmson	pressed	roosevelt	 to	pursue	charges	of	conspracy	
aganst	those	nvolved.	The	secretary,	moreover,	demanded	that	the	charg-








members.	 Gven	 the	 charged	 atmosphere	 created	 wth	 the	 leak,	 bddle	
probably	feared	the	worst	f	unsubstantated	nformaton	was	leaked	from	
the	Whte	house.	in	any	event,	bddle	authorzed	the	Fbi	to	nvestgate.28





edward	 Tamm,	met	 wth	 Secretary	 of	 the	navy	 Frank	 Knox	 and	 other	
	 27.	entry	for	5	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:76	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7).
	 28.	entry	for	5	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:76	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7);	harold	l.	












	 Usng	 ths	 copy	 of	 the	 vctory	 Program,	 Fbi	 agents	 mmedately	
compared	 the	 actual	 contngency	 plan	 wth	 that	 publshed	 by	 the	 ant-
nterventonst	 press.	 in	 so	dong,	 the	Fbi’s	 nvestgators	 focused	on	 the	
thrty-fve	quotatons	made	publc	from	the	vctory	Program.	each	quota-
ton	was	 scrutnzed	and	any	 nconsstency	between	 the	 two	documents	
was	lad	out	n	full	detal.	Whle	Fbi	offcals	found	numerous	mnor	and	







worked	 wth	Wedemeyer	 (who	 by	 now	 had	 been	 promoted	 to	 colonel)	
and	havng	known	hm	personally,	expressed	hs	trust	n	the	man.	Gven	
Wedemeyer’s	 known	 ant-nterventonst	 poltcal	 sympathes,	 however,	
and	the	fact	that	he	was	responsble	for	pecng	together	the	plan,	others	
suspected	he	was	gulty.	assstant	Secretary	of	War	 John	 J.	mcCloy,	 stll	
new	n	hs	poston,	ordered	Wedemeyer	to	hs	offce	to	dscuss	the	mat-













	 31.	 	 Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	21;	letter,	albert	C.	Wedemeyer	to	Walter	Tro-
han,	27	november	1953,	Wedemeyer	Papers,	box	139,	hia.
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thrd	 n	 command.	 Wedemeyer	 was	 understandably	 concerned.	 years	
later,	 n	1957,	he	descrbed	the	event	and,	whle	the	passage	of	tme	had	
undoubtedly	 colored	 hs	 memory,	 he	 conveyed	 hs	 lastng	 btterness:	
“When	edgar	hoover	[sic],	Thams	[sic,	Tamm],	Genau	and	other	Fbi	men	
descended	upon	me	n	my	offce,	at	that	tme	n	the	muntons	buldng,	
about	 December	 1	 [sic],	 1941,	 i	 was	 confused,	 worred,	 and	 a	 lttle	 bt	
angry.”	he	descrbed	the	ncdent:	“[Fbi	agents]	descended	upon	me	lke	
vultures	upon	a	prostrate	antelope.”32
	 Despte	 hs	 vvd	 descrpton	 of	 the	 Fbi	 offcals’	 vst,	 Wedemeyer	
descrbed	Tamm	as	“so	courteous	as	 to	be	dsarmng.”	The	Fbi	assstant	
drector	asked	whether	Wedemeyer	knew	how	the	War	Department’s	secu-









the	 plan.	 That	 he	 confused	 the	 dates	was	 a	 red	 flag	 to	 Fbi	 agents.	 The	
confuson	was	not	surprsng,	however,	snce	the	plan	was	completed	on	



















about	 hs	 tme	 n	Germany.	Genau	 asked	Wedemeyer	who	 n	Germany	
he	had	befrended,	partcularly	those	n	hgh-rankng	mltary	crcles.	he	







	 agent	 Genau	 then	 turned	 hs	 questonng	 to	Wedemeyer’s	 contacts	
wth	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 movement.	 he	 asked:	 “Do	 you	 have	 any	
contacts	wth	a	person	or	persons	wthn	the	amerca	Frst	Organzaton	
[sic]?”	 “yes,”	 Wedemeyer	 responded,	 “i	 have	 several	 frends	 connected	
wth	that	organzaton:	mrs.	[robert]	Taft,	John	T.	Flynn,	Senator	Wheeler,	
and	Colonel	lndbergh.	 i	 haven’t	 seen	 them	 for	 some	 tme	because	 i’ve	
been	 too	 busy.”	 When	 asked	 f	 he	 sympathzed	 wth	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	Wedemeyer	responded:	“in	many	ways,	yes.”	To	
Fbi	offcals	these	tes	were	a	sgnfcant	nvestgatve	lead	snce	hoover’s	




tons	 wth	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 Genau	 was	 partcularly	 nter-
ested	 n	Wedemeyer’s	 connectons	 to	Charles	lndbergh.	respondng	 to	
a	seres	of	questons,	Wedemeyer	admtted	to	havng	frst	met	lndbergh	



















exactly”	 determne	 who	 had	 leaked	 the	 vctory	 Program.	 Despte	 ths	












	 Though	 unable	 to	 specfcally	 dentfy	 the	 leaker,	 hoover	 advsed	
bddle	that	“thoroughly	relable	confdental	nformants”	ndcated	that	a	
hgh-rankng	general	staff	offcer	of	the	War	Department	had	leaked	the	










	 “There	was	 ample	 evdence	 to	 suggest	my	 gult,”	albert	Wedemeyer	
wrote	to	newspaperman	Walter	Trohan	n	1953.40	On	a	prma	face	level,	


























learned	 that	Wedemeyer	was	 “opposed	 to	 the	lend-lease	program”	and	
that	he	was	“very	 solatonst	 n	hs	statements	and	sympathes.”	beyond	
hs	 clear	 poltcal	 bases,	 Fbi	 offcals	 took	 note	 as	well	 of	Wedemeyer’s	
access	to	the	department’s	plans	to	send	troops	to	iceland	and	ts	plan	to	





Ford—the	 automoble	 magnate	 and	 fellow	 ant-nterventonst—and	 hs	
drector	of	plant	personnel	and	plant	securty,	harry	bennett.	lndbergh	
allegedly	 sad	 that	 he	 had	 receved	 “consderable	 nformaton”	 from	 an	
offcer	 n	 the	 army.	 Ths	 offcer,	 whom	 lndbergh	 had	 vsted	 whle	 n	
Washngton,	 D.C.,	 n	 addton	 to	 provdng	 lndbergh	 wth	 mltary-















	 Snce	 bennett	 could	 not	 produce	 the	 name	 of	 lndbergh’s	 army	
contact,	 Fbi	 assstant	Drector	 Tamm	 beleved	 that	 Ford	 could.	 So	 he	
ordered	the	Detrot	SaC	to	ntervew	Ford	but	to	do	so	n	a	nonconfron-
tatonal	way.	Delghted	wth	 the	progress	 beng	made	 to	 ascertan	who	







poenang	 lndbergh	 to	 testfy	 before	 a	 grand	 jury	 where	 he	 could	 be	



































	 Whle	 Fbi	 agents	 worked	 assduously	 to	 confrm	 Wedemeyer	 (or	
someone	 else)	 as	 the	 leaker,	 they	 also	 attempted	 to	 dentfy	whch	 ant-
nterventonst	senator	had	receved	the	plans.	Fbi	agents	focused	on	two	











































the	 senator’s	 request	but	was	unable	 to	 secure	a	 copy	untl	 3	December.	










arguments.	Wheeler	 wanted	 to	 prove	 to	 amercans	 that	 f	 the	 country	
contnued	on	ts	present	course	 that	war	was	 nevtable;	and	the	vctory	
Program	 only	 underscored	 that	 premse.	 addtonally,	 Wheeler	 dd	
not	beleve	 that	 revealng	 ths	 top-secret	plan	was	a	volaton	of	 the	 law	
because	 t	was	only	 a	 contngency	plan	of	producton	 requrements	 and	
	 51.	burton	K.	Wheeler	wth	Paul	F.	healy,	Yankee from the West	(new	york:	Doubleday,	
1962),	21.








not	an	operatonal	war	plan.	he	saw	no	 legtmate	reason	not	 to	 nform	
the	publc.53
	 Wheeler	decded	that	the	best	way	to	make	publc	the	vctory	Program	
was	 to	 ensure	 ts	 publcaton	 n	 a	 paper	 sympathetc	 to	 the	 ant-nter-
ventonst	cause.	he	therefore	decded	to	share	t	wth	Chesly	manly,	the	
Chicago Tribune’s	Washngton	correspondent,	because	“i	lked	manly	and	
knew	 hs	 paper	 would	 gve	 the	 plan	 the	 knd	 of	 attenton	 t	 deserved.”	
When	 presented	 wth	 the	 document	 that	 nght,	 accordng	 to	 Wheeler,	





havng	 faled	 n	 ther	 ntal	 efforts	 to	 dentfy	 the	 leaker	of	 the	vctory	





and	miD	 nterrogators	 contnually	pressed	manly	 to	 dentfy	hs	 source	
usng	 the	 classc	 nterrogaton	 tactc	 of	 constantly	 rephrasng	 the	 same	













	 53.	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	32–33.
	 54.	as	quoted	n	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	33.
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arthur	 hennng	 n	 Washngton,	 D.C.	 hennng	 refused	 to	 dentfy	 the	
source	of	 the	 leak,	but	 commented	about	 scoopng	 the	Sun:	 “Ths	 thng	
just	happened.	it	was	a	provdental	occurrence.	.	.	.	i	receved	no	nstruc-
tons	 from	my	 superors.”	hennng	also	 admtted	 to	havng	 seen	a	 copy	
of	 the	vctory	Program,	 but	 added	 that	 hs	 source	 “had	 a	 legal	 rght	 to	
have	the	plan	n	hs	possesson.”	When	asked	whether	ths	source	was	on	






























and	navy	Departments,	 but	 because	 these	people	 regularly	 shared	docu-
ments	wthout	chargng	them	out	the	real	number	“s	legon.”61
	 in	recaptulatng	the	case	for	bddle,	hoover	dsclosed	that	a	popular	
rumor	 suggested	mssour	 congressman	 Phlp	 bennett	 had	 pad	 a	War	
Department	clerk	for	the	plan,	but	Fbi	agents	could	not	corroborate	ths.	
regardng	Charles	lndbergh,	hoover	noted	that	 the	bureau’s	“extensve	
nvestgaton”	had	 faled	 to	 lnk	lndbergh	 through	 “personal	 frends	or	
contacts”	 to	 the	 leak.	 Fnally,	 those	War	Department	 offcers	 who	were	
“ant-brtsh,	ant-admnstraton,	or	otherwse	out	of	sympathy	wth	the	









	 60.	memorandum,	 edward	a.	 Tamm	 to	 J.	 edgar	hoover,	 14	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–
39945–4.
	 61.	Personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	 J.	edgar	hoover	 to	attorney	general,	27	
January	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–39945–26;	 blnd	 memorandum,	 27	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–39945–
26X.
	 62.	blnd	memorandum,	27	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–26X,	p.	4.







January	and	contnued	to	 ntervew	numerous	 ndvduals.	 in	the	mean-



















made	 a	 fnal	 decson	 as	 to	whether	 the	 grand	 jury	would	 be	 employed	
aganst	 those	 nvolved	 n	 the	 leak.	 agents	 ntervewed	 n	 partcular	 the	
thrty-two	mltary	and	cvlan	employees	n	the	offce	of	the	secretary	of	






	 64.	memorandum,	 D.	 mlton	 ladd	 to	 J.	 edgar	 hoover,	 13	 February	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–
39945–32.	Wheeler	has	wrtten	that	he	dd	not	beleve	the	Fbi	had	nvestgated	hs	role	n	the	
leak.	Senator	Davd	Walsh,	however,	told	the	montana	senator	that	“he	was	taled	for	several	
days.”	See	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	36.
	 65.	 For	 these	 ntervews	 see	 the	 218-page	 confdental	 memorandum	 by	 Joseph	 a.	
Genau,	24	march	1942,	Fbi	100–3709.
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	 by	may,	 havng	 receved	 no	 drecton	 from	 the	 Justce	 Department,	
hoover	 nqured	 of	 bddle	what	 the	 admnstraton’s	 decson	was	 as	 to	
the	leak	nvestgaton.	he	relayed	that	all	avalable	nformaton	had	been	




	 Ths	 dd	 not,	 however,	 end	 the	 matter.	 by	 June	 the	 admnstraton	





maton	 orgnated	 from	 government	 sources,	 the	 admnstraton	 sought	
to	ndct	the	Tribune	and	the	artcle’s	author,	Stanley	Johnson,	for	prntng	
“sedtous”	materal.	Ultmately,	however,	because	 the	government	could	













the	 vctory	 Program	 to	 the	 two	 newspapers;	 and	 the	 newspapers	 were	



















Department	 attorneys	 decded	 aganst	 pursung	 the	 case.	Wth	 the	 tde	
of	war	shftng	dramatcally	by	the	mddle	of	1942,	and	wth	more	urgent	
war-related	 matters	 occupyng	 the	 Whte	 house,	 nterest	 n	 the	 case	
seemed	to	have	dsspated.	nevertheless,	Fbi	efforts	to	dscover	the	source	
of	the	leak	and,	f	possble,	develop	evdence	aganst	them	for	prosecuton	
were	 prodgous	 f	 a	 falure.	 more	 mportant,	 however,	 was	 the	 reason	








nalst	Wllam	Stevenson’s	sensatonal	book	about	 the	bSC	head,	A Man 
Called Intrepid	(1976).	Stevenson	wrote	that	Senator	Wheeler	was,	ndeed,	
the	 person	 who	 had	 offered	 the	 vctory	 Program	 to	 the	 ant-nterven-
tonst	press,	belevng	t	 to	be	the	smokng-gun	evdence	that	roosevelt	
ntended	to	lead	amerca	to	war.	yet,	Stevenson	also	clamed,	the	vctory	
Program	was,	 n	 realty,	 part	 of	 a	 ruse	 concocted	 by	 the	 bSC’s	 Poltcal	
Warfare	Dvson	 to	provde	naz	Germany	wth	 a	 “fantastc	 coup.”	The	













edly	 slpped	 the	 phony	 vctory	 Program	 to	 Wheeler	 through	 a	 young	
mltary	 offcer.	The	bSC’s	 goal	was	 to	 have	Wheeler	 publcze	 the	 plan	
and	thereby	goad	htler	nto	declarng	war	on	the	Unted	States.	The	faked	
vctory	Program	was	 to	 stand	 as	 evdence,	 once	publshed	 n	 the	press,	















Flemng,	n	hs	book	The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
War within World War II	 (2001),	 accepts	 that	 the	vctory	Program	was	








The	 vctory	 Program	 leak	 and	 subsequent	 Fbi	 nvestgaton,	 therefore,	
are	best	understood	n	the	context	of	hoover’s	 long	effort	to	cater	to	the	
roosevelt	admnstraton’s	poltcal	nterests	rather	than	as	a	conspratoral	
	 70.	 Stevenson,	A Man Called Intrepid,	299–300.
	 71.	Thomas	Flemng,	The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War within 
World War II	(new	york:	basc	books,	2001),	1–48.	See	also	Flemng’s	artcle	“The	bg	leak,”	
American Heritage	38	(December	1987):	65–71.








motves	 as	 beng	 rooted	 not	 n	 treason,	 but	 n	 havng	 no	 sympathy	 for	
roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy.	Ths	 s	 characterstc	of	 the	domestc	 securty	
state,	and	later	Cold	War,	whereby	foregn	polcy	crtcs	were	targeted	for	




Blossoming of the 
Domestic Security State
November 1941 to March 1942
by	the	end	of	1941	the	debate	between	nterventonsts	and	ant-nterven-
tonsts	had	settled	nto	stalemate.	Whle	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	had	
won	passage	 of	many	measures	 to	 assst	 the	 beleaguered	alles,	 yet	 stll	
avod	drect	partcpaton	n	war,	t	could	not	break	the	deadlock	between	
two	rval	and	passonate	foregn	polcy	advocates	and	ther	postons.	The	
vctory	Program	 leak	appeared	 to	be	an	event	 the	admnstraton	could	
use	to	break	the	deadlock	and	fnally	dscredt	the	ant-nterventonsts	as	
consprators	who	llegally	ganed	access	to	secret	government	records	and	




tor.	 by	 the	 dawn	 of	 1942	 Fbi	 agents	 developed	 three	 cases	 that	 proved	
valuable	 n	 hoover’s	 effort	 to	 servce	 Whte	 house	 poltcal	 nterests	
and	to	promote	the	vew	of	 legtmate	crtcs	as	subversve,	exemplfyng	
the	 evoluton	 of	 the	 domestc	 securty	 state.	 each	 case	 reveals,	 n	 part,	
hoover’s	bureaucratc	motves	vs-à-vs		the	roosevelt	admnstraton	and	
hs	 questonable	 nvestgatve	 tactcs	 where	 agents	 consstently	 gnored	
ctzens’	cvl	lbertes.	Fbi	agents,	n	the	frst	case,	developed	a	frutful—f	
llegal—source	 of	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 on	 ant-nterventonst	 poltcal	
actvty	and	some	of	ths	nformaton	made	ts	way	nto	Fbi	reports	shared	




















the	 armed	 forces,	 unseat	 the	Government	 and	 set	 up	 a	naz	 regme.”	 in	
other	words,	they	were	charged	wth	volatng	the	Smth	act—advocatng	
the	 volent	 overthrow	of	 the	U.S.	 government.	among	 these	 thrty	were	
the	now	nfamous	but,	at	the	tme,	relatvely	obscure	fgures	of	lawrence	
Denns,	Gerald	Wnrod,	Wllam	Dudley	Pelley,	elzabeth	Dllng,	Joseph	
mcWllams,	 and	 George	 Sylvester	 vereck.1	 roosevelt	 had	 pressed	 hs	
attorney	 general,	 Francs	 bddle,	 by	 1944	 to	 ndct	 these	 rght-wng	 fg-
ures—who	sat	on	the	perphery	of	amercan	poltcs—for	sedton.	in	hs	
1975	 book,	Prophets on the Right,	 ronald	 radosh	 rghtly	 compared	 the	
tral	 of	Denns	 and	 company	 to	 those	 trals	 aganst	 alleged	 communsts	
n	the	1950s.2	What	the	tral	llustrated,	however,	was	the	well-establshed	
domestc	 securty	 state—the	 forerunner	 to	 the	 later	 natonal	 securty	
state—already	 n	 operaton	 n	 1944.	What	 elucdates	 ths	 so-called	 frst	
Denns	Case,	moreover,	s	that	whch	preceded	t;	namely,	the	Fbi’s	nves-
tgatve	 efforts	 aganst	 the	 brgham	 famly	 of	 new	 york,	 the	 revsonst	






	 1.	 “U.S.	 indcts	 30,	 allegng	 naz	 Plot	 to	 incte	mutny	 and	 revoluton,”	New York 
Times,	4	January	1944.




tve—and	her	 famly	proved	to	be	a	wndfall	 for	hoover’s	 nterest	 n	 the	
poltcal	actvtes	of	the	ant-nterventonsts	and	n	hs	effort	to	present	
them	 as	 subversve.	The	 prncpal	means	 by	whch	 Fbi	 agents	 collected	
ths	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 was	 a	 wretap	 of	 ethel’s	 telephone.	 Poltcally,	




	 not	 frnge	 fgures,	 the	 brghams	 were	 a	 promnent	 famly,	 whch	
stuated	 them	 perfectly	 among	 other	 foregn	 polcy	 crtcs	 whom	 Fbi	
agents	montored.	ethel	was	a	leadng	opera	and	concert	soprano	durng	










	 The	 catalyst	 that	 brought	 the	 brghams	 to	 the	 attenton	 of	 Fbi	 off-
cals	 was	 not	 ther	 poltcs	 but	 a	 rumor	 about	 them	 relayed	 to	 the	 vce	
presdent	 of	 the	 Unted	 States,	 henry	 Wallace,	 on	 3	 november	 1941.	
Wallace’s	unnamed	confdant	clamed	to	have	 nformaton	relatng	to	an	
alleged	 assassnaton	plot	 aganst	Presdent	roosevelt	 that	was	 lnked	 to	








	 3.	 See	ethel	brgham’s	obtuary	n	New York Times,	28	September	1968,	33.	On	the	new	
york	chapter	of	amerca	Frst	see	mchele	Flynn	Stenehjem,	An American First: John T. Flynn 
and the America First Committee	(new	rochelle,	ny:	arlngton	house,	1976).	For	Danel’s	
work	see,	for	example,	hs	page	one	story:	Danel	brgham,	“Pope	has	long	Talk	wth	Taylor;	
move	to	ad	Jews	n	France	Seen,”	New York Times,	20	September	1942.






then	 notfed	 the	 Secret	 Servce,	 whose	 responsblty	 t	 was	 to	 protect	
the	 presdent	 and	 nvestgate	 threats	 made	 to	 hs	 lfe.	 irrespectve	 of	
the	 Secret	 Servce’s	 jursdcton,	 on	 4	november	 1941	hoover	 obtaned	
from	 attorney	 General	 bddle	 authorzaton	 to	 wretap	 the	 brghams’	
telephone.	 Ths	was	 an	 unlawful	 acton.	 Snce	 the	 enactng	 of	 the	 1934	
Federal	Communcatons	act,	the	use	of	wretaps	by	anyone	was	llegal.	in	
1940,	however,	gven	the	sense	of	crss	after	the	naz	nvason	of	western	






lsh	 “the	 dentty	 and	 actvtes	 of ”	 the	 famly,	 Fbi	 agents	 contacted	 the	
Credt	bureau	of	Greater	new	york,	the	automoble	regstraton	bureau,	
and	 the	 brghams’	 mal	 carrer.	 in	 so	 dong,	 agents	 learned	 that	 both	
ethel	and	barbara	worked	for	the	local	amerca	Frst	Commttee	chapter,	





	 4.	Confdental	 report,	 SaC	 P.	 e.	 Foxworth,	 new	 york	 Cty,	 15	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	











	 6.	Confdental	 report,	 SaC	 P.	 e.	 Foxworth,	 new	 york	 Cty,	 15	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	
100–50729–19.
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Despte	hoover’s	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 effcacy	 of	 the	wretap,	 t	 remaned	 n	
place	for	another	month.	it	s	not	clear	whether	bddle	was	aware	that	the	
wretap	was	 contnued,	 but	hoover’s	 language	 seemed	 to	 suggest	 that	 t	
would	not	be.7





explctly	mentoned	 the	wretap.	 instead,	 as	was	 common	Fbi	 practce,	








the	 frst	 report	Foxworth	sent	 to	hoover.	 in	a	personal	and	confdental	
letter8	 to	hoover	dated	18	november	1941,	Foxworth	noted	that	no	fur-
ther	nformaton	had	been	developed	regardng	any	assassnaton	plot	or	
other	 llegal	 actvtes,	 but	 he	 dd	 report	 bountful	 poltcal	 ntellgence.	
Ths	 ncluded	the	new	york	amerca	Frst	chapter’s	decson	not	to	 jon	
the	 rght-wng	 group	Women	 Unted	 n	 burnng	 roosevelt’s	 campagn	
pledges	n	protest	because	of	the	negatve	publcty	t	would	engender,	and	




	 8.	 Fbi	 polcy	 requred	 letters	 to	 hoover	marked	 “personal	 and	 confdental”	 to	 be	
drected	mmedately	to	hs	desk	and	not	drectly	nto	the	bureau’s	central	records	system.	
See	athan	Theohars,	ed.,	From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover	 (Chcago:	 ivan	r.	Dee,	
1991),	2–4.
	 9.	 Personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	18	november	1941,	Fbi	100–















a	 heated	 poltcal	 dscusson	ethel	 brgham	had	wth	 a	 houseguest	who	
apparently	 dd	 not	 agree	 wth	 her	 poltcs.	 Fbi	 agents	 recorded	 ethel’s	










lndbergh.	 barbara	 brgham	 dscussed	 wth	 new	 york	 attorney	 eml	
morosn—whom	Fbi	offcals	beleved	 to	be	 subversve—ingalls’s	arrest	
for	not	regsterng	as	a	foregn	agent	and	the	possblty	of	amerca	Frst	
50729–6.	On	Women	Unted	 and	 other	 rght-wng	women’s	 groups	 see	Glen	 Jeansonne,	












rasng	 her	 $7,500	 bal	 when	 barbara	 expressed	 concern	 over	 ingalls’s	
arrest	 beng	 “a	 slap”	 for	 the	 commttee.	brgham	also	dscussed,	 sgnf-
cantly,	a	dnner	party	she	attended	wth	lndbergh	on	17	December	1941	
hosted	by	the	secretary	of	the	aFC’s	new	york	chapter,	edwn	S.	Webster.	
in	 a	 telephone	 conversaton,	 brgham	 sad	 that	 lndbergh	 had	 referred	
to	 the	 Japanese	as	a	 “yellow	perl”	 and	had	urged	amerca	Frst	 to	 rally	
behnd	the	war	effort	after	Pearl	harbor,	yet	“seemed	dscouraged	as	the	
govt	has	no	plan	nor	does	t	know	for	what	t	s	fghtng.”12
	 Ths	 partcular	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 concernng	 Charles	 lndbergh,	
gleaned	 llegally	 from	 a	wretap,	made	 ts	way	 to	 the	Whte	house	 and	
was	 then	 used	 by	 interor	 Secretary	 harold	 ickes—one	 of	 lndbergh’s	
fercest	crtcs.	(it	should	be	noted	that	ickes	would	not	have	known	the	















and	 made	 arrangements	 to	 publsh	 t	 wth	 vanguard	 Press.	 Tentatvely	
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ralled	behnd	the	war	effort	followng	the	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	harbor,	
and	despte	havng	won	a	contract	 for	 the	book,	 t	was	never	publshed.	
needless	to	say,	the	manuscrpt	confrms	that	at	 least	one	senor	admn-




Webster	 hosted	 at	 whch	 both	 brgham	 and	 lndbergh	 were	 present.	
Ctng	a	New York Mirror	story	that	recounted	the	event,	ickes	noted	that	
lndbergh	blamed	Great	brtan	for	the	outbreak	of	war	and	argued	that	
amerca	Frst	 should	wat	untl	 the	Pearl	harbor	 exctement	ded	down	
before	 attackng	 further	 roosevelt’s	 polces.	 ickes	 also	 clamed	 to	 have	
“from	a	prvate	source”	other	revealng	nformaton.	he	wrote:
The	 party	 was	 held	 n	 the	 home	 of	 edwn	 S.	Webster,	 secretary	 of	 the	





yellow	races	and	 the	russans.	he	sad	 that	 the	brtsh	and	 the	“fools	 n	
Washngton”	spoled	ths	plan.	in	concluson	he	nformed	the	group	that	
although	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	could	not	be	actve	at	the	moment,	
t	 should	 take	prompt	 advantage	of	 the	 nevtable	 casualty	 lsts	 to	make	
the	amercan	people	realze	that	they	have	been	betrayed	by	Great	brtan	
and	 the	 roosevelt	 admnstraton.	 The[n],	 he	 sad,	 the	 amerca	 Frst	














	 ickes,	 moreover,	 was	 not	 the	 sole	 recpent	 of	 ths	 nformaton.	 in	
august	1942,	lndbergh	was	subpoenaed	to	testfy	for	the	defense	at	the	
sedton	tral	of	Wllam	Dudley	Pelley,	leader	of	the	Slver	Shrts.	To	assst	
the	 prosecutors	 n	 ther	 cross-examnaton	 of	 lndbergh,	 Fbi	 offcals	
prepared	a	blnd	memorandum	that	 summarzed	 nformaton	 n	bureau	
fles	that	confrmed	the	avator’s	“foregn	or	natonalstc	sympathes.”	Ths	







tap	on	30	December	1941,	and	 then	prepared	a	 summary	 report	on	 the	
nvestgaton	 for	 hoover.	 in	 the	 eghty-nne-page	 document,	 labeled	
“inTernal	 SeCUriTy-G[ermany],”	 Foxworth	 summarzed	 the	 nne	






	 after	 havng	 receved	 ths	 report,	 hoover	 ordered	 Foxworth	 to	 fol-
low	up	several	loose	ends.	he	stressed	that	the	“possble	exstence”	of	the	












blnd	 and	 undated	memorandum	 re	Charles	a.	 lndbergh	 (ca.	 5	august	 1942),	 Fbi	 65–
11449–152;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	534.
	 19.	Confdental	report,	Foxworth	to	Fbi	hQ,	15	January	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–19.
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handled	 n	 a	most	dscreet	manner.”	a	 second	 follow-up	 that	 nterested	
hoover	was	 n	 ascertanng	 the	 dentty	 of	 the	 person	barbara	brgham	
clamed	had	vsted	the	Whte	house	bweekly.	regardng	these	two	loose	
ends,	hoover	demanded	mmedate	acton	and	regular	reports.20
	 The	 nformaton	 culled	 from	 the	 brgham	 wretap	 was	 not	 lm-
ted	 to	Fbi	offcals	and	a	memorandum	to	roosevelt	 regardng	Charles	
lndbergh’s	 dnner-party	 chats.	 On	 26	 January	 1942,	 hoover	 provded	
the	Whte	 house	 wth	 detaled	 nformaton	 on	 the	 brghams.	 The	 Fbi	
drector	nformed	roosevelt’s	secretary,	edwn	Watson,	that	a	member	of	
the	brgham	famly	had	threatened	the	lfe	of	the	presdent	and	had	then	
referred	 to	 the	exstence	of	a	One	Gun	Club	as	 “ready	 to	 start	a	 revolu-
ton”	once	 the	Unted	States	was	at	war.	by	 referencng	 these	 two	 tems,	
hoover	 frmly	establshed	the	bona	fdes	of	hs	 nvestgaton,	yet	he	was	
also	 careful	 to	make	 no	menton	 that	 the	 nformaton	 had	 been	 uncor-
roborated	(One	Gun	Club)	or	had	been	dsmssed	months	before	by	the	
Secret	 Servce	 (assassnaton	 threat).	notng	barbara’s	 clam	of	 knowng	
a	person	who	met	roosevelt	bweekly,	yet	hated	hm	“as	much	as	do	the	
brghams,”	hoover	provded	Watson	wth	a	 lst	of	names,	one	of	whch,	



































































t	was	 assgned	 a	 “symbol	 number”—the	 code-dentfcaton	 for	wretap	
or	mcrophone	 survellance	 targets.	 (The	Fbi	has	wthheld	 the	brgham	











but	 “addtonal	 ant-roosevelt,	 ant-Semtc,	 and	 contnued	 solatonst	






“holdng	 the	bag.”	These	 comments	were	wholly	wthout	 corroboraton,	
and	clearly	 should	not	have	been	regarded	as	 sgnfcant,	but	on	20	 July	
1942	hoover	 forwarded	 the	 nformaton	 to	 the	 attorney	 general,	harry	
hopkns,	miD,	and	adolf	berle.	none	of	these	recpents	were	nformed	
	 24.	 letter	and	accompanyng	memorandum,	Foxworth	 to	hoover,	21	may	1942,	Fbi	
100–50729–28;	memorandum,	 J.	 K.	mumford	 to	 ladd,	 3	 June	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–30;	
memorandum,	hoover	to	Foxworth,	9	June	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–31;	memorandum,	mum-
ford	to	ladd,	3	 June	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–30;	Francs	bddle,	In Brief Authority	 (Garden	
Cty,	ny:	Doubleday,	1962),	166,	168.
	 25.	memorandum,	e.	G.	Ftch	to	ladd,	6	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–35;	athan	Theoha-
rs	and	John	Cox,	The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition	(Phladel-
pha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1988),	9–10.
	 26.	 See	personal	and	confdental	 letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	27	June	1942,	Fbi	100–
50729–33;	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	7	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–34;	letter,	Foxworth	to	





as	 to	 hoover’s	 source,	 but	 hs	 sharng	 of	 ths	 nformaton	 can	 best	 be	
understood	 as	 part	 of	 hoover’s	 effort	 to	 break	 nto	 the	 feld	 of	 foregn	
ntellgence.	 Snce	 at	 least	 1940,	hoover	 had	 ved	wth	Colonel	Wllam	
Donovan—head	of	the	OSS	durng	the	Second	World	War—for	a	role	n	






mantaned	 the	 brgham	 wretap	 untl	 26	 October	 1942.	 Throughout	
1942,	 the	wretap	 yelded	 no	 crmnal	 or	 securty	 nformaton	 and	 only	
more	poltcal	ntellgence,	much	of	t	caustc.	On	17	July,	for	example,	Fbi	
agents	overheard	ethel	state	that	“the	Presdent	s	unable	to	stand	on	hs	





entered	 the	 war—n	 aprl	 1941	 lndbergh	 had	 resgned	 hs	 army	 ar	
Corps	 commsson	 as	 a	 colonel—as	 “part	 of	 the	 crookedness	 .	 .	 .	 of	 the	
Presdent.”	These	examples	are	 representatve	of	 the	 type	of	 nformaton	













47;	 confdental	 letter,	SaC	Foxworth	 to	hoover,	22	September	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–49;	
letter,	 SaC	 Foxworth	 to	hoover,	 2	October	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–50;	 confdental	 letter,	
SaC	Foxworth	 to	hoover,	 20	October	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–51;	 confdental	 letter,	 SaC	
Foxworth	 to	hoover,	18	October	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–52;	 report,	SaC	Foxworth	 to	Fbi	
hQ,	 10	 December	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–54.	 it	 s	 nterestng	 to	 note	 that	 followng	 the	
wretap’s	 dscontnuance,	 reports	 regardng	 ethel	 brgham	 were,	 n	 addton	 to	 labeled	
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	 by	1943,	Fbi	offcals’	vew	of	the	brghams	had	changed	sgnfcantly.	
by	that	date,	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventonst	crtcs	were	a	non-ssue	and	


































see	Douglas	m.	Charles,	 “informng	FDr:	Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance	and	 the	 isolatonst–




further	 demonstrated	 by	 Fbi	 offcals	 contnung	 t	 after	 Secret	 Servce	
agents	had	dsmssed	the	brgham	assassnaton	threat,	and	further	under-









of	 ts	 crtcs	as	 subversve—hoover’s	erroneous	clam	 that	amerca	Frst	
was	 lnked	 to	 the	 One	 Gun	 Club,	 for	 nstance,	 and	 that	 amerca	 Frst	
members	wanted	the	presdent	dead.
—■■■■■■■—




whch	 s	 yet	 another	 example	 of	 the	 operaton	 of	 the	 domestc	 securty	





from	a	varety	of	amercans	and	offered	 the	Fbi	access	 to	 ths	materal.	
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another	 vocal	 roosevelt	 admnstraton	 crtc	who	 receved	 specal	 Fbi	
attenton	after	 the	declaraton	of	war	was	 the	promnent	 revsonst	hs-
toran,	socologst,	crmnologst,	and	socal	crtc	harry	elmer	barnes.	a	
Columba	Unversty–educated	hstoran,	barnes	was	well	known	for	hs	
college	textbooks	World Politics in Modern Civilization	(1930),	A History of 
Western Civilization	(1937),	and	An Intellectual and Cultural History of the 
Western World	 (1937).	hs	best-known	work,	however,	was	hs	revson-




hs	 scholarly	 reputaton	made	hm	an	artculate	 and	promnent	 crtc	of	
roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy.
	 but	 why	 dd	 the	 poltcally	 lberal	 barnes—an	 early	 new	Deal	 sup-
porter—jon	wth	the	mostly	conservatve	ant-nterventonst	movement?	
The	 explanaton	 for	barnes’s	 defecton	 s	 rooted	 n	 hs	 Frst	World	War	
revsonsm,	whch	evolved	to	underpn	hs	crtcsms	of	new	Deal	dplo-
macy,	especally	n	hs	belef	that	nterventon	was	part	of	amercan	mpe-
ralsm.	he,	 therefore,	was	wllng	 to	 serve	as	a	 speaker	 for	 the	amerca	




























	 in	 February	 1936,	 barnes	 began	 to	 make	 publc	 comments	 about	
the	Fbi	 that	were	not	 n	harmony	wth	hoover’s	 carefully	 crafted	publc	
mage.	as	a	result,	the	Fbi	drector	dspatched	agents	to	montor	barnes’s	
talks.	One	 agent	 attended	 a	 talk	 barnes	 gave	 n	 Scranton,	 Pennsylvana,	








caust	dener.	See	Justce	Doenecke,	The Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941	(malabar,	Fl:	
Kreger,	1997),	22.
	 36.	roy	Turnbaugh,	“The	Fbi	and	harry	elmer	barnes:	1936–1944,”	Historian	42	(may	
1980):	 385–98.	 See	 also	roy	Turnbaugh,	 “The	Quest	 for	Truth	 and	 Justce:	harry	elmer	
barnes”	(Ph.D.	dss.,	Unversty	of	illnos,	1977).
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comment,	n	partcular,	caught	the	attenton	of	the	snoopng	agent.	barnes	
reportedly	 sad	 that	 hoover	 had	 “hoodwnked	 the	 publc	 wth	 a	 lot	 of	
cheap	publcty	 n	 the	 trackng	down	of	 a	 few	 crmnals.”	The	professor	







	 barnes’s	 crtcsm	 of	 the	 Fbi	 was	 not	 restrcted	 to	 one	 speech.	 in	
november	 1936,	 whle	 n	 St.	 lous,	 he	 agan	 crtczed	 the	 bureau	 n	 a	
fashon	smlar	 to	hs	prevous	commentary.	he	clamed	that	Fbi	agents	







bureau,	 and	 i	 feel	 that	 hs	 hand	 should	 be	 called,	 partcularly	when	 he	
by	 nnuendo	questons	our	honesty.	Therefore,	 t	 s	 suggested	 that	 some	
vgorous	 representatve	of	 the	bureau	 ntervew	barnes	 and	ask	hm	 for	
any	 nformaton	or	evdence	 that	he	has	as	 to	 the	“10,000	most	danger-
ous	crmnals	who	scorn	to	steal	less	than	$10,000	at	a	tme”	whom	“the	
Federal	 Department	 of	 Justce	 does	 not	 choose	 to	 meddle	 wth.”	 Then	




















agents	 learned	 that	 barnes	 had	 gven	 hs	 endorsement	 to	 the	magazne	
Soviet Russia Today.	agents	also	found	barnes’s	name	lsted	as	a	member	
of	 the	natonal	Commsson	 for	Defense	 of	 Poltcal	 Prsoners	 and	 as	 a	
board	member	of	People’s	lobby,	inc.	Gven	these	fndngs	and	knowledge	
that	barnes	was	connected	to	some	recent	but	unspecfed	“questonable	
actvty”	 n	Washngton,	D.C.,	 Fbi	 agents	 tred	 to	 ascertan	hs	 “present	






and	naz	mouthpece.	 Then,	 n	 July,	 another	 nformant	 accused	 hm	 of	
beng	 assocated	 wth	 “radcal	 and	 sem-radcal”	 groups	 and	 actvtes	
worldwde.	 as	 evdence,	 the	 nformant	 lsted	 barnes’s	 varous	 jobs	 and	




Fbi	 has	 been	 consultng	me	 frequently	 ths	 sprng	 about	 appontments	
to	 ther	 force.”	none	 of	 the	 varous	 charges	 leveled	 aganst	 barnes	were	
substantated,	 nor	 dd	 t	 seem	 to	matter.	 Taken	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 charges	
confrmed	for	Fbi	offcals	(and	others)	that	barnes	was	a	subversve	and,	




















who	 was	 assocated	 wth	 amerca	 Frst,	 had	 used	 barnes’s	 college	 text,	
Social Institutions,	 n	 1942.	 Snce	 the	 textbook	 was	 publshed	 after	 the	
amercan	entrance	nto	war,	and	because	t	was	crtcal	of	the	government,	
the	nformant	beleved	the	book	was	an	ndrect	attempt	to	dscredt	the	
roosevelt	 admnstraton.	as	 corroboraton,	 a	 Professor	mannhem	was	
quoted	n	reference	to	the	book	that	t	was	“obnoxous	and	.	.	.	not	the	type	
of	lterature	for	college	freshmen.”	Throughout	the	text	of	the	book	barnes	






	 barnes	 was	 not	 oblvous	 to	 the	 concerns	 voced	 n	 1942	 about	 hs	
textbook	Social Institutions.	hs	edtor	at	Prentce	hall,	S.	e.	Carll,	wrote	
barnes	and	asked	hm	to	revew	carefully	 the	statements	he	made	 n	hs	
book.	 Gven	 Carll’s	 concerns	 wth	 ths	 specfc	 book	 at	 ths	 partcular	
tme,	t	seems	lkely	that	Fbi	agents	ntervewed	or	contacted	hm	n	some	
manner.	in	any	event,	Carll	assured	barnes	that	he	dd	not	thnk	he	was	















“hypothetcal,”	 he	 confded	 that	 “strange	 thngs	 can	 happen	 n	 tmes	 of	
stress.”	moreover,	concern	wth	a	nonconformst	textbook	and	concurrent	





amercans	 to	 report	 drect	 to	 ts	 offces	 any	 suspcons	 they	 may	 have	





noted,	 he	was	not	 the	 only	 ndvdual	 the	roosevelt	 admnstraton	 tar-
geted	usng	 the	 sedton	 statutes.	 Followng	 the	amercan	 entrance	 nto	
the	Second	World	War,	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	and	Fbi	nvestgated,	
detaned,	 and	 prosecuted	 a	 number	 of	 ndvduals	 for	makng	 allegedly	
sedtous	 statements.	 accordng	 to	 assstant	 attorney	 General	Wendell	





aganst	 dsloyal	 utterance”	 because	 “passers	 of	 spurous	 con	 are	 beng	
recognzed	for	what	they	are”	and	that	ther	vews	“wll	be	rejected.”	Cvl	
lbertes	seemed	not	to	be	an	ssue	wth	berge.43





Wlson’s	polcy.	among	 those	bddle	 released,	 for	 example,	was	ells	O.	
Jones,	 who	 had	 publcly	 advocated	 mpeachng	 roosevelt	 for	 seekng	 a	
	 42.	 letter,	S.	e.	Carll,	edtor,	Prentce	hall,	to	barnes,	25	aprl	1942,	barnes	Papers,	box	
28,	ahC;	ralph	henry	Gabrel	as	quoted	n	Peter	Charles	hoffer,	Past Imperfect: Facts, Fic-





























	 by	march,	 the	 Kansas	 Cty,	mssour,	 feld	 offce	 agan	 reported	 on	
barnes	and	hs	textbook,	concludng	that	he	was	a	subversve	and	thereby	
lable	 for	 prosecuton.	 One	 “confdental	 nformant,”	 probably	 a	 profes-
sor	 at	 Kansas	Cty	Unversty,	 crtczed	 barnes	 as	 an	 academc	 because	
he	 “debunks	 and	 crtczes	 everythng	 called	 ‘amercansm.’”	 Ths	 same	
nformant,	who	beleved	barnes	was	not	a	fascst	but	“nclned	to	Socalsm	
and	Communsm,”	also	offered	 the	opnon	 that	he	was	 “a	 short	 sghted	
	 44.	 Francs	 bddle,	 In Brief Authority	 (Garden	 Cty,	 ny:	 Doubleday,	 1962),	 234–35;	
Wayne	 S.	 Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	 (lncoln:	Unversty	 of	nebraska	
Press,	1983),	533–34;	Washburn,	“FDr	versus	hs	Own	attorney	General,”	717.	On	the	var-
ous	cvl	lbertes	vews	wthn	the	Justce	Department,	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	Free Speech in 
the Good War	(new	york:	St.	martn’s	Press,	1999).
	 45.	report,	 SaC	albany	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 23	 January	 1943,	 Fbi	 100–6715–8;	 report,	 SaC	
albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	23	January	1943,	fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara;	memoran-
dum,	hoover	to	SaC	albany,	2	march	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–8.
	 46.	report,	 SaC	albany	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 23	 January	 1943,	 Fbi	 100–6715–8;	 report,	 SaC	
albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	23	January	1943,	fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
1 Chapter 
ratonalst	who	would	 go	 so	 far	 as	 anarchy;	 he	 s	 pedagogcally	 danger-
ous.”	The	nformant	agan	resurrected	the	specter	of	barnes’s	book	Social 
Justice,	commentng	that	t	was	“bad	for	students	because	t	presents	a	too	
one-sded	vewpont	and	crtczes	amercan	 deals	and	tradtons	 to	 the	
extreme.”	all	of	ths	suggested	to	Fbi	offcals	that	barnes	was	ndeed	gulty	
of	sedton	or,	possbly,	 they	took	what	 nformaton	they	developed	 rre-
spectve	of	ts	effcacy	to	servce	admnstraton	desres	for	prosecutons.47
	 Fbi	agents	were	then	dspatched	to	barnes’s	hometown	of	Cooperstown,	
new	 york,	 to	 ascertan	more	 specfc	 nformaton	 about	 hm.	 One	 Fbi	









	 by	 late	 aprl	 1943,	 wth	 the	 above	 consttutng	 Fbi	 offcals’	 accu-
mulated	nformaton	about	barnes,	Fbi	Drector	hoover	forwarded	t	 to	
Wendell	berge	for	hs	opnon	as	to	“a	volaton	of	the	Sedton	Statutes	and	
f	 you	 beleve	 further	 nvestgaton	 s	warranted.”	The	 assstant	 attorney	
general	 responded	 that	 the	 evdence	 collected	dd	not	warrant	 prosecu-
ton	 and	 he	 suggested	 that	 Fbi	 agents	 dscontnue	 ther	 probe.	hoover,	



























	 The	 followng	month	 an	Fbi	 agent	 n	albany	 arranged	 an	 ntervew	
wth	one	of	barnes’s	colleagues,	Dr.	Dxon	Fox,	a	hstoran	of	the	Unted	
States	and	presdent	of	Unon	College.	The	agent	asked	Fox	about	barnes’s	
speech	 before	 the	 new	 york	 State	 hstorcal	 assocaton—Fox	 was	 ts	





of	 the	mnorty	 n	most	dsputes”	and	 t	was	 ths	 that	best	explaned	hs	
behavor.	Ths	ntervew	was	convncng	enough	for	Fbi	offcals,	leadng	
them	to	close	the	sedton	case	aganst	barnes.51
	 The	closure	of	 the	 sedton	case	dd	not	end	Fbi	offcals’	 nterest	 n	




















n	wth	 nformaton	 that	 only	 reterated	 the	 nformaton	 culled	 from	 the	





	 Wth	 the	 feld	 offces	 reportng	 n,	hoover	 used	 the	 nformaton	 to	
ensure	 barnes	 was	 not	 apponted	 to	 the	 government	 poston.	 he	 for-
warded	to	George	Gould,	the	assstant	of	nvestgatons	at	Oem,	the	most	
derogatory	 nformaton	 collected	 on	 barnes.	 hoover	 then	 wrote	 Gould	
to	 nform	 hm	 of	 barnes’s	 crtcsm	 of	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 new	






to	 hre	 barnes,	 but	 the	 effort	was,	 n	 any	 event,	 fleetng.	hstoran	roy	
Turnbaugh,	who	has	ntmately	studed	barnes’s	lfe,	wrote	that	even	before	
hoover	had	forwarded	hs	nformaton	to	Gould,	the	prson	ndustry	hred	
barnes	 as	 a	 consultant.55	hoover’s	 acton,	 nevertheless,	 s	 demonstratve	
of	hs	 long	effort	 to	serve	the	roosevelt	Whte	house’s	poltcal	 nterests	
and	often	dong	so	wthout	promptng	 from	superors.	 it	also	shows	the	




laura	houghtalng	 ingalls	was	 a	 noted	 female	 avator	 durng	 the	 1930s	
who,	 among	 other	 unusual	 aeronautcal	 achevements,	 won	 $2,500	 n	
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and	 other	 promnent	 amerca	 Frst	members,	 ingalls	 was	 the	 only	 sg-
nfcant	member	 to	 have	 been	 prosecuted	 successfully	 for	 volatng	 the	
Foregn	agents	regstraton	act—the	law	that	Fbi	offcals	employed	tme	





ant-nterventonsts—those	 dentfed	 n	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	
and	not	radcal	frnge	groups—ingalls’s	case	stands	out	n	brght	contrast.56	







Commttee.	and	whle	 she	had	 ndeed	volated	 the	 letter	of	 the	 law—as	
stpulated	n	the	regstraton	act—her	motves	do	not	appear	to	have	been	
nsdous	nor	was	 there	 any	genune	naz	 nfluence	wthn	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee.
	 Ths	 makes	 ingalls’s	 prosecuton	 sgnfcant	 n	 two	 ways.	 Frst,	 t	
reflects	 Fbi	 offcals’	 strategy	 n	 pursung	 roosevelt’s	 promnent,	 and	
legtmate,	foregn	polcy	crtcs.	That	s,	to	develop	nformaton	that	mght	
have	led	to	a	successful	prosecuton	under	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	
act	 (among	 other	 laws),	 whch,	 n	 turn,	 would	 have	 dscredted	 ther	
opposton	efforts.	Second,	her	case	stands	out	as	 llustratve	of	 the	vew	












found	herself	wthout	 ganful	 employment	 n	 ether	 the	 arlne	 ndustry	
or	the	mltary.	ingalls	then	decded	to	wrte	hoover	askng	to	“work	for	
you	through	the	medum	of	my	arplanes	and	perhaps	serve	my	country	
as	well—somethng	 i	 long	 to	 do;	 even	 though	 i	 am	 a	woman—even	 n	
tmes	 of	 peace.”	hoover	 outrght	 rejected	 ingalls’s	 offer	 but,	 undaunted,	
she	renewed	t,	stressng	that	there	must	be	a	poston	for	a	woman	of	her	
talents.57
	 Frmly	 an	 advocate	 of	 gender-specfc	 roles,	 hoover	 frowned	 upon	
employng	 ingalls.	 The	 employment	 request,	 moreover,	 prompted	 Fbi	











	 by	 1941	 ingalls	 became	 a	 promnent	 speaker	 for	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee—she	 was	 consdered	 lndbergh’s	 female	 counterpart—lead-
ng	Fbi	offcals	to	take	a	renewed	nterest	n	her	actvtes.60	at	the	root	
of	 ther	 nterest	 was,	 unsurprsngly,	 her	 role	 as	 a	 controversal	 foregn	
polcy	 crtc.	 and	 t	 was	 durng	 the	 sprng	 and	 summer	 of	 1941	 when	











	 60.	 For	a	contemporary	vew	of	ingalls	see	mchael	Sayers	and	albert	Kahn,	Sabotage! 
The Secret War against America	(new	york:	harper’s,	1942),	209.
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to	Fbi	agents	 that	 ingalls	allegedly	beleved	 that	“Germany	 s	buldng	a	
country	[whle]	amerca	s	n	chaos.	The	Germans	have	the	best	brans	n	
the	world	and	are	the	fnest	organzers.	you	wll	be	surprsed	to	see	what	




wth	 German	 embassy	 offcals	 grew	 closer.	 ingalls	made	 arrangements	








er	 for	amerca	Frst.	her	problem	 lay	 n	 the	 fact	 that	 the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	 agreed	 only	 to	 pay	 her	 travelng	 expenses,	whch	 left	 her	 n	
fnancal	 strats	 and,	 wthout	 further	 funds,	 unable	 to	 contnue	 speak-



















wretap	and	 llegal	break-n	durng	 the	 ingalls	 nvestgaton.	a	report	 n	
her	Fbi	 fle	 states	 that	“most of the information	 n	 the	possesson	of	 the	
bureau	has	been	obtaned	from	hghly	confdental	sources	which are not 
competent evidence	 n	the	event	of	a	 tral.”	Wretaps	were	 llegal	and	any	
nformaton	obtaned	 from	one	or	 an	 llegal	 break-n	 (volatng	 	 Fourth	
amendment	 rghts),	 therefore,	were	 nadmssble	 n	 court.	addtonally,	
as	 the	 brgham	 case	 llustrates,	 Fbi	 agents	 euphemstcally	 referred	 to	





to	come	to	hs	home.	On	one	occason	he hung up the telephone during the 
conversation. . . .”	Knowledge	of	 ths	could	only	have	come	from	a	wre-
tap.66
	 Upon	the	German	declaraton	of	war	aganst	the	Unted	States	on	10	
December,	 baron	 Ulrch	 termnated	 hs	 contact	 wth	 ingalls.	 Fve	 days	
later,	hoover	nqured	wth	hs	Justce	Department	superors	as	to	whether	











for	 prosecutoral	 purposes,	 or	 used	wretap	 nformaton	 n	 the	 development	 of	 crmnal	
evdence.	Durng	the	late	1940s	ths	had	happened	wth	the	Judth	Coplon	case,	and	t	was	
deemed	frut	of	the	posonous	tree	and	not	admssble	 n	court.	See	Theohars,	Spying on 
Americans,	100–6.	emphass	added	n	quotes.
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crmnal	matter.	but	a	breakthrough	 n	 the	case	was	made	after	 ingalls’s	

















to	 her	 prosecutors,	 ingalls	 was	 a	 Ffth	 Columnst	 who	 had	 “used	 her	
prestge	aganst	 the	amercan	people	to	dsunte	them	at	the	pad	drec-














	 68.	memorandum,	 ladd	 to	hoover,	 19	December	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–34712–98;	memo-
randum,	m.	nel	andrews	 to	Wendell	berge,	19	December	1941,	 fle	146–6–162,	rG	60,	
nara.
	 69.	 indctment,	United States v. Laura Ingalls,	23	December	1941,	Washngton,	DC,	Fle	
146–6–162,	rG	60,	nara;	“mss	ingalls	Gets	Prson	Sentence,”	New York Times,	21	Febru-





volated	 ingalls’s	 Fourth	amendment	 rghts	 n	 order	 to	 gather	 evdence	
aganst	her.	Wthout	a	warrant,	Fbi	agents	had	used	a	thrd	party—mrs.	
ralph	revlo—who	was	lookng	after	ingalls’s	los	angeles	resdence	whle	














members,	 especally	 those	who	 could	 be	 lnked	 to	 ingalls.	 The	 head	 of	
the	 Fbi’s	 Washngton,	 D.C.,	 feld	 offce	 nformed	 hs	 superors	 that	 a	
warranted	 search	 of	 ingalls’s	 Dstrct	 of	 Columba	 apartment	 produced	
a	lst	of	amerca	Frst	members,	speakers,	and	speakng	dates.	The	agent	
also	relayed	that	the	lst	was	beng	retaned	snce	those	on	t	“are	beleved	
to	 be	 proper	 subjects	 for	 nvestgaton.”	moreover,	 n	 the	 event	 that	 the	
bureau	 pursued	 amerca	 Frst,	 the	 nformaton	 obtaned	 “would	 be	 of	
consderable	value.”	hoover	then	ordered	ths	nformaton	to	be	ncluded	
n	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	summary	report,	and	t	appeared	when,	
popularly,	 t	 was	 beleved	 the	 commttee	 planned	 to	 reenter	 amercan	
poltcs.71




laura	 ingalls	 case,	m.	nel	andrews,	 16	 February	 1942,	 Fle	 146–6–162,	rG	 60,	nara;	
“mss	ingalls	Says	Fbi	rejected	her,”	New York Times,	12	February	1942,	23.
	 70.	 ibd.;	“ingalls	Jury	Gves	verdct	of	Gulty,”	New York Times,	14	February	1942.
	 71.	 letter,	SaC	Washngton,	DC	to	hoover,	11	march	1942,	Fbi	100–34712–175;	letter,	
hoover	to	SaC	Washngton,	DC,	26	march	1942,	Fbi	100–34712–175.
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that	 she	 was	 a	 “conscous”	 agent.72	 even	 so,	 as	 a	 member	 and	 popular	
speaker	 for	amerca	Frst—she	made	over	 ffty	 speeches	 from	 the	 sum-
mer	of	1941	untl	Pearl	harbor—ingalls’s	prosecuton	was	atypcal.	most	
amerca	Frst	members	dd	not	assocate	wth	German	offcals,	let	alone	
accept	money	 from	 them.	 but	 ingalls’s	 case,	 to	 Fbi	 offcals,	 seemed	 to	
typfy	the	nherent	nature	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	by	1942.	and	
the	case	seemed	to	prove	that	hoover’s	tactcs	aganst	such	foregn	polcy	








The	 brgham,	 barnes,	 and	 ingalls	 cases	 llustrate	 the	 evoluton	 of	 the	
domestc	securty	state	from	an	evolvng	poltcal	arm	of	the	Whte	house	
before	 Pearl	 harbor	 to	 an	 even	 more	 aggressve	 and	 semautonomous	
agency	 after	 the	 declaraton	 of	 war.	 late	 n	 1941	 Fbi	 offcals	 obtaned	
authorzaton	for	a	wretap	of	brgham,	and	by	1942—wth	the	country	at	







ton.	Fnally,	 the	 ingalls	 case	 llustrates	 an	Fbi	 strategy	 sought	 tme	and	
agan	aganst	polcy	crtcs:	to	lnk	them	to	foregn	governments	and	pros-





	 72.	 “mss	ingalls	Gets	Prson	Sentence,”	New York Times,	21	February	1942,	1.
a	close	 examnaton	of	 the	 Fbi’s	 survellance	 of	Charles	 lndbergh;	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee;	Senators	burton	Wheeler,	Gerald	nye,	and	Davd	
Walsh;	 Congressman	 hamlton	 Fsh;	 those	 assocated	 wth	 the	 vctory	
Program	 nvestgaton;	 the	 brgham	 famly;	harry	 elmer	 barnes;	 laura	
ingalls;	and	others	confrms	the	underlyng	poltcal	nature	of	Fbi	offcals’	
efforts.	Fbi	Drector	J.	edgar	hoover	sought	 n	each	nstance	to	cater	to	
the	 roosevelt	 admnstraton’s	 poltcal	 and	 polcy	 nterests—that	 beng	














where	 Fbi	 offcals	 focused	 exclusvely	 on	 ant-nterventonst	 crtcs	 to	
satsfy	the	desres	of	some	hgh-level	admnstraton	offcals	to	hold	them	
responsble	and	to	dscredt	ther	arguments.
	 Fbi	 survellance	 efforts	 aganst	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	 were	 wde-
spread,	 thorough,	 and	 responsve	 to	 roosevelt’s	 poltcal	 nterests.	 Fbi	




mal	 covers,	 offcal	 nvestgatons;	 perused	 organzatons’	 prvate	 fles;	
collected	 derogatory	 ntellgence;	 provded	 publc	 opnon	 leaders	 wth	
Fbi-obtaned	poltcal	ntellgence	(usng	blnd	memoranda);	lkely	lased	
wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 about	 the	 ant-nterventonsts;	 and	 sought	 to	
develop	cases	aganst	them	that	would	have	dscredted	ther	efforts	n	the	




	 The	 Fbi’s	 survellance	was	 not	 lmted	 or	 “never	 sgnfcantly	mob-
lzed”	and	Presdent	roosevelt’s	purposes	were	also	not	“essentally	benev-
olent,”	as	prevous	studes	 ndcated.1	 instead,	 they	reflected	an	 ntensve	
Fbi	nvestgatve	effort	and	a	callous	dsregard	by	hoover	and	roosevelt	
for	 hs	 legtmate	 poltcal	 opponents’	 cvl	 lbertes.	 more	 specfcally,	
one	can	chart	the	Fbi’s	efforts	wth	the	ntensfcaton	of	the	foregn	pol-
cy	debate.	Durng	1939	and	1940,	Fbi	agents	passvely	montored	ant-	
nterventonst	 neutralty	 advocaton.	 Durng	 the	 frst	 half	 of	 1941	 and	
the	lend-lease	debate,	that	survellance	markedly	ntensfed	when	crtcs	
drectly	crtczed	the	presdent’s	polces,	ncludng	Fbi	efforts	to	develop	
nformaton	 that	 had	 the	 potental	 to	 dscredt	 lndbergh	 and	amerca	
Frst.	but	durng	 the	 second	half	of	1941,	when	 the	Great	Debate	dead-






lash	whle	 few	amercans	dared	 crtque	 government	 acton	 to	preserve	
securty.
	 Taken	as	a	whole,	Fbi	survellance	durng	ths	perod	reveals	a	smlar	
pattern	 of	 behavor	 that	 occurred	 durng	 the	Cold	War	 (.e.,	 the	 use	 of	





	 1.	Charles	 F.	 Croog,	 “Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst–interventonst	






	 in	 return	 for	 satsfyng	 varous	 admnstraton	 poltcal	 nterests,	
hoover,	an	archconservatve	n	a	lberal	admnstraton,	not	only	preserved	
hs	 bureaucratc	 poston	 as	 Fbi	 drector	 but	 also	 obtaned	 over	 tme	
ncreased	 authorty	 for	 hs	 bureau.	When	 attorney	 General	 Cummngs	
sought	 to	publcze	 the	crme	 ssue	durng	 the	early	new	Deal	 to	ensure	







the	onset	of	 the	european	War,	 n	1940,	roosevelt	 further	 ncreased	Fbi	
nvestgatve	authorty	by	secretly	authorzng	the	use	of	llegal	wretaps	n	
natonal	defense	cases.	hoover	subsequently	exploted	ths	executve	drec-
tve	 to	develop	a	not	 nsgnfcant	 level	of	 nvestgatve	autonomy	 for	hs	
Fbi	when	 the	attorney	general	 showed	dsnterest	 n	montorng	wretap	






cy’s	 annual	 appropratons	datng	 from	1934	 further	 alludes	 to	hoover’s	
success	n	developng	hs	Fbi	durng	ths	perod.	in	1934	the	Fbi	employed	
391	 agents	 and	 a	 support	 staff	 of	 451	 and	was	 approprated	 $2,589,500.	
by	1936,	the	year	roosevelt	ncreased	Fbi	nvestgatve	authorty	to	have	
t	 focus	 on	 ntellgence	 nvestgatons,	 the	 bureau	 had	 nearly	 doubled	









The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide	(Phoenx,	aZ:	Oryx	Press,	1999),	4–5.
15Conclusion
the	embryonc	orgns	of	the	nsttutonal	sde	of	the	later	natonal	secu-
rty	 state.	a	hallmark	of	 the	Second	World	War,	Cold	War,	 and	War	on	





Securty	Coordnaton,	 both	 sought	 smlar	 goals	 n	 regard	 to	 Presdent	
roosevelt’s	 ant-nterventonst	 foregn	 polcy	 crtcs.	 Together,	 wth	 the	






credt	 them,	 t	 nevertheless	 created	 a	 certan	 chllng	 effect.	 lndbergh	
beleved	that	the	Fbi	had	wretapped	hs	telephone	and,	ndeed,	Fbi	agents	
collected	 nformaton	 about	 the	 avator	 ndrectly	 from	 an	 llegal	 wre-
tap	and	shared	 t	wth	 the	Whte	house	and	 the	 federal	prosecutor	who	
was	 to	 queston,	 and	 perhaps	 dscredt,	 lndbergh	 before	 a	 grand	 jury.3	








the	 admnstraton	 from	a	wretap	on	Grunewald.	 John	T.	 Flynn,	 of	 the	
new	 york	 branch	 of	 amerca	 Frst,	moreover,	 feared	hoover’s	 Fbi	 was	
akn	 to	 the	 Gestapo,	 and	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 perodcal	Uncensored	
accused	the	Fbi	of	montorng	legslators.4










	 roosevelt	 and	 senor	 admnstraton	offcals	 found	hoover’s	 reports	
to	 be	 valuable.	after	 recevng	 the	 frst	 of	hoover’s	 poltcal	 ntellgence	
reports	n	1940,	roosevelt	thanked	the	Fbi	drector	n	a	personal	letter.	by	
late	1941,	when	the	Great	Debate	became	stalemated	over	neutralty	rev-
son,	roosevelt	drected	 the	attorney	general	 to	have	 the	Fbi	 nvestgate	
the	money	sources	behnd	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	n	the	hopes	that	
a	grand	jury	probe	would	end	the	mpasse.	Senor	admnstraton	offcals	
also	pressed	 for	 an	Fbi	 nvestgaton	of	 ant-nterventonsts	 n	order	 to	
hold	 them	responsble	 for	 the	vctory	Program	 leak.	but	most	unsubtle	
was	 interor	 Secretary	 ickes’s	 use	 of	 Fbi	 nformaton—whch	 had	 been	
developed	unbeknownst	to	hm	partly	through	an	llegal	wretap—n	hs	
crtcal	 book	 manuscrpt	 on	 lndbergh.	 Clearly,	 senor	 admnstraton	
offcals	 found	hoover’s	 reports	 tantalzng	and,	 n	 some	 nstances,	used	
ths	nformaton.
	 Ths	 study,	 therefore,	 complements	 the	work	of	 hstorans	who	have	
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